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This work accesses the nature of and level of safety culture in the academic research 
community at Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College (LSU).   After 
serious chemical related accidents in academic research laboratories the National Academies of 
Science has made recommendations to improve safety within academic research by encouraging 
researchers to go beyond simple compliance with regulations and work toward fostering a strong, 
positive safety culture.  The term, “safety culture” is used to describe workplace safety in various 
efforts to improve it.   Researchers have studied these concepts from technical, social, and 
psychological viewpoints leading to the general consensus that a positive safety culture improves 
job safety. The concept of safety culture utilizes the concepts of organization theory that is directly 
related to safety such as safety attitude, values, and behavior.  The safety attitude, values, and 
behavior at LSU are analyzed in reference to current thinking regarding safety culture.   
A quantitative survey of the safety climate at LSU is presented to provide insight regarding 
the level of safety culture.  The relative value of the safety climate at LSU was found to be 3.72 
on a scale of 5 which is comparable to the published values of other universities and considered to 
be good.  A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of a linear model for safety culture model based 
on inputs of safety climate, safety attitudes, and safety behaviors. CFA is a technique used in 
structural equation modeling (SEM) to determine if a certain model is valid. The goodness of fit 
values indicated that the model’s overall structure of the culture model provided a reasonable fit 
of the data and confirmed the conceptual model. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this work is to access the nature of and level of safety culture in the 
academic research community at Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical 
College (LSU).   Across the nation, several serious chemical related accidents in academic research 
laboratories have generated discussion regarding methodologies that researchers can utilize to 
improve safety in academic laboratories. A recent report from the National Academies of Science 
has made recommendations to improve safety within academic research by encouraging 
researchers to go beyond simple compliance with regulations and work toward fostering a strong, 
positive safety culture. The NRC report defines “safety culture as an organization’s shared values, 
assumptions, and beliefs specific to workplace safety”.  Universities must integrate safety as an 
essential element in the daily work of laboratory researchers and strive toward a constant 
commitment to safety (NRC 2014).   
The renowned agricultural chemist and teacher, Justus von Liebig (1803-1873), was quoted 
in an 1890 address by August Kekulé as saying that “you have to ruin your health to get anywhere 
in chemistry” (Purchase 1994).   Although researchers of von Liebig’s day may have sacrificed 
their health for science, work conditions for the modern researchers have greatly improved thanks 
to increased safety awareness and technological advances in exposure control. Universities provide 
basic engineering controls, such as fume hoods and biological safety cabinets, to reduce 
researchers’ levels of exposure, while the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
rules requires education of laboratory personnel in exposure control (OSHA 1990).   Regulatory 
requirements often drive safety initiatives at most universities and most universities are still in the 
command and control mode practiced by the Environmental Protection Agency in the 1970’s.  A 
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majority of universities do not have the same level of laboratory safety rules as required for 
industry (Backus at el.).     For example, use of reactive chemical reviews and standard operating 
procedures are basic safety requirements in industry, however, these basic chemical safety tools 
are often unused at the university level.  Instead, the level and enforcement of safety requirements 
are at the discretion of the principal investigator in academic laboratories.   The general consensus 
is that this relaxed approach toward safety makes academic laboratories more dangerous than those 
in industry (Peplow & Marris).      
The terms, “safety climate” and “safety culture”, are used to describe workplace safety in 
various efforts to improve it.   Researchers have studied these concepts from technical, social, and 
psychological viewpoints leading to the general consensus that a positive safety culture improves 
job safety and a safety climate survey can be used as a metric to assess safety performance.  The 
concepts of safety climate and culture utilize the basic concepts of organization theory that is 
directly related to safety such as safety attitude, values, and behavior (Reiman).   The definitions 
of both safety climate and culture tend to be global in nature and ill-defined.  The relationship 
between the two is unclear but even so, safety culture is an established key concept and a beloved 
buzz word of safety professionals. 
Literature reviews of existing safety culture models conclude that most of the definitions 
of safety culture are very similar and the differences focus on the way people think and/or behave 
in relationship to safety (Guldenmund 2000/Choudhry).  The concept is holistic in nature and 
safety culture is something an organization ‘is’ rather than something an organization ‘has’ 
(Reason 1998).    Safety culture results from a combination of positive attitudes, good management 
practices established by organizations, and assigning the highest priority to safety. However, it is 
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difficult to quantify (Choudhry 2007).  Aside from general consensus that a positive safety culture 
is necessary for safe work conditions, there is neither an accepted model for safety culture nor a 
clear-cut definition.  
 In practice, researchers tend to use safety culture and safety climate interchangeably.  
Safety climate studies often focus on the way that people perceive safety without addressing the 
actual attitudes or behavioral aspects of safety.  Safety climate should not be viewed as an 
alternative or synonym to safety culture.  Rather, safety climate is an aspect of safety culture and 
it is dependent on the overall prevailing safety culture (Gadd, 2002).    Put simply, safety climate 
can be considered as a “snapshot” view of the organizations safety culture. Safety climate is 
measured via semi-quantitate method using questionnaires (Zohar, 2010).     
While safety climate can be measured, safety culture is an abstract concept that considers 
safety in a holistic manner.  Most models for improvement of safety culture have been qualitative 
in nature and consider safety culture as being the end achievement of various inputs such as 
attitude, behavior, shared beliefs, training, communications, management support, and leadership.  
While these studies offer goals to promote a better safety culture, they do not offer a straight 
forward manual of “How to Improve”.  However, the Association of Public and Land‑grant 
Universities (APLU) recently published a report that provides a clear-cut methodology to improve 
safety culture (APLU). 
Figure 1 presents an onion model of safety culture to demonstrate its complexity.   Safety 
Culture is at the center of concentric circles of actions, attitudes, and behaviors that have influence 
an organization’s overall safety.  The outer layer provides the fundamental cornerstones of any 
organizational culture system.  There needs to be strong support on the level of policy and the 
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related policy documents must provide the underlying principles of the organization.  Without 
strong management support these policies will not be acted upon and the culture is weak.  
Individual commitment to safety is required for these policies to have meaning and effect. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, leadership provides the direction support the whole system. Without 
these, the process of improving safety culture cannot succeed. 
  
Figure 1.1.  Safety Culture Inputs  
The second layer of the onion model is comprised of action items that can aid in 
strengthening safety culture.  The development of safety systems and institutional support provide 
the processes that improve safety.  A positive attitude helps in promoting safety and staying 
involved in it.  Incident learning and training provides employees and supervisors with the 
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necessary knowledge to improve. Altogether, these actions items are tied by honest 
communications within the group.   
The third layer takes into account the psychological aspects that help build the culture of 
the organization.  Every organization has institutional knowledge, shared values, and behavioral 
norms that determine how the overall system operates. Every employee has basic beliefs and 
attitudes that shape their personal behavior and their part in a safety culture.  These factors merge 
together to form the safety culture of academic labs, including those at LSU.   If the overall goal 
is to improve safety culture at LSU, then it is necessary to improve safety attitudes and behaviors 
using the action tools that are available. In this study, aspects of the onion model are reviewed to 
determine the overall status of safety culture at LSU. 
1.1. Thesis Overview 
Chapter two presents the general background information to understand the nature of safety 
culture at LSU.  LSU is the flagship university and the major educational and research center for 
the state of Louisiana.  It is a major research center with several hundred research laboratories and 
research expenditures in 2013-14 at $144 million (LSU). The biological, chemical and physical 
hazards found in a research laboratory are detailed to stress the potential for an exposure to a 
laboratory worker.  While all hazards are reviewed, the primary focus is on chemistry.  Simply 
because chemists are leading the effort to improve safety culture (Bertozz). The engineering, 
administrative, and personal controls used at LSU to prevent employee exposures are reviewed.  
Universities are required to comply with state and federal regulations.  While safety culture is a 
holistic goal, the impact of government regulations drives most aspects of LSU’s safety program.   
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Chapter three examines the events that initiated the current level of concern to improve 
safety culture.  The Laboratory Safety Institute maintains a memorial which lists all the known 
laboratory accidents that resulted in death for the last hundred years.  Over 50 researchers have 
died in lab accidents around the world since 1990 (LSI). The first incident in the United States to 
draw national attention to lab safety was the death of Dartmouth researcher, Karen Wetter Hahn 
(NRC 2014).    A qualified researcher working in her field of expertise was exposed to a dimethyl 
mercury.  She was wearing improper gloves for the task at hand and died after 18 months due to 
mercury poisoning.    
In 2008, a researcher at University of California at Los Angles (UCLA) died as the results 
of an accident that involved the use of pyrophoric compound.  While the internal UCLA 
investigation was closed, CAL/OSHA cited UCLA for safety violations and fined them $30,000.  
At the insistence of the researcher’s family, civil and criminal charges were brought again the 
principle investor (PI) and UCLA.  After years of legal battle, UCLA settled and the PI was fined 
and given community service.  This case is important because an individual PI was held 
accountable for an accident and the settlement resulted in a new level of safety requirements for 
the UC system (Torrice 2014).     
A lab was destroyed and a graduate student was injured in an explosion at Texas Tech 
University in 2010.  The student was scaling up an explosive compound when it detonated.  This 
incident is significant because it was the first time that an academic accident was investigated by 
the Chemical Safety Board (CBS).  The CBS is a federally mandated organization whose mission  
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is to investigate chemical accidents.  The investigation standards used in industry were applied and 
deficiencies were found from the lab worker all the way to the upper management of the university 
(CSB).       
In 2016, another significate incident occurred at the University of Hawaii (UH) when a 
tank containing hydrogen exploded injuring a lab worker.  The University of California Center for 
Laboratory Safety (CLS) was contracted to investigate the incident as an independent third party 
reviewer.  The CLS issued a detailed technical report concerning the explosion and the immediate 
cause. The immediate cause of the accident was the ignition of a hydrogen and oxygen gas mixture 
contained within pressure tank by a static charge (CLS/Tech). Recommendations to improve 
research safety operations were made in a second report (CLS/Rec).    Known historical laboratory 
incidents at LSU are reviewed (EHS).    The LSU incident at Choppin Hall is compared to the UH 
incident using the CLS recommendation report as a templet to consider potential risks for LSU.   
Chapter four takes a deeper look at safety culture and safety climate in terms of 
organization theory.  Organization climate is commonly considered as the generalized perceptions 
about the organization’s items of concern.  Organizational culture tends to reflect how people 
behave, how things are done, and the underlying values and beliefs of the organization (Ali at el.).    
The perception of the resulting attitudes and behavior help to establish the culture of the 
organization.  Personal, team, and institution attitudes are considered as the primary components 
that influence a person’s attitude about safety (Cheyne).   Situational behaviors are also a 
component of the safety culture of an organization.  Planning, practice, and negligence are 
considered as the primary components of safe behavior in a research laboratory (Jorgensen).   The 
relationships between safety culture, climate, attitudes, and behaviors can be complex and 
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confusing but the concepts are useful tools for understanding the dynamics of institutional culture 
and to foster organization improvement (Peterson and Spencer).  
Chapter five reviews the general structure of academic research in terms of the systemic 
impact of safety culture.   Every university is different, but many universities, including LSU, 
places the primary responsibility of laboratory safety on the PI.   The PI generally has significant 
authority in the determination of safety policy for the laboratory (Backus at el.). Research 
conducted by PI’s are usually conducted in an autonomous manner with minimal administrative 
oversight.  The expected duties of research faculty have exponentially increased.  In addition, the 
primary mission of research, the PI is expected to write grants, mentor students, teach, administrate 
those grants, and serve on various committees.  It is not surprising that the typical researcher sees 
safety as just another troublesome requirement that distracts from their real work (Kroll 2013).  
In 2012, the American Chemical Society (ACS) issued a significant report on improving 
the culture of laboratory safety, Creating Safety Cultures in Academic Institutions.  The report 
recognizes that most scientific researchers do not have strong safety skills and calls for changes in 
the academic safety educational process to promote and improve safety culture.  This report 
identifies the best practices of a good safety culture and provides specific recommendations to 
strengthen their safety culture (ACS, 2012).   The National Research Council (NRC) published 
Safe Science: Promoting a Culture of Safety in Academic Chemical Research in 2014.  Due to the 
number of significant events in laboratories, the NRC was asked to look at instilling stronger safety 
practices in chemical research.  A distinguished panel reviewed the ideas and methodologies of 
safety culture from the industrial and academic sectors and made recommendations for making 
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laboratory science safer.  The goal of the project was to move chemical research beyond simple 
compliance to the adoption of a culture of safety in academic laboratories (NRC 2014).  
A task force formed by the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (APUL) 
utilized both of the reports above and additional sources to produce a roadmap for universities to 
enhance safety culture, A Guide to Implementing a Safety Culture in Our Universities. The 
guidance document that provides recommendations and guidance on the most appropriate 
strategies in a clear and concise bullet point format.   Each facet of the university from the president 
down to student body have clearly defined action items and responsibilities to improve safety 
culture.  Additionally, the APUL directly contacted the leadership of all its member universities 
and called on them to implement the recommendations to improve laboratory safety (APUL).  
Chapter six provides the results of a quantitative survey of the safety climate at LSU, which 
may also provide insight regarding the level of safety culture. The data set for this exercise utilized 
a laboratory safety survey preformed in 2011 originally designed with the purpose of supporting a 
Hazard Mitigation Plan. The survey provides a measure of perceptions of laboratory safety among 
university personnel.  The data was collected via individual interviews and statistically analyzed.  
The relative value of the safety climate at LSU was found to be 3.72 on a scale of 5. This value is 
comparable to the published values of other universities and considered to be good (Steward at 
el.).  
Chapter seven presents the results of a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of a linear model 
for safety culture. CFA is a technique used in structural equation modeling (SEM) which utilizes 
cross-sectional statistical modeling techniques that includes factor analysis, path analysis and 
regression analysis.  CFA is used to determine if a certain model is valid (O’Rourke & Hatcher). 
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A linear model of safety culture is proposed based on inputs of safety climate, safety attitudes, and 
safety behaviors (Figure 1.2).   Data to confirm the model was based on an electronic survey that 
was sent to 1000 research personnel consisting of LSU faculty, research staff, and graduate 
students.   
 
Figure 1.2. Safety Culture Conceptual Model 
Approximately 300 responded and the data was tabulated and statically analyzed using structural 
equation modeling techniques.  A linear model for Safety Culture at LSU was compared to the 
conceptual model using PRO CALIS in SAS 9.4.  The Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR) 
of the model is 0.053.  The Bentler Comparative Fit Index is 0.895.  Root Mean Residual (RMR) 
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is 0.058.   The goodness of fit values indicate that the model’s overall structure of the culture model 
provides a reasonable fit of the data and confirms the conceptacle model. 
In the conclusion section, the overall safety program and level of safety culture at LSU is 
summarized and evaluated. The existing lab safety program at LSU is reviewed in comparison to 
the APUL recommendations that help define safety culture.  In general, the perception of LSU 
personnel is that the safety culture is good.  However, that perception can easily and quickly change 
with one incident.  
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CHAPTER 2.  HAZARDS AND APPLICABLE REGULATIONS 
2.1. University Background 
Louisiana State University is the flagship institution of the state of Louisiana.  The 
university is located on more than 2,000 acres in the southern part of Baton Rouge on the east bank 
of the Mississippi River. The main part of the campus contains over 250 principal buildings 
grouped on a 650-acre plateau.  In 2011, this university enrolled nearly 24,000 under-graduate and 
over 5,000 graduate students in 14 schools and colleges. The university has over 6,000 full-time 
and 9,000 part-time employees which include over 1,400 faculty members. The university is 
designated as a land-grant, sea-grant, and space-grant institution (LSU). The Office of 
Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) has a staff of ten safety professionals that provides 
regulatory compliance assistance, training programs, program development and implementation, 
technical support, inspections, and emergency response services for the Baton Rouge campus of 
Louisiana State University.  
The primary goals of a university are to promote educational learning and research.  LSU 
consistently ranks among the top 30 universities in total federal, state and private expenditures.  
LSU’s instructional programs include 193 under-graduate and graduate professional degrees.  In 
addition to the colleges, schools, centers for advanced study, and specialized units headquartered 
at this university, various state and federal governmental agencies maintain offices and laboratories 
on campus.  At any given time, more than 1,200 sponsored research projects are in progress.  
Faculty, staff members, and graduate students also pursue numerous research projects that are not 
funded by outside agencies.  Research expenditures at LSU in 2013-14 were $144 million. LSU’s 
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awarded grants and contracts from federal, state, and private sources provide a significant boost to 
the Louisiana economy (LSU).  
2.2.  Hazards in Laboratories 
University research laboratories are unique workplaces due to the number and type of 
potential hazards.  Commonly university laboratories harbor the potential for acute and chronic 
exposure to a wide range of toxic agents.   Every major university has the potential to utilize 
biological, chemical, mechanical, electrical, physical, and radiological agents in research settings 
(Prudent 2011).  
2.2.1.  Biological Hazards 
Biological agents can pose a threat to workers and the general population depending on 
their potency and mechanism of release.  Since the initial printing in 1984, Biosafety in 
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) has become the minimum standard of 
practice for biosafety.  The BMBL addresses the safe handling and containment of infectious 
microorganisms and hazardous biological materials.  Biological agents such as bacteria and fungi 
are living organisms while as viruses and prions are non-living biological agents.  Toxins produced 
by biological agents are also items of concern.  Through a risk based assessment process, biological 
agents are assigned to Biosafety Levels 1 through 4 with specific handling procedures and controls 
for each biosafety levels (BMBL 2009).  
Modern biological research has grown exponentially in the last thirty years and is highly 
regulated in certain areas. Creation or research with biological agents that include recombinant 
DNA or synthetic nucleic acid molecules require additional scrutiny and handling procedures.  
Detailed safety practices, containment procedures, and training requirements are found in the 
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National Institute Health (NIH) Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic 
Nucleic Acid Molecules.  To insure compliance with the NIH Guidelines, all applicable institutions 
are required to establish an Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) to review and approve 
protocols for working with Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules, Pathogens, 
potential Infectious Agents, Biological Toxins, and Human Clinical Trials (NIH 2016).  Biological 
Safety Committee’s look at all levels of biological projects to ensure safe protocols. The Inter-
Institutional Biological Recombinant DNA Safety Committee (IBRDSC) serves this function for 
both LSU and Agricultural Center (IBRDSC).  
Working with laboratory animals also pose numerous safety issues.  Any biological agent, 
hazardous chemical, radiation source that has a potential to impact the animal also has the potential 
to impact the corresponding laboratory worker.  Another risk is the fact that sometimes the animals 
spit, kick, scratch, or bite the handler.  Institutions that work with animals and receive Federal 
funding must establish an Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) to review and 
approve protocols for all research-related animal work (NRC 2009). The mission of the LSU 
IACUC is to review teaching and research protocols to ensure the humane treatment of the animals 
and the safety of the research (IACUC).  
2.2.2. Chemical Hazards 
Chemicals have inherent physical, chemical and toxicological properties that require 
laboratory personnel to have a good understanding of the related health and safety hazards. The 
main types of chemical hazards include flammability, corrosively, reactivity/ instability, 
gases/cryogenic liquids, and toxicity.  Laboratory personnel must understand the major hazard 
classes of chemicals, the types of toxicity, and recognize the potential routes of exposure. The most 
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important single generalization regarding laboratory research is to treat all compounds as 
potentially harmful, and work with them under conditions to minimize exposure by skin contact 
and inhalation (Prudent).  
Flammable materials are simply materials that burn readily and are found in almost every 
research lab as some form of solvent or reactant.  Flammable and combustible liquids are classified 
according to their flash point, with flammable liquids having a flash point of less than 100 °F and 
combustible liquids having a flash point between 100-200 °F. Both flammable and combustible 
liquids are considered fire hazards.  Care must be taken during laboratory work to prevent ignition 
of flammable materials (CHP).  
Corrosive chemicals are those which can cause damage to living tissue at the site of contact 
by chemical reaction.  Major classes of corrosive substances include strong acids (e.g., sulfuric, 
nitric, hydrochloric, and hydrofluoric acids), strong bases (sodium hydroxide, potassium 
hydroxide, and ammonium hydroxide), dehydrating agents (sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide, 
phosphorus pentoxide, and calcium oxide), and oxidizing agents (hydrogen peroxide, chlorine, and 
bromine).  Corrosive substances pose a danger not only to skin and eyes, but also to respiratory 
tracts and sometimes to digestive tracts. Corrosive chemicals also have the potential to corrode 
other materials which might result in failure of a piece of equipment (CHP). 
Highly reactive materials are those that have the potential to vigorously polymerize, 
decompose, condense, or become self-reactive under conditions of shock, pressure, temperature, 
light, or contact with another material.  Anytime there is a runaway reaction there is a potential for 
an explosion. Compounds that contain high energy bonds such as azides, organic nitrates, nitro 
compounds, azo compounds, perchlorates, and peroxides that can violently destabilize when 
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exposed to light, mechanical shock, heat, or catalysts.  Reactive metals such as sodium, lithium 
and potassium react with water or alcohols to produce flammable hydrogen gas.  Air-reactive 
chemicals are also called pyrophorics; they react with oxygen or water in the air immediately upon 
exposure and ignite, sometimes violently.  Organometallic reagents are often used in reactions that 
produce flammables as products or are carried out in flammable solvents and require special 
attention (CHP).  
Oxidizing agents are chemicals that can remove electrons from other compounds often 
resulting in a violent reaction when they come in contact with reducing materials, trace metals, 
and sometimes ordinary combustibles. These compounds include the halogens, oxyhalogens, 
peroxyhalogens, permanganates, nitrates, chromates, and persulfates, as well as peroxides.  
Organic peroxides are a special class of compounds with unusually low stability and are among 
the most hazardous substances found in a laboratory.  Common solvents, such as diethyl ether and 
tetrahydrofuran, can form peroxides on exposure to oxygen in air and become concentrated as the 
solvent evaporates.   Although they are low-power explosives, they are hazardous because of their 
extreme sensitivity to shock, sparks, and other forms of accidental detonation.  Any sample of a 
highly reactive material may be dangerous. The greatest risk is due to the remarkably high rate of 
a detonation reaction rather than the total energy released. A high-order explosion of even 
milligram quantities can drive small fragments of glass or other matter deep into the body. It is 
important to use even minimum amounts of hazardous materials with adequate shielding and 
personal protection (CHP).  
A compressed gas is defined as a material in a container with an absolute pressure greater 
than 40 psi at 21 °C and cylinder of compressed gas are common laboratory supplies.  Along with 
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the hazard associated with the high pressure, the compressed gas retains any hazard associated 
with the material in its gaseous form (CHP).  The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has 
established codes that specify the materials to be used for the construction and the capacities, test 
procedures, and service pressures of the cylinders in which compressed gases are transported.  The 
Compressed Gas Institute has published a useful guide to safe handling and storage procedures for 
compressed gases (OSHA 1965). Cylinders must be restrained or secured from tipping or falling 
to prevent damage to the valve.  Damaged valves may fail, resulting in catastrophic release of 
energy. (Prudent) Storage and use of flammable gases, like acetylene or hydrogen, are strictly 
regulated by local fire authorities (OSHA 1965).  
Cryogenic liquids are agents or processes that deal with very low temperatures and are 
defined as materials with boiling points of less than −130 °F to differentiate them from standard 
refrigeration processes. Cryogens are often used in cold traps to condense volatile vapors from a 
gas stream and storage of biological samples.  Cryogenic conditions are often achieved by using 
liquefied gases, particularly liquid nitrogen and helium.  Rapid vaporization of cryogenic can 
displace oxygen from the atmosphere and asphyxiate lab personal. Cryogens have the ability to 
liquefy other gases, including oxygen and air, which can present addition hazards.  The primary 
hazards of cryogenic liquids are frostbite, asphyxiation, fire or explosion, pressure buildup (either 
slowly or due to rapid conversion of the liquid to the gaseous state), and embrittlement of structural 
materials (CHP). 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Laboratory Standard defines 
a hazardous chemical as a chemical for which there is statistically significant scientific evidence 
that acute or chronic health effects may occur in exposed personnel. The term 'health hazard' 
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includes chemicals which are corrosive, carcinogens, toxic or highly toxic agents, reproductive 
toxins, irritants, sensitizers, and agents which damage specific organs (OSHA 1990).  
Carcinogens are chemicals which are or may be associated with the development of 
carcinoma in humans.  Generally, they are chronically toxic substances which cause damage after 
repeated or long-duration exposure. Their effects may only become evident after a long latency 
period and are particularly insidious because they may have no immediate apparent harmful effects 
(Prudent). Numerous national and international agencies issue lists of known or suspected human 
carcinogens. The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) uses a classification system 
which divides agents into one of five groups. Group 1 agents are definitely carcinogenic to humans; 
Group 2A agents are probably carcinogenic to humans; Group 28 agents are possibly carcinogenic 
to humans; Group 3 agents cannot be classifiable as to carcinogenicity; and Group 4 agents are 
probably not carcinogenic to humans (Boyle & Levin, 2008). Whereas, the National Toxicology 
Program (U.S. Public Health Service) issues a biennial report to Congress with a classification 
system that uses only two groups: agents which are known to be human carcinogens, and agents 
which are reasonably anticipated to be human carcinogens (NTP).  Not to succumb to logical 
chemical classification, one can refer to California’s Proposition 65 which lists numerous 
chemicals believed by the state of California to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity regardless of 
scientific evidence. 
Toxicity is a characteristic of many substances from the poisons used by the ancient Greek 
to the waste from Love Canal.  A toxin can be defined as a chemical which in small doses can 
cause adverse health effects (Gallo).  Modern toxically is based on risk assessment methods which 
are often expressed in terms dependent upon the dose to which one is exposed, the amount of time 
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of exposure, and the route of exposure. A common measure of toxicity of a material is the LD 50, 
the concentration of exposure that will result in the death of fifty percent of a given population.  
The evaluation of hazards associated with working with toxic substances is complex and it is 
important to note that a number of factors influence the response of individuals to exposure to 
toxic compounds (Eaton and Gilbert).  
Reproductive toxins can affect the reproductive health of both male and female personnel 
if proper procedures and controls are not used.  For women, exposure to reproductive toxins during 
pregnancy can cause adverse effects on the fetus and postnatal functional defects.  In men, various 
effects chemicals can impact sperm and male fertility.   Chemicals that that cause local, short-term 
adverse effects, either from short-term or chronic use are defined as irritants. They are generally 
classified as noncorrosive agents for which inflammatory effects are reversible.  Sensitizer 
(allergen) is a substance that causes exposed people to develop an allergic reaction in normal tissue 
after repeated exposure to the substance.  Often initial exposure causes little or no effect, but upon 
repeated exposure may elicit strong reactions (CHP).  
2.2.3. Physical Hazards  
Electrical and magnetic hazards are common in laboratories with hazards associated with 
electrical shock or the ignition of flammables. Common electrical equipment found in laboratories 
includes fluid and vacuum pumps, lasers, electrophoresis and electrochemical power supplies, x-
ray equipment, stirrers, hot plates heating mantles, microwave ovens and sonication devices.   It is 
the responsibility for lab personal to regularly inspect electrical equipment to ensure that it is 
properly grounded and all wiring is intact (Prudent). 
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High and low pressure systems are also found in LSU research labs.  Vacuum pumps are 
often used in conjunction with glass reaction vessels and rotary evaporators.  High pressure vessels 
can be used for chemical reactions.  However, the most common high pressure vessel is the steam 
autoclave.  Autoclaves are used to destroy biological materials via high pressure and high 
temperature.  Failure of the containment vessel is the primary danger associated with work at high 
or low pressure and the subsequent implosion or explosion which can result in injury and 
destruction (Prudent). 
Many laboratories at LSU have some form of mechanical equipment that have the potential 
to be a safety hazard.  For example, gas turbines for combustion research, polymer extruder, 
concrete pressers, various pumps, and rotating equipment.  Additionally, there are several machine 
shops on campus. Many biological labs use high speed centrifuges which operate at high speed at 
and have great potential for injuring users if rotors are unbalanced.  Even sample container 
breakage can generate aerosols that may be harmful if inhaled (OSHA 2010).  
2.2.4. Radiation Hazards 
Radioactive materials are found in research laboratories and LSU is no exception.  A 
radioisotope is a chemical element with an unstable nucleus that undergo spontaneous decay to a 
more stable form and has the potential to release radiation that can be damaging to living tissue.  
Radioisotopes are commonly used in the life sciences research laboratories to trace biological 
energy pathways.  Nuclear medicine is on the forefront of scientific medical research. 
Radioisotopes are used both in the diagnosis and treatment of certain diseases. Radioactive sealed 
sources are also found in various laboratory settings.  Analytical instruments used sealed source 
as powers sources and detection units. X-ray machines and lasers are also sometimes referred to 
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as sealed sources.   Acquisition, use and disposal of radioisotopes are heavily regulated by state 
agencies under the authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  Nonionizing 
radiation also poses a hazard to laboratory workers.  The primary hazard is to eyesight and 
nonionizing radiation includes ultraviolet, visible, and near-infrared radiation from lamps and 
lasers, and radiofrequency and microwave radiation from ovens, heaters and inductive furnaces 
(Prudent). There are claims that cancer is caused by electric and magnetic fields from cell phones 
and power lines. Despite denial from the NIH Cancer Institute there are still people out there 
wearing cone shaped aluminum hats (NIH). 
2.3. Methods for Control of Laboratory Hazards 
A hierarchy of hazard control is mandated by OSHA to protect workers from hazards.   The 
preference of order for hazard control is engineering controls, administrative controls, and as a last 
resort the use of personal protective equipment.  The four standard routes of exposure to a chemical 
or biological agent are inhalation, absorption, ingestion, and injection and the exact nature of the 
control depends on the exposure path (Prudent). 
Equipment use to remove or reduce the hazard in the workplace are considered as an 
engineering control.  Protection from inhalation hazards in laboratories consist primarily of 
ventilation devices like chemical fume hoods, biosafety cabinets, and local ventilation devices like 
snorkels. Chemical fume hoods are intended for work with flammable and corrosive chemicals by 
removing fumes from the breathing zone of workers via air flow. Biosafety cabinets are intended 
for work with bacteria, viruses, cell lines by keeping a sterile environment inside the cabinet and 
protect personnel in the laboratory by confining microbes. Microorganisms are removed by 
filtering air through a particulate filter and a carbon filter.  Snorkels simply remove air from the 
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room via a hose over the process of concern (Prudent). LSU has a strong program for ventilation 
controls.  Chemical fume hoods are maintained by Faculties Services and flow rates are checked 
yearly.  Biological safety cabinets are also checked yearly by outside contractors.  EHS has a 
dedicated Industrialist Hygienist to oversee ventilation control.   
   Engineering control for other exposure routes are dependent on the situation and if there is 
an engineering solution.  Safety showers and eyewash stations are fundamental pieces of 
laboratory safety equipment that could be considered as engineering controls (OSHA, 2010). 
Safety showers are uses to quickly wash off hazardous materials off of the body and eyewash 
stations are used to rinse eyes after an exposure (Prudent). LSU provides laboratories with access 
to safety showers and eye wash stations. 
The next level of controls to reduce exposure to hazardous material is administrative 
controls.  Administrative controls are basically consisting of good laboratory practices as outlined 
in Prudent Practices and the BLMB. Some of these items fall into the common sense range like 
using smallest amount needed of the hazardous material, good handling technique, no food or drink 
in the lab, proper clothing and shoes, and wearing proper personal protective equipment. 
Administrative controls also contain items that are more proactive in nature.  Hazardous material 
should be inventoried and tracked to minimize storage usage levels. Chemicals should be stored 
by a defined plan that prevents the mixing of incompatible material.  The development and use of 
standard operating procedures (SOP) provides guidance to the lab worker. Safety reviews and 
hazard analysis can often help determine problems before they happen (Prudent, BLMB).  At LSU, 
EHS provides these types of tools for the researcher use via the EHS Assistant.  However, there is 
    
23 
 
no mandate to use these particular administrative control tools, but it left to the discretion 
individual PI.  
Mandating the use of Personal protective equipment (PPE) in the lab is a significant 
administrative control.  PPE against absorption and injection include protective laboratory coats 
or gowns, gloves, and eye protection. Unfortunately, the enforcement of the PPE use varies from 
lab to lab depending on the PI.  Lab coats can protect workers against skin and clothing contact 
with hazardous materials.  Different lab coats provide different protections and lab coat selection 
should be part of a hazardous analysis.  Eye protection can include impact-resistant safety glasses; 
safety goggles or full-face shields depending on the level of hazard.  Nobody should enter any lab 
containing hazardous material without basic eye protection and a lab coat. Lab personnel handling 
hazardous materials should wear gloves.  It is important to select the right type of glove to use and 
these needs to be part of the hazard analysis.  Also very important, lab workers need to be taught 
the proper techniques for glove use.  For example, how and when to take gloves off to prevent 
contamination (Prudent). 
When engineering and administrative controls cannot reduce risk of inhalation to 
acceptable levels, employees may wear respirators. Use of respirators is considered to be the last 
line of defense against exposure and a separate OSHA respiratory standard controls use of 
respirators. This standard requires that respirator users must have medical approval; be fit-tested 
annually, and have appropriate style of respirator for the task.  LSU prefers to use administrative 
and engineer controls whenever possible, but has a respiratory protection program.  
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2.4. Regulations with Potential to Impact Laboratory Safety  
Numerous federal, state, and local regulations have a potential to impact laboratory safety 
at a university to varying degrees.  Perhaps the most relevant regulatory requirements for 
laboratory safety come from OSHA.   The OSHA standards of the 1970’s were aimed at industry 
and did not translate very well to laboratories; however, these OSHA general duty clauses do 
require the employer to provide a workplace free from recognized hazards (Prudent). The Hazard 
Communication Standard was initially established in 1983 for chemical manufacturers but was 
expanded to all industries (universities included) in 1987.  The Hazard Communication Standard 
mandated improved chemical labeling, material safety data sheets (MSDS), and chemical training 
for workers.  The overall impact of the Hazard Communication Standard was to increase access to 
information about hazardous materials (OSHA 1987).  The Hazard Communication Standard was 
recently updated to become compliant with the Globally Harmonized System endorsed by the 
United Nations. The format for Safety Data Sheets (SDS) was standardized and a more coherent 
system of international warning words and symbols has been adopted (OSHA 2000).   Louisiana 
has a State Right-to-Know law that mimics the federal hazardous communication regulation (LAC 
33).   
The 1990 OSHA Laboratory Standard "Occupational Exposure to Hazardous Chemicals in 
Laboratories” required laboratories to develop a chemical hygiene plan to reduce the potential for 
chemical exposure.to workers, determine potential exposure levels for workers, and provide 
training.  The lab standard is one of the earliest performance standards issued by the federal 
government and the major objectives of the standard are outlined in Appendix A of the standard.  
The standard requires development of a chemical hygiene plan (CHP) consisting of good chemical 
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hygiene practices as recommended by the National Research Council's 1981 edition of Prudent 
Practices.  The standard also requires employee training and defines special requirements for work 
with particularly hazardous substances and acute toxins. Based on the requirements of the OSHA 
Lab Standard, LSU has a CHP which can be accessed online, The CHP discusses the general 
principles of lab safety; responsibilities; laboratory design and maintenance, applicable standard 
operating procedures, general procedures for working with chemicals; and safety 
recommendations (CHP). 
Other OSHA regulations have the potential to apply to laboratory settings such as the 
Respiratory Protection Standard (use of masks and respirators); the Blood borne Pathogens 
Standard (control the biologic hazards of human blood) and a number of standards found in 29 
CFR 1910.1000 (OSHA 2010).  In Louisiana, the OSHA program is administrated by the federal 
government and public employees including LSU employees are exempt from the OSHA 
requirements.  LSU Policy Statement 19 (PS-19), “Environmental Health and Safety”, states that 
all University activities shall be conducted in accordance with applicable safety codes, and 
governmental safety and environmental standards, which includes OSHA standards (PS-19).  
Unfortunately, at this university, compliance with OSHA regulations is policy and not a legal 
requirement.   
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates safe handling, storage and disposal 
of hazardous chemical waste through the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  Prior 
to passage of the initial RDRA regulations, disposal of hazardous chemical waste was largely 
unregulated.  It was a common practice to dispose of hazardous chemical waste in uncontrolled 
landfills or directly to the sanitary sewer.  The end result was the contamination of soil and water 
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with toxic chemicals (EPA).  While the regulations are aimed at industry, that are applicable to 
university laboratories in full force.  In Louisiana, the RCRA program is administered by the 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and LSU is subject to federal and state Hazardous 
Waste regulations.  EHS is responsible for the hazardous program at LSU.  LSU is a large quantity 
waste generator which means that it generates over 1000 kilograms of waste per month.  EHS 
operates a 90-day waste facility which is permitted for storage only and no treatment or disposal 
is allowed on site.  Chemical and biological waste are collected, categorized, and stored by EHS.  
Outside vendors collect the waste and it is incinerated at an approved facility.    
A tremendous amount of effort is expended in training personnel in proper methods of 
waste disposal, but often a nonchalant attitude regarding following the rules prevails among the 
waste generators.  Not unexpectedly, there is a flurry of activity to “make things right” following 
a federal or state waste handling citation similar to response to a serious accident (CEN).  LSU 
provides an example of reactive handling of regulatory citation.  On May 21, 2003, RCRA 
personnel conducted an inspection of waste handling on the Baton Rouge Campus and numerous 
citations were issued.  In lieu of a large fine, LSU agreed to a Consent Agreement with the EPA 
to complete a Supplemental Environmental Project.  The SEP required installation of a chemical 
inventory system, personnel to manage chemical inventory, review the use of alternate fuels, and 
provide training for other schools in Louisiana.  At the completion of the program a total of 
$206,000.00 had been spent on SEP implementation activities (SEP). 
The Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) are intended to enhance the 
security of US chemical plants against terrorist attacks. The US Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) also applied the CFATS rule to academic universities.  The regulation required any facility 
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holding a quantity equal or greater to the target level of a defined chemical (Appendix A list) to 
register, complete, and submit a preliminary screening assessment (Top-Screen).  DHS would 
determine the associated level of risk which in turn would require the facility to perform site 
vulnerabilities assessments (SVA) and implement site security plans (SSP) to thwart terrorist 
attacks.  LSU completed an extensive inventory of the CFATS chemicals and determined that it 
was below any of the chemical threshold levels (Homeland).  
Biological Safety is rapidly becoming inundated with rules and regulations.  The select 
agent program (42 CFR Part 73) is a maze of strict requirements and inspections enforced through 
the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  Outside of the select agent program, there 
are few federal regulations to reference.  National Institutes Health (NIH) has issued strong 
biosafety requirements for projects involving DNA and RNA.  Enforcement is through the threat 
to withhold grant funds and by reference to standard code for the practice for biosafety (BMBL).  
As such it us the responsibility of the university to guide researchers and monitor biological safety.  
At LSU, the Inter-Institutional Biological and Recombinant DNA Safety Committee (IBRDSC) 
has assumed this role through the registration and review of biological projects (IBRDSC).  
Radiation Safety is a long established program that is highly regulated with specific requirements and 
consequences for the receipt, possession, use, transfer, and disposal of radioactive materials (NRC).  LSU’s 
Radiation Safety Office works with the Department of Environmental Quality to obtain licenses for each 
researcher using radioactive materials.  Each license clearly defines the specific use and purpose of the 
radioactive materials.  Prudent practices for working with radioactive materials are similar to those needed to 
reduce the risk of exposure to toxic chemicals.   The Radiation Safety Office monitors the use of radioactive 
materials at LSU (RAD). 
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CHAPTER 3.  SIGNIFICANT SAFETY EVENTS  
Concerns about safety in academic laboratories has increased in the past few years as 
demonstrated by numerous editorials in chemistry related journals such as Chemical and 
Engineering News (an American Chemical Society publication) and chemistry related blogs 
such as such as ChemJobber and ChemBark. The rise in concern is partly because of 
recognition of the necessary to improve safety culture, partly of regulatory requirements, and 
partly due to several significant incidents that have brought attrition to the issue (NRC 2014). 
Adverse laboratory incidents occur more frequently in teaching and research   when 
compared to industrial laboratories. Estimates of the frequency of these incidents in school 
and college laboratories have been reported to be 100 to 1,000 times greater than the 
frequency seen in industrial laboratories (LSI).m Scientists learn and establish safety 
practices during their years of study at post-secondary institutions, and carry those safety 
habits into their professional careers. Improving ways in which laboratory safety is taught 
s important to the future health and safety of society (ASC 2012).   Reports that review 
these significant incidents in an effort to help the academic community to emphasize safety 
in research laboratories have been published by such noteworthy organizations such as the 
American Chemical Society, National Research Council, and The Association of Public and 
Land Grant Universities (APLU).  These reports will be reviewed later in Chapter Five.  This 
chapter looks at several of these significant events, describes some known incidents at LSU, 
and compares an accident at the University of Hawaii to a similar incident at LSU. 
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3.1. Dartmouth Incident  
 The death of Karen Wetterhahn is the first significant events that started increasing the 
awareness of safety culture.   Dr. Wetterhahn, a professor of chemistry at Dartmouth College and 
director of the Toxic Metals Research Program, died on June 8, 1997 of mercury poisoning.  Her 
death was attributed to a single exposure of dimethyl mercury in August, 1996.  During a transfer 
of dimethyl mercury between containers, Wetterhahn spilled several drops of the compound onto 
her gloved hand.  The spill was considered as only a minor incident at the time because it was done 
under the standard safety protocol at the time, conducting the transfer in a fume hood, wearing eye 
goggles, and disposable latex gloves.  Approximately five months later, Wetterhahn began 
experiencing physical difficulties and was diagnosed with acute mercury poisoning.  Her condition 
continued to deteriorate and in February 1997, Wetterhahn went into a coma.  Within ten months 
of the initial exposure she was dead (Dartmouth).  
Dr. Wetterhahn was considered as a specialist in metal toxicology, but was not aware of 
all the potential hazards associated with dimethyl mercury.  The dimethyl mercury transfer was 
carried out using the best safety precautions known at the time.  The Material Safety Data Sheets 
(MSDS) for dimethyl mercury recommended the use of chemically impervious gloves when 
handling the compound, but provided no additional details on the subject. Permeation testing after 
Dr. Wetterhahn’s death indicated that dimethyl mercury permeates all standard gloves used in a 
research lab.  OSHA safety guidelines were modified to discourage the of dimethyl mercury as an 
after fact of recognition of the high handling risk.   An OSHA memorandum called for research 
organizations to produce a “protective chemical hygiene plan, which includes adequate guidance 
on the appropriate selection of personal protective equipment and engineering controls” (OSHA 
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DMM).   The significant factor of this incident was that it surprised the academic community that 
a researcher would not know the hazards in their field of study and demonstrated the need for 
collaborative relationships between university researchers and health and safety professionals in 
to determine potential laboratory hazards and creating safe handling protocols. 
3.2. University of California Los Angeles Death  
 The death of a chemistry research assistant, Sheharbano (Sheri) Sangji, from a chemical 
fire has brought significant attention to the general status of the safety culture in academic 
laboratories.   On December 29, 2008, Ms. Sangji was working in the laboratory of Dr. Patrick 
Harran in the Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry at University of California, Los Angeles 
(UCLA) to scale up a reaction that had been previously completed.  While drawing tert-butyl 
lithium in pentane into a syringe when an undetermined amount of the liquid splashed onto her 
hands, arms, and torso, and immediately ignited her clothing.  Ms. Sangji was not wearing a lab 
coat and was burned over 43% of her body.   She died from her burns on January 16, 2009 
(Kemsley 2009).   
The incident was investigated by the UCLA Fire Department, UCLA Police Department, 
UCLA Environmental Health & Safety Office (EH&S), Los Angeles (LA) City Fire Department, 
and California Division of Occupational Safety & Health (Cal/OSHA).  The information collected 
by UCLA fire marshal investigators was reviewed by the California State Fire Marshal Arson 
Bomb Investigation Division and concluded that the incident was an accident and closed the case.  
Cal/OSHA investigated the incident due to Sangji’s status as an employee rather than a graduate 
student and as a result of the investigation Cal/OSHA fined the university $31,875.  Cal/OSHA 
cited UCLA due to the lack safety training and training documentation; failing to ensure employees 
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wore appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), and failing to correct unsafe conditions 
and work practices identified in a previous laboratory safety inspection.  Sangji’s family publically 
expressed their belief that the investigations were inadequate and pressed to take the matter to the 
Los Angeles district attorney’s (LA DA) office.  Cal/OSHA forwarded its findings to the LA DA’s 
office for evaluation (Kemsley 2011).  
On December 27, 2011, the LA DA’s Office filed charges against the University of 
California (UC) Reagents and UCLA chemistry professor Patrick Harran for felony violations of 
California labor laws.  California labor code that makes it a crime for any employer or employee 
manager to willfully violate any occupational safety or health standard in a way that causes death 
or prolonged injury to an employee.  The term “willfully” means that the employer’s actions were 
not accidental but it does not imply that the employer intended to break the law or injure an 
employee.  The specific charges cite regulations involving failure to correct unsafe workplace 
conditions and procedures in a timely manner, failure to require work-appropriate clothing and 
personal protective equipment, and failure to provide chemical safety training to employees.  
Convection on the charges had the potential for a four-and-a-half years in state prison term for Dr. 
Harran and the university faced fines of as much as $4.5 million (Kemsley 2011). 
UCLA did not contest the findings or appeal the fine but began working to enhance the 
university’s lab safety programs.  In a summary report, Gibson’s reports improved operations of 
the Office of Environment, Health and Safety (EH&S).  They instituted mandatory laboratory 
safety training of researchers and enhanced overall inspection procedures.  Implementation of a 
Laboratory Hazard Assessment Tool (LHAT) that helps researchers in the identification of hazards 
    
32 
 
and track laboratory space and personnel.  Use of personal protective equipment (PPE) improved 
and the LHAT helps guide lab groups in compliance with PPE policies (Gibson). 
On July 27, 2012 a settlement agreement between the UC board of reagents and the LA 
DA’s office was signed which dropped the felony charges against UC.  The agreement did not 
include Dr. Harran and the charges against him were not dropped.  The Regents accepted 
responsibility for the laboratory conditions that led to Sangji’s death and establish an 
environmental law scholarship in Sangji’s name at UC Berkeley.  They also agreed to maintain a 
laboratory safety program for laboratories at all of its campuses (Torrice 2012). 
The safety program requires specific safety training for principal investigators and 
laboratory personnel.  Written standard operating procedures for hazardous chemicals had be 
developed and reviewed by the PI before that chemical can be used in their lab.  PI’s are required 
to outline minimal personal protective equipment their laboratories and enforce the use of PPE. 
Additionally, ULCA is required to formally document and evict any laboratory personnel who 
fails to wear the proper PPE (PEA). 
On Sept. 5, 2012, Dr. Harran was arraigned and testimony heard during a preliminary 
hearing in November and December, 2012.  Dr. Harran was ordered to stand trial on April 26, 
2013.  Dr. Harran’s defense team filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the credibility of the 
chief Cal/OSHA investigator of the case.  The investigator had a sealed juvenile record for murder 
of man during a failed methamphetamine deal.  The motion contended that the failure to disclose 
the conviction brings into question his creditability and that the incident report. The judge denied 
the defense motion to dismiss the case.  The motion was appealed to the California Court of Appeal 
and the motion was dismissed on Oct. 24, 2013 (Torrice 2014).  
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On June 20, 2014, an agreement to defer Dr. Harran’s prosecution of on felony charges 
was approved. The charges were not dismissed, but the case was effectively placed on hold until 
his completion of the terms of the agreement.  Dr. Harran is required to pay a $10,000 fine and 
complete multiple forms of community service over a five-year period.  The professor must 
complete 800 hours of community service in the UCLA hospital system in a non-teaching role.  
He is also required to develop and teach an organic chemistry preparatory course for Los Angeles 
inner-city high school students.  He is required to lecture all incoming UCLA chemistry and 
biology students about laboratory safety. Any violation of the California labor code over the five-
year term will nullify the terms of the agreement.  The L.A. DA’s office, Cal/OSHA, and the court 
will monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement.  Assuming full compliance, the DA’s 
office will move to dismiss all charges against him and will not pursue any further prosecution at 
the end of the five-year term (DPA).  
Dr. Harran was selected as a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science in 2015.  In theory, the AAAS selection process is based only on scientific achievement 
and not behavior or other issues.  However, in response to numerous comments, the AAS 
reconsidered his election as fellow.  Based on the fact that several members of the nomination 
committee were unaware of the accident, the AAS rescinded the election of Patrick Harran as a 
fellow (Kemsley 2015).  
This incident and court case is very significant in the world of academic laboratory safety 
culture.  The safety programs developed for the UC schools provide a “gold” standard for 
laboratory safety requirements.  The additional UCLA requirements reintroduced the concept of 
EHS as safety cops.  However, the most significant aspect is the knowledge that individual 
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researchers are really responsible for their people and that they cannot count on full University 
support in case of a serious incident.  
3.3. Texas Tech University Laboratory Explosion  
A laboratory explosion at Texas Tech University (Texas Tech) is another pressing example 
of the need to improve the culture of safety in academic research.   On January 7, 2010, a graduate 
student within the Chemistry and Biochemistry Department was severely injured when a chemical 
that he was working with detonated.  While there have been numerous academic incidents, this 
one is significant because it was formally investigated by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 
Investigation Board (CSB).  While the report noted that academic research laboratories have a 
unique cultural and dynamic nature, the CSB found systemic deficiencies within Texas Tech that 
contributed to the incident (CBS).  
The CSB is a scientific investigative organization established by the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990.  Its mission is the investigation of chemical incidents to determine root 
causes and to issue recommendations in an effort to prevent future events.  Texas Tech was the 
first academic incident that was investigated using the same standards and techniques as an 
industrial chemical accident (CBS). 
Texas Tech was a subcontractor in a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
program titled “Awareness and Localization of Explosive-Related Threats” (ALERT).  The focus 
of Texas Tech’s research included synthesizing and characterizing new potentially energetic 
materials. Graduate students were synthesizing a nickel hydrazine perchlorate (NHP) derivative 
on the order of 300 milligrams.  In order to have a uniform sample for analytical testing the reaction 
was scaled up to 10 grams. The scale up was done without written procedures, consulting the PI, 
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or formal hazard analysis. The product was placed in mortar with hexane to grind to a uniform 
size.  When it exploded, the worker was not wearing safety goggles.  After the incident, all partners 
in the ALERT program implemented a voluntary stop-work order in the laboratories working with 
energetic materials which lasted four months (CBS). 
Often an accident investigation tends to focus on the actions and decisions of the 
individuals involved in the immediate activities preceding the event. For example, it is likely that 
an in house investigation of the Texas Tech incident would have focused on the actions of the 
student and the inquiry ended at that point.  This is a limited form of inquiry that tends to overlook 
the underlying causes of the incident.  The CSB applied modern accident causation methods in the 
form of in the James Reason’s “Swiss cheese model” to the Texas Tech explosion. (Reason) The CSB 
concluded that each layer of safety management within the university had deficiencies that 
contributed to the incident (CBS). 
Texas Tech’s laboratory safety management plan was modeled after OSHA’s Laboratory 
Standard (29 CFR 1910.1450) which primarily addresses chemical health hazards and does not 
consider potential physicals hazards in the laboratory.   Practices and procedures were not in place 
to effectively assess and control the hazards of the energetic materials research work. Guidance 
for research laboratory hazard evaluation did not exist.  Texas Tech did not have a comprehensive 
system to document and communicate near-miss and previous incidents.  The principal 
investigators, the department, and university administration at Texas Tech provided insufficient 
safety accountability and oversight (CBS). 
The CBS report notes that generally academic laboratories have not utilized the vast 
number of references, standards and guidelines developed to promote different types of hazard 
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evaluation methodologies in industrial settings.  The CSB calls for all academic institutions to use 
the lessons learned from the Texas Tech incident as an opportunity to compare their own policies 
and practices for laboratory safety (CBS). 
3.4. University of Hawaii Incident  
On March 16, 2016, a postdoctoral researcher lost her arm, sustained burns to her face, 
and temporary loss of hearing in hydrogen/oxygen explosion at the University of Hawaii at Manoa 
campus (UH).  She was working in a laboratory at the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute (HNEI) in 
the Pacific Ocean Science and Technology (POST) building.  The University of California Center 
for Laboratory Safety (CLS) was contracted to investigate the incident as an independent third 
party reviewer.  The CLS issued a detailed technical report concerning the explosion and the 
immediate cause. The immediate cause of the accident was the ignition of a hydrogen and oxygen 
gas mixture contained within pressure tank by a static charge (Merlic 1).  Recommendations to 
improve research safety operations were made in a second report (Merlic 2). 
The primary goal of the research at HNEI is renewable energy sources and energy 
integration into the grid system. The specific lab’s primary research involved green production of 
bioplastics and biofuels using open continuous gas flow bioreactors.   Knallgas bacteria captures 
the energy from the reaction between hydrogen and oxygen to fix carbon dioxide into cellular 
components. Individual gas flows were metered into a gas proportioner and then through the 
bioreactor with the excess gas vented into a laboratory fume hood.  This type of process had been 
used in the lab since 2013 using various types of bioreactors (Merlic 1). 
The postdoctoral researcher had joined the research group in October 2015 with the 
assignment of developing a closed gas system bioreactor for elimination of gas waste.  She came 
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from a university with a strong safety program and had inquired into the safety procedures required 
from the university.  She completed her required safety training before starting to work in the lab.  
Her training also the use of the existing reaction system (1gallon pressure vessel) and preparation 
of the reaction gas mixture (70% H2/20% O2/10% CO2).  This reaction system had been used for 
about 8 months without incident.  Experimental protocol changes and any necessary changes were 
discussed in weekly group meetings.  It was determined to scale-up the experimental procedure by 
pre-mixing the three gases in a thirteen-gallon gas storage tank (Merlic 1).  A tank was ordered 
and leaked checked upon arrival.  Between February until March 16, 2016 the gas storage tank 
was filled eleven times with varying explosive mixtures (H2/O2 /CO2) and pressures (37- 117 
psig).   The experiments were reviewed on a weekly basis with the primary concern being 
improvements of the bacterial culture conditions.  Researchers assumed that the process was safe 
if they stayed well below the maximum pressure of the rated gas storage pressure (140 psig).    It 
is of significance to note that the lab was subjected to a laboratory safety inspection in January 
2016.  The use of the gas storage tank was not questioned because the inspector used a typical 
checklist focusing on storage of chemicals, waste handling, gas cylinder storage, laboratory fume 
hood certification, and documentation of training (Merlic 1).  
A “near miss” incident with the small pressure reactor occurred the day before the 
accident.  Upon touching the on/off button of the vessel’s digital gauge, the researcher heard a 
“cracking sound”.  When the vessel was opened, the petri dishes inside were singed and cracked.  
A pressure gauge had been added to the experimental setup the month before to allow better 
measurement of gas consumption, but the gauge was not rated as intrinsically safe.  Upon reporting 
the incident, the PI advised the researcher not to use the vessel again (Merlic 1). 
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The next day, she proceeded to set up a run using the bioreactor and the thirteen gallon 
mixed gas storage tank. The tank had the same type of pressure gauge as the one-gallon tank and 
it was the eleventh time that it has been filled with a hydrogen/oxygen mixture. When she pushed 
the On/Off button of the pressure gauge on the tank, it exploded.   The resulting explosion caused 
severe injuries to the postdoctoral researcher and devastating the lab and adjoining areas (Merlic 
1). 
The actual cause of the accident was discharge of a static charge to an explosive mixture.  
There were several safety errors related to the explosion.  The researchers were not familiar with 
the fundamental principles of working with extremely explosive gases.  Instrumentation was not 
intensively safe and the tank was not grounded.  Previous incidents of static shocks were ignored.  
Blast barriers were not in place and the researcher was not wearing PPE (Merlic 1). 
3.5. Louisiana State University Incidents 
 Documentation on historical incidents at LSU is poor.  This is largely due to a lack of a 
methodology for record keeping in the Office of Environmental Health and Safety who is normally 
the responsible party for laboratory accident investigation.   Almost all the mature professors in 
the chemistry department have stories of the “good old times” involving fires and explosions.  
Without records, these incidents do not exist and are not useful as learning tools. 
3.5.1 Life Science Annex Incident 
 The available documentation for this event consists of a one-page accident report and 
historical knowledge from the professor involved.  In 2002, a postdoctoral researcher was running 
an experiment in a chemical fume hood when there was an explosion.  He lost an eye and was 
admitted to a hospital for treatment.  The professor was out of town when the accident happened 
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and there is no information as to the reaction being run.  Although, the professor indicated that 
there was a good amount of damage in the lab.   The post doc recovered and returned home.  As a 
learning/punishment lesson, the professor was made the safety officer of the department and served 
in that role for several years.   It should be noted, that an accident of that magnitude at this point 
in time would warrant a full investigation by an outside party. 
3.5.2 Choppin Hall Incident 
On March 10, 2011 in the 6th Floor Hallway of Choppin Hall; a chemistry graduate student 
was carrying a pressurized stainless steel one-liter cylinder with a pressure gage and valve 
assemblies between rooms when the gas mixture inside the tank exploded in the hall.  The cylinder 
had been prepared for an offsite chemistry demonstration as part of the chemistry department’s 
educational program.  The purpose of the demonstration to produce small scale fires and 
explosions in balloons under controlled conditions.  The balloons are filled from separate pressure 
cylinders containing either hydrogen or oxygen.  Balloons are filled by mixing hydrogen and 
oxygen in balloons.  This was a standard part of the graduate student’s job function.   The root 
cause of the incident was that an unpurged cylinder containing one gas was filled with the other 
gas which resulted in an explosive mixture (LSU EHS). 
The graduate student was carrying the cylinder by the pressure gage. Inspection of the 
cylinder reviled that the explosion caused the bottom valve assembly on the tank to blow out 
completely. The hot pressurized gas mixture blew the tank completely out of his hand and flashed 
part of his long sleeve cotton shirt away, particularly on the lower part of his left arm.  The bottom 
valve assembly disintegrated causing shrapnel wounds to the student’s left hand.  He was taken to 
Baton Rouge General emergency room for treatment. Doctors found first and second degree burns 
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to his left arm and hand. The student also required an operation to remove the metal fragments 
from his arm and hand.  Some metal was left in his hand and the large laceration to his hand was 
left open to heal properly.  There was no nerve or tendon damage.  The student was released that 
night and made a full recovery (LSU EHS). 
There was no active fire aside from the initial detonation, although the smoke from his 
shirt set off the fire alarm. LSU Police, Baton Rouge Fire, & LSU EHS responded to the alarm. A 
Baton Rouge Arson Investigator also responded (LSU EHS) After interviews with the principle 
investigator and graduate student and inspection of the cylinder, it is believed that there was an 
accidental mixing of hydrogen and oxygen gas in the pressure cylinder.  The detonation could have 
been triggered by the compressive heating that took place on recharging the pressure cylinder.  The 
pressure cylinder was labeled as containing oxygen and had a partial pressure of gas already in it.  
The graduate student recharged it without releasing the existing gas and flushing the tank out. 
Although the pressure cylinder was labeled for oxygen it may have had a partial pressure of 
hydrogen (LSU EHS). 
EHS recommend development of a procedure that addressed cylinder labeling, filling, and 
emptying.  All personal were required to document that they understood the procedure before 
working with the project.  Additional signage was required for the primary fill tanks.  The PI was 
also asked to review the process to see if lower pressures could be used in the procedure (LSU 
EHS). 
3.5.3 Dairy Science Incident 
 On April 10, 2014, an international undergraduate intern (Honduras) was working on an 
undergraduate research project in the Dairy Foods Research and Teaching Lab.  The student was 
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heating a bottle of media in order to pour some agar plates. She had placed a screw top Pyrex bottle 
on a hot plate to heat the media.  The media began to boil and exploded when it was picked up. 
The student has failed to follow operating procedures and loosen the screw top so that excess 
pressure would not build up in the bottle. One large piece of glass from the bottle severely cut the 
top side of her wrist just above her left hand. She also received some minor cuts on the forearm of 
her right arm. While the hot media did spray onto her hair, she received no burns on her face or 
arms (LSU EHS). 
 LSU Campus Police, Baton Rouge Police, Baton Rouge Fire Department, and EMT 
officers responded.  The student was treated by EMT and taken to the emergency room at Our 
Lady of the Lake Hospital.  She was treated at the emergency room and released.  The next day 
she underwent successful surgery to repair damaged tendons in her left wrist.  She returned to 
Honduras at the end of the semester. 
 The lab was closed off and EHS responded to examine the lab.  EHS confirmed the events 
as described above, checked the lab for hazardous materials, and cleaned up the blood.  Since 
Dairy Science was an academic unit of the Ag Center, the official accident report was completed 
by the Department Head. The report states that the student had received careful safety instructions 
in all lab procedures and had been supervised by graduate students through the first replication of 
her experiments.  The base cause of the accident was deviation from standard lab procedures by 
the student.  In a follow-up report by EHS, some questions were raised about training 
documentation and written standard operating procedures.  There was no official response from 
the Ag Center and the incident was considered closed.  
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3.6. Comparison of UH and Choppin Hall Event  
This section is to compares of the safety programs between the University of Hawaii and 
Louisiana State University.  After a thorough review by The University of California Center for 
Laboratory Safety (CLS) of the UH safety program after a major accident found several 
deficiencies in their safety program.  The safety program at LSU operates in a similar fashion and 
had a similar type of accident.  In general, both universities provide the base level of compliance 
while a great deal of responsibility pushed to the principle investigators. 
UH at Manoa has approximately 19,000 total students (undergraduate and graduate 
students) and is a public research university.  The campus is home to over 300 principal 
investigators with over 500 laboratory rooms. There are 20 colleges and professional schools 
including the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute (HNEI) which conducts research on renewable 
energy sources.  The explosion occurred within a HNEI laboratory.  The Environmental Health 
and Safety Office (EHSO) consists of 22 individuals and manages the laboratory safety program 
under the direction of the Vice Chancellor of Research (Merlic 2).  
Louisiana State University has approximately 24,000 undergraduates and over 5,000 
graduate students in 14 schools and colleges. This university has over 6,000 full-time and 9,000 
part-time employees which include over 1,400 faculty members. LSU has approximately 500 
principal investigators with over 800 laboratory rooms.  The Office of Environmental Health and 
Safety (EHS) have a staff of ten safety professionals.   EHS is in the Facility and Property Oversite 
Division and directly reports to the Assistant Vice President of Real Estate, Public Partnerships, 
& Compliance.    
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While the level of injury and property damage was much lower at LSU, there are 
similarities between the two incidents.  Both were repetitive tasks that involved a hydrogen/oxygen 
gas mixture.  Consider the level of scrutiny if an outside agency had completed the LSU 
investigation.  Internal investigations tend to focus on the actual incident and make 
recommendations prevent reoccurrence.  Outside agencies tend to look beyond root causes of the 
incident using techniques developed for industry to address fundamental safety issues (Merlic 2). 
Clearly, the UH laboratory is not alone in having safety problems.  In fact, overall the safety 
problems found in UH and LSU laboratories are remarkably similar due to size and structure of 
their respective safety programs and culture.  Both are public universities with a large research 
base and a relatively small EHS unit with very little real enforcement power.  It extremely 
challenging to incorporate safety into research. PIs are driven by the real and perceived pressures 
to produce results and to publish to get and maintain funding.  Safety is not perceived as a factor 
in the advancement of their carriers while invocation and scientific discoveries are core 
considerations. When the constant modification of experimental procedures is part of the 
fundamental research process, stopping to complete a safety review can be seen as a determent to 
forward progress.  Additionally, with the current predominance of interdisciplinary, often 
researchers are not qualified to work with highly hazardous materials and do not recognize the 
potential hazards.   As long as researchers tend to place higher value on results than on safety and 
physical hazards are loosely regulated, there is a high potential for catastrophic incidents (Merlic 
2). 
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3.7. Potential Impacts of CLS Recommendations to LSU 
The CLS report found serious deficiencies in UH’s laboratory safety program.  The 
accident is attributed to a lack of effective safety oversight program and the general state of the 
existing safety culture.  Some of the recommendations in the CSL report are specifically aimed at 
the underlying safety problems at UH while others are directed toward all at all institutions of 
higher education that conduct research (Merlic 2). 
UCSL Recommendation:  Role of Campus Leadership in changing safety practices 
All improvements in the culture of safety must come from Senior Campus Leadership. 
Without Statements from the highest level within the University that reinforce the importance of 
conducting all research safely there will not be any fundamental improvement in the culture of 
safety. The CLS report also emphasis the need for campus leadership to be familiar with the 
similarity in the institutional issues cited in CLS report and CBS report on the Texas Tech 
laboratory explosion. Another recommendation is that campus administrative and EHSO leaders 
review and determine how the APLU report “Guide for Implementing a Safety Culture in Our 
Universities” could be utilized to improve the research safety. Perhaps the most important 
recommendation is the formation a faculty–led safety committee be formed to address safety needs 
relating to chemical and physical hazards (Merlic 2). 
LSU:  The APLU report has been reviewed by LSU leadership.  An existing committee, the 
Research Safety Committee, has been requested to review the report and make 
recommendations to improve the overall culture of safety at LSU.  
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UCSL Recommendation:  Active Role of Faculty in changing safety practices. 
The CLS report stresses the need for faculty to be engaged with both the campus 
administration and EHSO to guide safety changes via leadership of a Chemical and Physical Safety 
Committee. Faculty must work to ensure that the necessary resources are provided and that safety 
is a collaborative effort to improve safety culture (Merlic 2). 
LSU:  Facility safety attitudes range from extremely pro-active to non-existent. Some faculty 
expect EHS handle all safety matters for their lab.  The repurpose of the Research Safety 
Committee is a right step in the involvement of LSU faculty because the committee has 
requested more facility join the committee.  However, faculty tend to feel overwhelmed 
with their current duties and do not care to be involved in another “worthless” committee.  
As such, upper leadership needs to encourage faculty to become involved by confirming 
the importance of safety.     
UCSL Recommendation:  Formulate a unified Research Safety Program.  
The CLS report recommended that UH form a single operating unit to support to support 
research operations.  They pointed out the need for additional staff and addition of a Learning 
Management System to integrate researcher training. Another conclusion was that EHSO lacked 
IT support to upkeep their website with pertinent safety information.  The report also suggested 
that the qualifications of personal be upgraded (Merlic 2).  
LSU:  With the exception of Radiation Safety, LSU EHS is a single operating unit.  EHS chemical, 
biological, industrial hygiene, and waste personal work together to support the research 
community.  Of the ten professionals on staff, there are three PhD’s and five certified 
professionals.  When compared to peer institutions, additional EHS people are needed for 
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a research facility the size of LSU.  The Campus Safety, Health, and Environmental 
Management Association (CSHEMA) has developed equations that estimate EHS staffing 
and budget based on the ratio of research/non-research floor space.  Based on these 
equations, LSU should have a staff of 22 safety personnel and an operating budget of 1.5 
million (CSHEMA).  
LSU EHS has provided researchers with a database tool, Environmental Health and 
Safety Assistant (EHS Assistant), to document on-line training, complete chemical and 
biological inventories, inspection response, and risk assessments.  While the EHS Assistant 
is an excellent tool, it has proven to be a challenge to convince researchers to utilize the 
database tools.   
Communication and outreach was a significant issue at UH which was attributed to 
their web site and LSU has a similar issue with their web site.   As such, a needed resource 
of LSU EHS is an IT person to support the maintenance of the Safety Web site and the 
EHS Assistant. 
UCSL Recommendation:  Laboratory inspection Program 
The CLS report suggested several modifications of the UH inspection program. The 
inspection process was not rigorous and recommended that the “Lab Inspection Checklist” be 
modified to cover additional hazards and the questions be grouped by hazards.  Inspections need 
to be carried out with researchers present while there is active research ongoing. Collaborative 
inspections need to be used as an educational experience for both researchers and inspectors.  The 
report suggested that each lab have a designated Laboratory Safety Officer as the point of contact 
for EHSO (Merlic 2). 
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LSU:  LSU has taken a collaborative approach to inspections.  The general approach is for the 
EHS inspector to take a consultant approach and talk to researchers about our services.  
The base inspection process consists an informal walkthroughs and review of the 
documentation associated with the EHS Assistant database. Compliance inspections ae 
schedule as needed.     
UCSL Recommendation:  Revise the Chemical Hygiene Plan and Laboratory Safety Manual 
The CLS report recommends a complete revision of the UH Chemical Hygiene Plan (CHP) 
and Campus Laboratory Safety Manual to move away from compliance documents in an effort to 
move the campus towards a more comprehensive culture of safety where safety is an integral part 
of research.  The documents should be revised by a joint team of EHSO and research faculty to 
achieve these goals (Merlic 2). 
LSU:  LSU revised the CHP to include physical hazards and links to standard operating procedures 
after the Texas Tech incident, but it remains a basic compliance document.  The LSU safety 
manual is also a compliance document and outdated.  LSU has taken the approach that 
safety information is available on the Safety Web site and hard copies are not required.  
However, the web site is hard to navigate and does not provide a free flow of information.  
Modification and updating the web is dependent on part time graduate students. However, 
none of the professional staff has the expertise or time to modify the web site to make a 
living document. 
UCSL Recommendation:  Develop effective SOPs.  
The report recommends that UH ESHO revise all aspects of SOP program.  The CLS report 
finds a generalized approach to campus-wide safety training and states the lab-specific safety 
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training should be a mandatory requirement.  An important part of this requirement is the use of 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to ensure that safe practices are followed where there are 
hazardous materials or conditions. Laboratory SOPs were inadequate, incomplete, or absent 
entirely and researchers need better guidance on SOP development, content, and use (Merlic 2).  
LSU:  LSU has provided some general SOP’s on the web site.  The SOP’s are linked in the 
Chemical Hygiene Program plan.  These examples use an industrial format that address 
safety, background, the procedure, and waste disposal.  However, research labs do not 
generally utilize SOP’s, let alone a standard format.  
UCSL Recommendation:  Develop a mechanism to address risk assessments.  
The report recommends that UH EHSO development a mechanism to address risk 
assessments.  Since the root cause of UH incident was a failure to recognize the extreme hazards 
presented by a gas tank filled with an explosive gas mixture, UH EHSO should provide researchers 
with technical assistance for development of and implementation of risk assessments. A Research 
Safety Committee approval should be required before such conducting experiments (Merlic 2). 
LSU:  LSU has an electronic tool through the EHS Assistant that is a basic risk assessment, 
Laboratory Assessment Tool (LAT).  Researchers complete an assessment of the hazards 
in their lab by answering yes/no questions relating to chemical, biological, radiation, 
mechanical, hazards.  The LAT is submitted to EHS for review.  Upon approval, a report 
is generated for the research lab that describes the potential hazards and the required 
mediation actions.  While not a formal risk assessment, it allows EHS to recognize potential 
sources of hazards and investigate as needed.  
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UCSL Recommendation:  Safety Training 
While the CSL report did not make specific reconditions on UH Safety education program, 
it did note that the basic UH in-class “Lab Safety Training” courses only cover general safety 
principles and act as a starting point for researchers.  The report stated that lab-specific safety 
education is critical to ensure that researchers know their own research and that UH need to ensure 
that policies and procedures are in place to ensure that such training occurs (Merlic 2).  
LSU:  LSU has developed a series of power point training courses that provide basic training.  This 
training is required yearly and reminders of training due are sent out monthly.  The level 
of compliance with the training has increased since the program was started, but remains 
about 70% compliance level which is below desired levels.   
 The on-line training only provides the basic level of safety training. EHS does offer 
hand-on lab training on a demand basis, specifically incoming chemistry graduate students 
and BL3 personnel.  Those sessions are documented in the EHS Assistant, but lab based 
training is not currently documented by EHS 
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UCSL Recommendation:  Personal Protective Equipment 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is the lowest level in the hierarchy of hazard controls, 
but wearing the proper PPE can be a lifesaving act.  However, wearing PPE is often at the 
discretion of the principle investigator.  The CSL report noted that researchers did not consistently 
wear appropriate PPE in the laboratory where the accident occurred.  The report also noted that 
the level of PPE is often underestimated simply researchers do not understand the potential hazards 
(Merlic 2). 
LSU:  Use of PPE in LSU research labs is not consistent and depends of the level of enforcement 
by the PI.  Like UH, LSU has researchers that underestimate PPE requirements or feel that 
it is not necessary.  Proper PPE has to be provided by the employer.  PPE use requires a 
culture of safety to encourage workers to consistently wear their safety equipment.  EHS 
has initiated a pilot Nomex lab coat program for high hazard chemistry workers.  The 
program was funded by RISK/EHS and the results indicate that it improved the safety 
culture and encouraged worker to wear all their PPE in a consistent basis.  However, the 
program has not generated enough upper level support to ensure future funding.  
UCSL Recommendation:  Gas Cylinder Use 
The CSL report detailed several examples of improper gas and gas cylinder usage at UH 
since gas use was integral to the UH accident (Merlic 2).  
LSU:  LSU has provided training on the use of gas cylinders.  However, constant violations of gas 
cylinder handling and use have been noted in research labs.  Further education on the topic 
is required.  
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UCSL Recommendation:  Near Miss Events in Research Laboratories 
A near miss event is an unplanned and unexpected event that does not result in any injury, 
illness or property damage, however could have had the potential to do so.    A near miss event is 
a warning that something is wrong and should result in a shutdown of operations and trigger a 
thorough investigation of all procedures.   This did not happen at UH because of the way that 
researchers generally perceive risk. Either they do not recognize the hazard or it became a routine 
part of their work and they consider themselves as experts in the field (Merlic 2). 
The CLS report recommended that UH develop a process by which all near-misses and 
accidents are promptly reported and investigated.  In order to be effective, near miss reporting 
must not result in punitive actions. This was also a recommendation of the CSB to following the 
incident at Texas Tech University (Merlic 2).  
LSU:  LSU has an effective program of accident reporting and investigation.  Like most other 
universities, LSU does not have a near miss reporting system.  There is no data as to how 
many near misses there have been and if their investigation would prevent a future accident.  
Conclusion 
Investigating near miss incidents, the UH incident, and all the other recent lab accidents 
provide LSU an opportunity to take a hard look at the lab safety program.  It is a chance to improve 
the safety culture before being forced to do so as the result of a catastrophic incident.  
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CHAPTER 4.  SAFETY CLIMATE AND SAFETY CULTURE  
Workplace safety has been studied from technical and psychological viewpoints and has 
led to the general consensus that a positive safety culture improves job safety. Aside from the 
general consensus, there is neither an accepted model for safety culture nor a clear cut definition. 
The term “safety culture” was first used in reference to the Chernobyl accident in April 1986 in 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports.  The term culture was borrowed from 
anthropology and refers to a generalized description of personal decisions of the individual 
engaged in activities that impact safety (Sorensen). Today, safety culture is an established key 
concept and buzz word of safety professionals (Choudhry). The concepts of organizational culture 
and climate have provided the basis for many of the definitions and measures proposed for safety 
culture and climate (Cox and Flin).  A review of safety climate or safety culture is not complete 
without a review of the relevant aspects of organizational culture and climate.   
4.1. Organization Culture 
Organizational culture can be described as a phenomenon that involves beliefs, values and 
behaviors and exists at a variety of different levels.  It manifests itself in a wide range of artefacts 
within any particular organization.  Organizational culture helps define the environment of the 
organization which in turn allows workers to comprehend, interpret, accept, and control their work 
environment to enhance performance.  Organizational culture can be considered to be defined by 
the following characteristics.  It is a holistic construct, relatively stable, and multidimensional.   
Organizational culture is shared by groups of people so that culture is a synergistic aggregate of 
various sub-cultures such as national culture, corporate culture, organizational culture, 
departmental culture, group culture and psychological climate.  Organizational culture constitutes 
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practices such norms, values, ritual, heroes, and symbols in a manner of multiple layers not unlike 
an onion.  It is also functional in the sense that it supplies a frame of reference for behavior, i.e. 
the way we do things around here (Guldenmund 2000).  
There are two main lines of research in respect to organizational culture, one considers it 
as an entity and the other as an aspect. In cultural assessment, the perspective from which the 
culture in question is viewed influences which aspects of an organization are considered important 
(Choudhry), Reiman and Oedewald (2004) claim “organizational culture refers to values, norms 
and underlying assumptions forming over time during the company history and affecting all the 
company’s activities and are in turn affected by them”  (Reiman and Oedewald). This depicts the 
cultural overlap within an organizational setting and is representative of the entity view.  The 
aspect view suggest that culture analysis must be context-specific and related to a central issue or 
object.  The nature of organizational culture has been a vigorous debate for almost 40 years. There 
is universal agreement that it exists, and that it plays a crucial role in shaping behavior in 
organizations.  However, there is little consensus on what organizational culture actually is, how 
it influences behavior, and whether it is something leaders can change (Guldenmund 2000). 
Organizational culture tends to reflect how people behave, how things are done, and the 
underlying values and beliefs of the organization (Ali at el.).  The perception of the resulting 
attitudes and behavior help to establish the climate of the organization.  The relationship between 
culture and climate can be complex and confusing but the concepts are useful tools for 
understanding the dynamics of institutional behavior and to foster organization improvement 
(Peterson and Spencer).  
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4.2. Organizational Climate 
 The antecedent of organizational culture is organizational climate.    In the 1970s, much 
research was undertaken under the title of organizational climate.  Gradually, during the 1980s, 
the term culture replaced the term climate in this type of research. The development of these 
concepts has been successive rather than in parallel. While related, they currently represent 
different concepts (Guldenmund 2000). Organizational climate can be viewed as a collective 
subjective construct in which there are multiple subsystem climates that can be referenced to 
criteria such as structure, effectiveness, and safety.  Climate can be analyzed across levels over 
time and considered to be the individual descriptions of the social setting or context of which the 
person is part (Falcione et al).   Climate as has been defined as the enduring quality of the total 
organization that is experienced by the occupants, influences   further   behavior, and   can   be 
described in terms of the values of a particular set of characteristics of the organization (Tagore). 
Research on organizational climate requires the measurement of both objective organizational 
conditions and the individual perceptions of those conditions. Climate can be considered as a 
shared perception, a shared set of conditions, or a combination of both (Denison).  
4.3. Culture versus Climate 
The relationship between organizational culture and climate has been a point of discussion 
for over forty years and many authors have addressed the relationship between culture and climate.   
For example, Denison (1996) has claims there is a clear distinction between the two.  Climate 
refers to a situation and how it links to the attitudes and behaviors of organizational members.  
Climate is subject to direct manipulation by people with power and influence because of its 
temporal and subjective nature.   Culture is an evolved context that is rooted in history, collectively 
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held, and sufficiently complex to resist many attempts at direct manipulation (Denison). Another 
distinguish between culture from climate is the way that they can be measured. Climate research 
tends to use quantitative techniques to describe phenomena at a given time from an external 
perspective (Glick).  Climate can be viewed as a 'mood' indicator which reflects the perceptions of 
the organization at a discrete point in time (Cox and Flin). 
Culture research is holistic on nature and employs qualitative techniques and an 
appreciation for the unique aspects of individual social settings   to explain the   dynamic processes 
within the organization (Glick). A culture study is concerned with uncovering unit values and 
beliefs through on-going observations of the individuals in their group. Climate research can be 
characterized by surveys of members’ attitudes about their organization (Cheyne).    
Culture and climate are now often used as interchangeable terms, however there are 
differences (Denison). Climate generally focus on individual or 'group' perceptions of the 
prevailing structures and culture measures generally focus on the patterns of values and beliefs 
that lead to the emergence of these structures (Cooke and Szumal). Culture and climate both are 
learned through socialization and interaction and deal with the ways by which members of an 
organization make sense of their environment (Reichers and Schneider). Climate as describes 
shorter-term characteristics of the organization which indicate how it treats its members.    Culture 
reflects longer-term characteristics which describe the types of people that the organization 
employs (Vereke).  Culture and climate provide different interpretations of the same phenomenon 
in that that climate can most accurately be understood as a manifestation of culture.  As such, a 
‘positive’ culture will be promoted and maintained by a 'positive' climate and vice versa.  Culture 
and climate can be viewed as reciprocal processes in a cyclic relationship (Shein). 
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4.4. Safety Culture 
 Safety culture is an organizational culture which emphasizes safety.  As such, it will exhibit 
the same, or similar, characteristics and relationships with other phenomena as its parent concept. 
The concept of safety culture is important for the understanding of occupational health and safety 
management and can be utilized to determine how to focus safety management efforts by assessing 
its safety culture (Cheyne). 
After the Chernobyl incident, the concept of safety culture became an over-riding priority 
in the nuclear industry.  The main element of safety culture as defined by International Nuclear 
Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) was that safety was a priority commitment in policy, 
management and individual levels.  Individual awareness, responsibility and control are to be 
supported within the immediate work group and the resulting safety behaviors are also reinforced 
through the organizational safety management process and the communication lines within the 
organization.  In 1993, the Advisory Committee on Safety in Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) 
Human Factors Study Group provided an updated definition of safety culture that offered a 
breakdown of the elements required to achieve a good, or positive, safety culture and specify their 
inter-relationships.  Like other definitions of safety culture, the ACSNI definition emphasize 
shared values and beliefs that interact with an organization’s safety structures and control systems 
to produce behavioral norms (Reason 1998). The notion that safety culture is a shared and social 
phenomenon is central to many of its definitions (Cheyne). 
Most of the widely-quoted definitions of Safety Culture treat it as an entity in itself. The 
concept is holistic in nature and safety culture is something an organization ‘is’ rather than 
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something an organization ‘has’.  Safety culture results from a combination of good safety 
attitudes, good safety management established by organizations, and assigning the highest priority  
Table 4.1 Definitions of Safety Culture 
Reference Definition of safety culture 
Pidgeon (1991) The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical 
practices that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees, 
managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered 
dangerous or injurious. 
IAEA (1991) That assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations, which 
establishes that, as an over-riding priority, nuclear plant safety issues 
receives the attention warranted by their significance. 
ACSNI HSC 
(1993) 
The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of 
behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency 
of, an organization’s health and safety management. Organizations with a 
positive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on 
mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety and by 
confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures. 
Kennedy and 
Kirwan (1998) 
An abstract concept, which is underpinned by the amalgamation of 
individual and group perceptions, thought processes, feelings and 
behaviors, which in turn gives rise to the particular way of doing things in 
the organization. It is a sub-element of the overall organizational culture 
Hale (2000) Refers to ‘the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural groups 
as defining norms and values, which determine how they act and react in 
relation to risks and risk control systems’ 
Glendon and 
Stanton (2000) 
Comprises attitudes, behaviors, norms and values, personal 




Those aspects of the organizational culture which will impact on attitudes 
and behavior related to increasing or decreasing risk 
Cooper (2000) Culture is ‘the product of multiple goal-directed interactions between 
people (psychological), jobs (behavioral) and the organization 
(situational); while safety culture is ‘that observable degree of effort by 
which all organizational members directs their attention and actions 
toward improving safety on a daily basis’ 
Mohamed (2003) A sub-facet of organizational culture, which affects workers’ attitudes and 
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Table 4.1 (Cont.) 
Reference Definition of safety culture 
Richter and Koch 
(2004) 
Shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of work and 
safety - expressed partially symbolically – which guide people’s actions 
towards risk, accidents and prevention 
Fang et al. 
(2006) 
A set of prevailing indicators, beliefs and values that the organization owns 
in safety 
Zhang et al. 
(2007) 
The enduring value and priority placed on worker and public safety by 
everyone in every group at every level of an organization. It refers to the 
extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal 
responsibility for safety; act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety 
concerns; strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both individual and 
organizational) behavior based on lessons learned from mistakes; and be 
rewarded in a manner consistent with these values. 
Edwards et al. 
(2013) 
Can be viewed as the assembly of underlying assumptions, beliefs, values 
and attitudes shared by members of an organization, which interact with an 
organization’s structures and systems and the broader contextual setting to 
result in those external, readily-visible, practices that influence safety. 
ACS (2012) A reflection of the actions, attitudes, and behaviors of its members 
concerning safety—these members include the managers, supervisors, and 
employees in the industrial and governmental communities; and the 
administration, faculty, staff, and students in the academic community 
NRC (2014) Safety culture refers to an organization’s shared values, assumptions, and 
beliefs specific to workplace safety or, more simply, the importance of 
safety within the organization relative to other priorities. A strong, positive 
safety culture arises not because of a set of rules, but because of a 
commitment to safety throughout an organization.  
Stuart, R. (2017) 
CSHEMA 
Culture COP 
Safety culture are informal aspects of the organizational operations related 
to environmental health and safety issues. In higher education, the 
organizational mission is teaching, research and service and safety culture 
supports success in those aspects of the institution. 
 
to safety (Cooper). However, a different view presented by Guldenmund that organizational 
culture should be considered as the central theme.  Safety culture is an aspect of organizational 
culture and researchers should focus on how to measure it (Guldenmund 2000). 
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 Numerous definitions of safety culture exist in the academic literature as demonstrated in 
Table 4.1.  The definitions are similar in the perspective of beliefs, with each focusing, to varying 
degrees, on the way people think and/or behave in relation to safety. These definitions tend to 
reflect the view that safety culture is something an organization ‘is’ rather than something an 
organization ‘has’.    The safety culture of an organization to be one in which safety is regarded by 
everyone as being an issue that concerns everyone (Choudhry).  
It has been observed that a positive safety culture implies that the whole is more than the 
sum of the parts.   The various individual components and processes interact a synergistic effect 
where all the people involved share similar perceptions and adopt the same positive attitudes to 
safety producing a collective commitment.   The converse is true in that organizations with a poor 
safety culture, the resulting whole is less than the sum of its parts (Booth and Lee).  
A model for safety culture presented by Cooper proposes that interactive and reciprocal 
relationships exist between psychological, situational and behavioral factors in safety culture as 
well as in organizational culture (Cooper).  Safety culture can be considered a product of multiple 
goal-directed interactions between people (psychological), jobs (behavioral), and the organization 
(situational).  There is perpetual dynamic interplay among people and their environments (Davis). 
People’s attitudes and perceptions about safety can be assessed through safety climate 
questionnaires to provide a measure of the psychological dimension. The behavioral aspects of 
safety culture can be measured through self-reporting procedures.  An alternate is the use of 
observational safety behavioral checklists and trained personnel to observe, quantify, and provide 
feedback.  Audits and inspections that look at the structure of the organization, policies, working 
procedures, and management systems can be utilized to assess the situational aspects of safety 
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culture.  These components can be measured independently or in combination to quantify safety 
culture (Cooper). 
The definitions suggested by the American Chemical Society (2012), the National 
Research Council (2014), and the CSHEMA (2017) can be considered as functional definitions of 
safety culture aimed at academic research laboratories.  The ACS and NRC definitions are part of 
reports that provide a specific frame work to improve safety culture.  The CSHEMA definition is 
the baseline for a working group on improving safety culture.  Zhang provides an excellent 
summary of the properties found in the various definitions of safety culture. There are several 
common features which are detailed below:  
 Safety culture is a concept defined at group level or higher, which refers to the shared 
values among all the group or organization members  
 Safety culture is concerned with formal safety issues in an organization, and closely 
related to, but not restricted to, the management and supervisory systems.  
 Safety culture emphasizes the contribution from everyone at every level of an 
organization. The safety culture of an organization has an impact on its members’ 
behavior at work.  
 Safety culture is usually reflected in the contingency between reward system and safety 
performance. Safety culture is reflected in an organization’s willingness to develop and 
learn from errors, incidents, and accidents.  
 Safety culture is relatively enduring, stable and resistant to change (Zhang et al). 
Aside from general consensus that a positive safety culture is necessary for safe work 
conditions, there is neither an accepted model for safety culture nor a clear-cut definition.  
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Literature reviews by Choudhry, Dongping, and Mohamed (2007) and Guldenmund (2000) of 
academic papers concerning safety culture models concluded that most of the definitions of safety 
culture are very similar and the differences focus on the way people think and/or behave in 
relationship to safety (Choudhry et al., Guldenmund 2000) Safety culture results from a 
combination of good safety attitudes, good safety management established by organizations, and 
assigning the highest priority to safety.   
4.5. Safety Climate 
Like the concepts of organizational   culture and climate are linked, the definitions, 
conceptualizations, and models of safety culture   are linked throughout the literature with the 
concept of safety climate.  The definitions of both safety climate and safety culture tend to be 
global and are often based on the objectives of the researcher.   In general, safety climate looks at 
the perceptions of the group members while safety culture also considers the groups beliefs and 
attitudes (Guldenmund 2000). 
Researchers tend to use safety culture and safety climate interchangeably but safety climate 
studies tend to focus on the way that people perceive safety and does not address actual behavioral 
or situational aspects of safety.  Safety climate should not be viewed as an alternative to safety 
culture because safety climate is an aspect of safety culture and is dependent on the overall 
prevailing safety culture   Safety climate is the more appropriate term for the output from 
questionnaire based surveys. Climate surveys are only capable of sensing surface features 
discerned from the workforce's attitudes and perceptions at a given point in time.  Likewise, 
methodology is one of the main differences between organizational culture and climate (Denison). 
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There are as many definitions of safety climate as there are researchers.  Normally, the 
research uses the definition that best fits their research (Guldenmund 2000).  However, the 
majority of definitions differ from safety culture in common ways. As summarized by Zhang, the 
commonalities of safety climate definitions include: 
 Safety climate is a psychological phenomenon, which is usually defined as the 
perceptions of the state of safety at a particular time.  
 Safety climate is closely concerned with intangible issues such as situational and 
environment factors.  
 Safety climate is a temporal phenomenon, a “snapshot” of safety culture, relatively 
unstable and subject to change (Zhang).   
Various researchers have proposed to use safety climate as an alternative performance 
indicator by correlating their results to the established safety performance indicators like safety 
management audits, accidents and incidents and near-misses.  The first reported measure of safety 
climate using a questionnaire was completed in 1980 for employees in industrial organizations in 
Israel.   Since safety climate studies measure perception of the group’s overall safety level, some 
researchers have suggested that determination of safety climate can be used as a safety 
performance indicator much like safety management audits and accidents, incidents, and near-
misses reporting (Guldenmund 2000).   For example, Cabrera reports a relationship   between 
certain audited management   areas and attitudinal measures. Also, the modification factors 
resulting from their audit and a self-reported accident measure are highly correlated in their study 
(Cabrera et al.). Zohar (2010) reviewed and summarized numerous safety climate studies 
performed for industry that used various types and numbers of questions (Zohar 2010).   
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There are indications that safety climate has a positive effect of safety behavior, but studies 
showing direct correlations have not resulted in clear cut conclusions (Cooper). Safety climate 
research has focused on the methodology to improve measurement scales and predictive validity 
with regard to a variety of safety outcomes.   Guldenmund suggested that climate research should 
focus on the validity of the construct and whether it indeed yields a robust indication of an 
organization’s safety performance and not on the development of new measurement tools  
(Guldenmund 2000).   In agreement, Zohar states that “Safety climate perceptions should thus 
focus on the nature of relationships between safety policies, procedures, and practices, taking into 
account that oftentimes rules and procedures associated with safety compete with those associated 
with other domains (e.g. safety vs. productivity or efficiency)”.   He also claims that research has 
validated safety climate as a robust leading indicator or predictor of safety outcomes and calls for 
the research to approach safety climate in a theoretical manner (Zohar 2010). 
Guldenmund (2000) raises the question of what to do with a given safety culture or climate 
has assessment.   Most safety climate research reports some type of scores on certain dimensions, 
but since most researchers work with their own dimensions or scales there are not any acceptable 
benchmarks He also suggests that an integrative framework be developed that merges safety 
climate with safety culture and delivers categories for both safety attitudes and basic assumptions 
that are open to investigation (Guldenmund 2000).   CSHEMA is offering a standard climate 
survey to its members in an effort to build a database for benchmarking.   The relationship between 
culture and climate can be complex and confusing but the concepts are useful tools for 
understanding the dynamics of institutional behavior and to foster organization improvement 
(Peterson and Spencer).   
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4.6 Safety Attitudes  
Historically, the most prominent framework for the study of attitudes has been the tripartite.  
Attitude is an unobservable psychological construct which manifests itself in relevant beliefs, 
feeling, and behavioral components (Fazio).  A fairly simple attitude model is the ABC model of 
attitude which describes its structure in terms of three components. The Affective component 
which involves a person’s feelings/emotions about the attitude object. The Behavioral (or conative) 
component which is the way the attitude we have influences how we act or behave.  The cognitive 
component involves a person’s belief / knowledge about an attitude object.  One of the underlying 
assumptions about the link between attitudes and behavior is that of consistency.  The principle of 
consistency is when the behavior of a person to be consistent with the attitudes that they hold. In 
theory, this reflects the idea that people are rational and attempt to behave rationally at all times 
and that a person’s behavior should be consistent with their attitude(s). However, even though the 
principle may be a sound one, it is clear that people do not always follow it and often behave in 
seemingly quite illogical ways.  Attitude strength is often a good predictor of behavior in that the 
stronger the attitude the more likely it should affect behavior. Attitude strength involves 
importance and personal relevance and refers to how significant the attitude is for the person and 
how relates to self-interest, social identification and value. If an attitude has a high self-interest for 
a person, it is going to be extremely important and have a very strong influence upon a person's 
behavior. By contrast, an attitude will not be important to a person if it does not relate in any way 
to their life.   The knowledge aspect of attitude strength covers how much a person knows about 
the attitude object. People are generally more knowledgeable about topics that interest them and 
are likely to hold strong attitudes (positive or negative) as a consequence. Attitudes based on direct 
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experience are more strongly held and influence behavior more than attitudes formed indirectly 
(McLeod).   
Employee attitudes play a significant role in an organization’s safety culture. The factors 
that influence safety culture are   norms and rules for effectively handling hazards, positive 
attitudes   towards   safety, and the capacity   for reflection   on safety   practice (reflexivity).   
Along with the addition of senior management commitment, these factors have been described as 
idealized organizational objectives.  The measurement   of employee   attitudes towards safety and 
their perceptions of workplace hazards can thus provide some indication of whether these 
objectives are being met and, in turn, the nature of an organization’s safety climate and 
underpinning safety culture (Pidgeon).   In fact, employee attitudes are one of the most important 
indices of safety culture since these attitudes are often framed as a result of all other contributory 
features of the working environment (Cox and Cox, 1991). The idea that attitudes can be indicative 
of culture is further substantiated in light of the three component description of attitude. Shared 
values and basic assumptions influence the affective and cognitive aspects, while the cultural 
behavioral norms and organizational practices influence the behavioral intention component 
(Cheyne). The application of the ABC model to attitude and potential behavior change, has been 
described as the “winning of hearts and minds” (Cox and Cox, 1996) where both emotions (hearts) 
and cognitions (minds) should be targeted to alter behavior (Cox and Cox, 1996). 
 Much research into the assessment and quantification of culture and climate for safety has 
centered on the use of surveys to determine attitudes and their potential impact on behaviors.  
Studies have used attitude and perception measurement techniques in relation to safety issues in 
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different organizational settings such as industrial gas manufacturing, chemical sector, 
construction, mining, aviation, nuclear, offshore oil production, and metal processing (Cheyne). 
 Additionally, there is widespread interest in measuring healthcare provider attitudes about 
issues relevant to patient safety (safety culture). A standardized Safety Attitudes Questionnaire 
was developed by the University of Texas Center of excellence for Patient Safety Research and 
Practice to establish benchmarking data.  The model demonstrated good psychometric properties 
and it is open access.  The Healthcare industry has embraced it use in several different areas to 
improve patient safety.  The survey measures caregiver attitudes in six patient safety related 
domains. It allows direct comparison with other organizations, to prompt interventions to improve 
safety attitudes, and to measure the effectiveness of these interventions (Sexton).  
Development of safety attitudes is a complex process involving mindfulness, situational 
awareness, and sense-making (Klein 2006).. The process of acquisition, reflection and action is the 
desired pathway for the development of positive attitudes for a strong culture of safety. Awareness, 
recognition, evaluation, and control are considered as the individual aspects of attitude toward 
safety (NRC 2014; Grau 2002; Hamaideh 2004; Chenyl 2000).   
Lab personnel need to be aware of their surroundings and act accordingly.  There are 
numerous hazards and risks associated with working in a research in the laboratory. Researchers 
often work on the cutting edge of science and do not see the potential hazards.  There are federal, 
state and local regulations covering research laboratory safety that need to be considered.  Lab 
personnel must be aware of the resources that are available to lab personnel, like the EHS Assistant 
and web page, and utilize these tools.   While the university, laboratory directors, and co-workers 
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should take every precaution to assure the safety of an individual, the individual lab worker must 
be aware that their safety is ultimately their own responsibility.  
The need to recognize the risks and hazards associated with working in a research 
laboratory is a critical aspect of developing a strong safety attitude. Institutional procedures are in 
place to protect researchers and lab personnel must recognize the need to follow the safety rules 
of their lab.  Training is a key aspect so that lab workers are able to recognize the chemical and 
physical hazards in research laboratories and the specific risks associated with their laboratory. 
The goal is to develop lab worker with an understanding that it is possible to work safely in a 
research laboratory if proper policies and procedures are implemented and followed. 
The need to identify and evaluate potential hazards of an experiment throughout the life of 
a study is another cornerstone of any culture of safety.  Related safety information should be 
reviewed before an experiment is attempted and utilized to make educated predictions about the 
potential hazards inherent in the experiment.  It is necessary for a researcher to look beyond the 
experiment and consider potential worst case scenarios.  A hazard analysis be completed with each 
procedural change to ensure the continuing safety of the project. 
Institution wide administrative protocols and engineered safety features are the first line of 
experimental risk control.  Based on the evaluation step, the next level of control are the specific 
risk controls that are necessary for the planned experiment.  The researcher must consider what 
can be done to do this experiment safe to complete and put those controls in place.  
However, the three validated studies identified in the literature did not find that these four 
aspects were related to the factors extracted during factor analysis (Grau, 2002; Hamaideh, 2004; 
Chenye, 2000). The factor extractions of the three reviewed studies varied slightly with the focus 
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of the individual instrument, but were generally divided into three sub-factors; personal 
responsibility, involvement as part of a team, and institutional responsibilities.  The structural 
model proposed in Chapter Seven utilize sub-factors, Personal, Team and Institution, to describe 
the attitude component of the model. 
4.7. Safety Behavior 
Historically, safety professionals have centered on controlling the physical work 
environment and work procedures of employees in an effort to prevent errors and accidents, such 
as use of standard operating procedures and use of proper personal protective equipment.  A 
complementary approach to safety improvement focuses on the human factors in work accidents. 
Given the inevitability of human error, it is necessary contextualize behavior for greater 
understanding.  Fogarty utilizes the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to examine the human 
factors that contributed to violations in aviation maintenance (Fogarty).  
TPB appears to provide a link between climate and types of workplace behaviors that are 
intentional but unsafe acts. An unsafe act results from the deliberate deviation from the safe method 
of performing a particular task or job or from slips, lapses and mistakes made by individuals 
(Reason 2000).  An individual’s behavior is a direct function of behavior intention and perceived 
behavioral control.   Intentions are themselves shaped by attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived 
behavioral control, which in turn are each based on an underlying belief structure. A person’s 
attitude towards a behavior is determined by their salient beliefs about the consequence of the 
behavior and the desirability of the outcome for each.  Behavior is also influenced by the subjective 
norms which refer to an individual’s perceptions of the beliefs and behaviors of significant others 
also influence behavior.  Perceived behavioral control (PBC) refers to a person’s perception of the 
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ease or difficulty of performing the behavior and is another determinant of behavior intention. 
People often intend to perform certain behaviors, yet fail because of factors that fall outside their 
control (Ajzen 1991).  
            The vignette survey method had demonstrated validity in measuring both socially sensitive 
issues and highly complex constructs. The general method of using vignettes in psychological 
studies involves the presentation of a situation where participants are asked to declare the 
likelihood of reacting to the situation with a given set of possible options reflecting the range of 
the latent trait being studied.  This method has been used successfully in determining a person’s 
perceptions, values and norms in studies of culturally sensitive subjects. Based on the success of 
vignette use in identifying traits in sensitive situations, they may be a very good option for self-
reporting behaviors addressing safety in the research laboratory (Alexanda).  
 A series of vignettes was written reflecting real-life incidents occurring in research 
laboratories over the past five years. Each of these incidents resulted in injuries or damages. The 
option selected in the actual incident that resulted in injuries or damages was included as a possible 
solution along with alternative options ranging from very safe to very unsafe. Multiple vignettes 
were developed to address each of the three aspects of safe behavior in a research laboratory 
(Planning, Practice and Negligence) proposed in the structural model in Chapter seven 
(Jorgensen).   
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CHAPTER 5.  SAFETY CULTURE DEVELOPMENT IN LABORATORY RESEARCH  
5.1. Laboratory Safety in Academia  
   Most universities do not have strict laboratory safety rules similar to those found in 
industry (Backus at el.).   The general consensus is that this relaxed approach toward safety makes 
academic laboratories more dangerous than those in industry (Peplow & Marris). A 2011 editorial 
in Nature contends that academic research laboratories only deal with safety and environmental 
concerns after a substantial accident (Nature).  After the accident, there is a flurry of activity 
focusing on whether the university or principle investigator (PI) could have taken more precautions 
to prevent the accident.  A significant portion of this activity is related to damage control and 
public perception.  Most researchers are well aware of the safety deficiencies in their laboratories, 
but historically too many researchers have a poor attitude in regard to safety and fail to address the 
issues.  This is further complicated by the fact that researchers often see the safety professional as 
a “Safety Cop” whose role is to enforce those “trivial” rules (Elston).  
In an industrial setting, safety is a significant concern and directly linked to job 
performance standards.  Safety is reviewed in the perspective of being a system management 
priority where accidents arise from casual factors that reside at multiple levels within complex 
socio-technological economic systems.  Accidents can result from actions of a frontline worker 
(active failure) but can often be traced to a decision made at higher level of the organization (latent 
failure).  Analytical tools such as risk assessment methodologies are utilized to find potential 
system failures and correct them.  Industrial units tend to be well-defined structures with strong 
management organizations that have the authority to make necessary changes at various levels to 
impact safety (Reason). Ashbrook (2013) contends that universities are governed in a manner 
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similar to small cities where all concerned parties have a voice.  This concept of rule by committee 
makes the application of any system perspective tool difficult because the general structure finds 
the concept of latent failures unacceptable (Ashbrook).  
The PI generally has significant authority over their ‘fiefdoms’ and determines safety 
policy for the laboratory (Backas el at.)  Research conducted by PIs is usually conducted in an 
autonomous manner with minimal administrative oversight as long as the researcher continues to 
bring in money.  Universities are putting increasing pressure on researchers to obtain grant monies 
with significant overhead charges.  Universities take anywhere between 30 to 50 percent of the 
grant for administrative and indirect costs.  Researchers are expected to pay their salaries and the 
salaries of their staff from the grant funds.   Additionally, federal funding is at all-time low and the 
competition for grant money is extremely high.  Most research faculty also has teaching 
responsibilities.  Depending on the university, a teaching load is between two and four courses per 
year which includes class time, preparation time, office hours, and grading.  Schools are admitting 
students with inadequate preparation and demanding that more students pass.  Additionally, faculty 
is required to serve on various committees.  It is not surprising that the typical researcher sees 
safety as just another troublesome requirement (Kroll).  
University research laboratories are unique workplaces due to the number and type of 
potential hazards.  Commonly university laboratories harbor the potential for acute and chronic 
exposure to a wide range of toxic agents.   Every major university has the potential to utilize 
biological, chemical, corrosive, explosive, flammable, physical, and radiological agents in 
research settings (Emery).   Researchers tend to follow the money and apply for grants in “hot” 
areas of research.  This often results in the performance of research outside the researcher’s 
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particular area of expertise.  For example, what qualifies an electrical engineer to do human cell 
tissue culture?  Additionally, the rise of cross-discipline incubator projects has helped to stretch 
and challenge the breadth of expertise of many faculty members. The scope of operations at 
universities is often increasing in complexity due to further collaboration with individuals at other 
institutions.  Therefore, increased organizational complexity and an independent mode of 
operation create a situation where it is especially difficult to build a strong safety culture in 
academia (Askbrook).   
Ashbrook (2013) contends that the underlying reason for the lack of safety culture in 
academia is due to the decentralized nature of academic culture and the general lack of 
accountability.  Laboratories in industry normally have strong lines of management which can 
define a safety strategy and enforce its implementation.  Universities function through the concept 
of shared governance between the Board of Trustees, the administration, the faculty, and 
unofficially, the staff.   Without consensus from all the involved parties, it is challenging to 
implement any program, not just laboratory safety programs.  University administration is 
responsible for developing, publicizing, and monitoring university safety policies.  Faculty should 
be involved in making these policies and have the primary responsibility for their implementation.  
Faculty is also responsible for the primary training of their personnel, be it informal on the job 
training or a formal introduction to the laboratory and its respective safety procedures.  The EHS 
department serves to promote the administration’s policies and act as reference sources for faculty.  
Each party in a positive safety culture has clearly defined roles and must be held accountable 
(Askbrook).  The NRC promotes improved safety culture throughout academic by a commitment 
to safety throughout each university that supports the free exchange of safety information, 
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emphasizes learning and improvement, and assigns greater importance to identifying and solving 
problems rather than placing blame (NRC 2014).  
Improvement in laboratory safety via application of safety culture concepts to an academic 
organization is feasible.   A strong positive safety culture is not a set of rules, but a commitment 
to safety throughout an organization.   The largest challenge to improve safety and regulatory 
compliance in the research laboratory is to instill a mindset change at the university.  University 
administration must make safety a priority and assume responsibility for developing, publicizing, 
and monitoring university safety policies.  Faculty should be involved in making these policies 
and have the primary responsibility for their implementation.  Research leaders must realize that 
they are responsible for the safety of their people and for the primary training of their personnel, 
be it informal on the job training or a formal introduction to the laboratory and its respective safety 
procedures. The environmental health and safety (EHS) department serves to promote the 
administration’s policies and acts as reference sources for faculty. EHS professionals must work 
with administrators, faculty, and researchers to help establish a strong, positive safety culture.  
Each party in a positive safety culture has clearly defined roles and must be held accountable (NRC 
2014, Ashbrook). 
5.2. American Chemical Society Safety Culture Report  
The American Chemical Society assembled a Safety Culture task force to develop 
guidance, suggestions, and recommendations that can help strengthen the safety culture in two- 
and four-year undergraduate, graduate, and postdoctoral programs.  The task force goals were to 
identify the best elements and best practices of a good safety culture and make recommendations 
that could be used by universities and colleges to strengthen their safety culture.  Another goal was 
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to identify tools and resources that would be beneficial to these efforts.  Creating Safety Cultures 
in Academic Institutions: A Report of the Safety Culture Task Force of the ACS Committee on 
Chemical Safety was published in 2012 (ACS 2012).  
Creating Safety Cultures defines safety culture as “a reflection of the actions, attitudes, and 
behaviors of its members toward safety” and suggests seven characteristics of a strong safety 
culture: (1) strong leadership and management for safety; (2) continuous learning about safety; (3) 
strong safety attitudes, awareness, and ethics; (4) learning from incidents; (5) collaborative efforts 
to build safety culture; (6) promoting and communicating safety; (7) institutional support for 
funding safety.  Based on these seven characteristics, Creating Safety Cultures makes seventeen 
Table 5.1 ACS Recommendations to Improve Safety Culture 
Number / Recommendation 
Recommendations Concerning Leadership and Management 
1 Establish the lines of authority for safety; develop a safety policy that includes laboratory 
safety, and includes safety responsibilities in the job descriptions and performance plans of 
all employees. 
2 Encourage every leader to become a proponent of safety and safety education, and to 
demonstrate this care for safety in their actions with other staff members and students. 
3 Establish a strong, effective safety management system and safety program for the 
institution, including laboratory safety. 
Recommendations Concerning Teaching Laboratory Safety 
4 Ensure graduating chemistry undergraduate students have strong skills in laboratory safety 
and strong safety ethics by teaching safety lessons in each laboratory session, and by 
evaluating and testing these skills throughout the educational process (table 1). 
5 Ensure all faculty, staff, and graduate and undergraduate students involved in teaching, 
managing, or overseeing students in laboratory courses and sessions have successfully 
completed a course in lab safety. 
6 Implement hazards analysis procedures in all new lab work, especially laboratory research. 
(Cont.) 
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Table 5.1 (cont.) 
Number / Recommendation 
Recommendations Concerning Safety Attitudes, Safety Awareness, and Safety Ethics 
7 Build awareness and caring for safety by emphasizing safety throughout the chemistry 
curricula. 
8 Include safety education and training (for undergraduate students, graduate students, and 
postdoctoral scholars participating in proposed research) in research grant proposals, and 
oversight of research for safety. 
9 Adopt a personal credo: the “Safety ethic”—value safety, work safely, prevent at-risk 
behavior, promote safety, and accept responsibility for safety. 
Recommendations Concerning Learning from Incidents 
10 Establish and maintain an incident reporting System, an incident investigation System, 
and an incident Database that should include, not only employees, but also graduate 
students, postdoctoral scholars, and other nonemployees. 
11 Establish an internal review process of incidents and corrective actions with the 
Departmental Safety Committee (faculty, staff, students, graduate students, and 
postdoctoral scholars), and provide periodic safety seminars on lessons learned from 
incidents. 
12 Publish or share the stories of incidents and the lessons learned (case studies) to your 
institution’s Web site, a public Web site, or an appropriate journal where students and 
colleagues from other institutions may also use these as case studies for learning more 
about safety. 
Recommendations Concerning Collaborative Interactions 
13 Establish a series of safety councils and safety committees from the highest level of 
management to the departmental level or lower. Each of these committees reports, in turn, 
to a committee that is higher in the hierarchy of the institution. 
14 Establish a close working relationship with EHS personnel at every departmental level, 
seeking their advice and experience in safety, and offering departmental and faculty 
advice to EHS based upon their experience and knowledge of chemistry. 
15 Establish a close working relationship with local emergency responders, so they are 
prepared to respond to emergencies in laboratories. 
Recommendations Concerning  Promoting Safety 
16 Establish a system to promote safety in an institution or department that encompasses: 
electronic communications; printed materials; special seminars or events discussing or 
promoting safety; a recognition system for good safety performance; and a process to 
solicit, review, and act on suggestions for improving safety and identifying safety issues. 
Recommendations Concerning Institutional Support 
17 Identify the ongoing need to support a strong safety culture and work with administrators 
and department chairs to establish a baseline budget to support safety activities on an 
annual basis. 
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recommendations for academic institutions attempting to improve safety culture. (Table 5.1) Each 
recommendation aims to help institutions more strongly demonstrate the seven characteristics of 
safety culture that the report identifies.  
Creating Safety Cultures emphasizes the importance of safety education in undergraduate 
teaching laboratories. The expectation is that strong safety education during undergraduate studies 
will translate to graduate students with stronger safety ethics and will lead to stronger safety culture 
in academic labs.  In turn, the overall quality of safety in research will increase. Like the responses 
to the ULCA and Texas Tech incidents, Creating Safety Cultures emphasizes the need for 
reporting systems, investigation systems, and a database of safety incidents with the belief that 
incident reporting supports continuous learning about safety. In addition to its broader 
recommendations about strengthening safety culture, the Creating Safety Cultures offers 
suggestions for the duties that the entire hierarchy of academic laboratories, from university 
presidents, to principal investigators and faculty, to laboratory staff, might undertake to improve 
safety culture. 
5.3. National Research Council Safety Culture Report  
In response to the wave chemical incidents, the National Research Council formed the 
Committee on Establishing and Promoting a Culture of Safety in Academic Research Laboratories. 
Its purpose was to look at ways to look at instilling stronger safety practices in chemical research.  
The committee consisted of university academic leadership and safety and health administrators, 
highly distinguished chemistry faculty members, and experts in the field of safety culture and 
human systems integration.  The goal was to move chemical research beyond simple compliance 
to the adoption of a culture of safety in academic laboratories.  Safe Science: Promoting A Culture 
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of Safety in Academic Chemical Research was published in 2014.  Safe Science presents a series 
of findings, conclusions, and recommendations as described in Table 5.2.    The contention is that 
if followed, these recommendations can assist institutions in establishing and promoting a culture 
of safety in academic chemistry research (NRC 2014).   
Table 5.2. NRC Recommendations to Improve Safety Culture 
Consideration Comment  
Institution-Wide Dynamics and Resources 
Finding 1 Safety is emerging as a priority and a core value of many academic institutions 
and of individual laboratories. A strong, positive safety culture is more beneficial 
than a compliance-only culture. 
Finding 2 A strong, positive safety culture is a core element in the responsible conduct of 
research. 
Conclusion 1 If laboratory safety is an unquestioned core value and operational priority for the 
institution, then safety will never be traded for research productivity. 
Recommendation 
1 
The president and other institutional leaders must actively demonstrate that 
safety is a core value of the institution and show an ongoing commitment to it. 
Finding 3 The availability and commitment of university resources to laboratory safety 
vary across institutions. 
Finding 4 Universities often do not provide sufficient incentives to promote a strong, 
positive safety culture. In some cases they may create barriers or disincentives. 
Conclusion 2 University policies and resource allocations have a strong impact on a 
department’s ability and willingness to help provide for a strong, positive safety 
culture. If an institution or individual laboratory wants to develop and sustain a 
safe and successful research program, then it must consider the resources it has 
available for safety and explore research options and requirements accordingly. 
Recommendation 
2 
The provost or chief academic officer, in collaboration with faculty governance, 
should incorporate fostering a strong, positive safety culture as an element in the 
criteria for promotion, tenure, and salary decisions for faculty. 
Recommendation 
3 
All institutions face a challenge of limited resources. Within this constraint, 
institutional head(s) of research and department chairs should consider the 
resources they have available for safety when considering or designing 
programs, and identify types of research that can be done safely with available 
and projected resources and infrastructure. 
(Cont.) 
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Table 5.2 (cont.)  
Consideration Comment  
Finding 5 There is a lack of clarity and consistency about safety roles and 
responsibilities across the university, particularly among faculty, researchers, 
and environmental health and safety personnel. 
Recommendation 
4 
University presidents and chancellors should establish policy and deploy 
resources to maximize a strong, positive safety culture. Each institution should 
have a comprehensive risk management plan for laboratory safety that 
addresses prevention, mitigation, and emergency response. These leaders 
should develop risk management plans and mechanisms with input from 
faculty, students, environmental health and safety staff, and administrative 
stakeholders and ensure that other university leaders, including provosts, vice 
presidents for research, deans, chief administrative officers, and department 
chairs, do so as well. 
Research Group Dynamics 
Finding 6:  There is variability across academia with regard to the involvement of 
researchers at all levels in establishing and sustaining a strong, positive 
laboratory safety culture. 
Finding 7: The deeply rooted hierarchy and highly competitive nature of academic 
research can inhibit the advancement of a strong, positive safety culture. 
Finding 8 Students and postdocs are dependent on the principal investigator for their 
professional advancement. The power differential in this relationship may 
affect group members’ willingness to raise safety concerns. 
Finding 9 Most researchers in academia are still in the early phases of their professional 
development. As such, they may not have the requisite knowledge and skills to 
recognize and understand the risks associated with their work. 
Finding 10  Research is regularly performed independently (including during off-hours 
and alone) and may be carried out with limited or no oversight or feedback. 
Conclusion 3 Contribution and engagement by both principal investigators and by 
researchers through an open and ongoing dialogue are critical to creating a 
strong, positive safety culture. Safety culture is more likely to be sustained 
when safety issues are discussed broadly and frequently as an integral part of 
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Table 5.2 (cont.)  
Consideration Comment  
Conclusion 4 There are several key attributes related to research group dynamics that 
contribute to the advancement of the laboratory safety culture. A strong, 
positive safety culture: includes open communication about safety as a key 
element that is sought out, valued, and acted upon; values learning and 
continuous improvement with respect to safety; includes regular safety 
communication, for example, “safety moments,” in academic research 
events (e.g., seminars, group meetings, doctoral defenses, and teaching); 
and empowers student and research trainees to have a “voice” and 
maintain an environment that encourages raising safety concerns freely 
without fear of repercussions. 
Conclusion 5 A research group with a strong, positive safety culture engages with 
environmental health and safety personnel collaboratively. 
Recommendation 
5 
Department chairs and principal investigators should make greater use of 
teams, groups, and other engagement strategies and institutional support 
organizations (e.g., environmental health and safety, facilities), to establish 
and promote a strong, positive, safety culture. 
Recommendation 
6 
Department chairs should provide a mechanism for creating a robust safety 
collaboration between researchers, principal investigators, and 
environmental health and safety personnel. 
Data, Hazard Identification, and Analysis 
Finding 11 Leading indicators from hazard analysis, risk mitigation, and best practices 
are not being widely used in laboratory safety planning. Often these data 
are not being collected for academic and non-industrial laboratories. 
Finding 12 Incident and near-miss data are important sources of information for 
driving improved safety performance and for monitoring progress. Such 
key data are often repressed or distorted when there is a punitive approach 
in response to incidents. 
Conclusion 6 Information is a key input to establishing and promoting a strong, positive 
safety culture. Incident and near-miss reports are important learning tools 
for laboratory safety, but presently are not effectively reported, compiled, 
analyzed, and disseminated within the research community. To ensure that 
useful data are available, a change in reporting and the availability and 
sharing of information is necessary. 
(Cont.) 
  
    
80 
 
Table 5.2 (cont.)  
Consideration Comment  
Finding 13 Researchers may not understand or appreciate the hazards of chemical 
materials and procedures in their work. This may be especially relevant for 
departments in which researchers typically have less training in chemistry 
(e.g., molecular biology, biochemistry, and engineering), yet often work 
with potentially hazardous materials or procedures 
Recommendation 
7 
 Organizations should incorporate non-punitive incident and near-miss 
reporting as part of their safety cultures. The American Chemical Society, 
Association of American Universities, Association of Public and Land-
grant Universities, and American Council on Education should work 
together to establish and maintain an anonymous reporting system, building 
on industry efforts, for centralizing the collection of information about and 
lessons learned from incidents and near misses in academic laboratories, 
and linking these data to the scientific literature. Department chairs and 
university leadership should incorporate the use of this system into their 
safety planning. Principal investigators should require their students to 
utilize this system. 
Finding 14  Hazard analysis is not routinely incorporated into experimental designs, 
procedures, and records in academia. 
Conclusion 7 Routine hazard analysis is a critical component in research planning and 
execution. It represents an element of a strong, positive safety culture. 
Comprehensive hazard analysis and the use of engineering controls are 
especially important for experiments that are new to the individual and/or 
are being scaled-up. 
Recommendation 
8 
The researcher and principal investigator should incorporate hazard analysis 
into laboratory notebooks prior to experiments, integrate hazard analysis 
into the research process, and ensure that it is specific to the laboratory and 
research topic area. 
Training and Learning 
Finding 15 Laboratory safety training is highly variable across institutions, 
departments, and research groups. 
Conclusion 8 A high-quality training program is an important element of a strong, 
positive safety culture. 
Finding 16 There is a lack of comprehensive, early, and individual-laboratory-centric 
training and education for researchers, principal investigators, and in some 
cases, environmental health and safety staff. Many researchers arrive at a 
new institution or in a new laboratory without proper training or 
appreciation for appropriate safe laboratory practice. 
(Cont). 
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Table 5.2 (cont.)  
Consideration Comment  
Conclusion 9 Classroom and online training is necessary but not sufficient to ensure 
knowledge, skills, qualifications, and abilities to perform safely in a 
laboratory environment and to establish a strong, positive safety culture. 
Recommendation 
9 
Department leaders and principal investigators, in partnership with 
environmental health and safety personnel, should develop and implement 
actions and activities to complement initial, ongoing, and periodic refresher 
training. This training should ensure understanding and the ability to 
execute proper protective measures to mitigate potential hazards and 
associated risks. 
 
Safe Science is an academic-like document that was the first to have development of a 
safety culture as it primary concern.   Safe Science examines safety systems and culture outside of 
academic chemical research to identify key themes, principles, and methods that are relevant to 
laboratory safety.  Three stages of safety systems and cultures are described.  The technology 
period was where safety was addressed in terms of engineering and administrative controls.  The 
systems perspective is based on the concept of human–systems integration (HSI) that reside at 
multiple levels within complex sociotechnical systems.  Safety Culture represent the third epoch 
of modern safety management (NRC 2014).   
Safe Science addresses the current state of laboratory safety in chemical research in 
academic settings.  Current practices and attitudes are reviewed in the context of the current 
hierarchy of actors involved in laboratory safety.  After identifying the strengths and weaknesses 
of the actors, systems are identified that may be established to raise the overall safety performance 
of academic research labs to improve laboratory safety dynamics. Roles, responsibilities, 
authorities, and accountability for the conduct of safe science in academic research institutions is 
also considered.  
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5.4. APLU Guide to Implementing Safety Culture 
The last publication to be considered is perhaps the most useful.  A Guide to Implementing 
a Safety Culture in Our Universities was issued in April 2016 by the Association of Public and 
Land-grant Universities (APLU).  APLU is a research, policy, and advocacy organization 
dedicated to strengthening and advancing the work of public universities in the U.S., Canada, and 
Mexico.  APLU formed the Task Force on Laboratory Safety to provide research universities with 
recommendations and guidance on the most appropriate strategies to help enhance the culture of 
laboratory safety on each campus (APLU 2).   The task force was created in coordination with the 
Association of American Universities (AAU), American Chemical Society (ACS), and Council on 
Governmental Relations (COGR), is comprised of senior research officers, environmental and 
health safety officers, faculty, and industry and national lab representatives (APUL 1).  All 
universities are called to embrace a renewed commitment to improving the culture of safety for all 
academic research, scholarship, and teaching.  APLU representatives made direct appeals to 
university presidents and Chancellors to utilize the guide and publicize their commitments and 
expectations within their institutions.  
This document presents the roadmap for a university to improve safety culture. The guide 
distills years of thinking about lab safety by presenting 20 specific recommendations synthesized 
from the National Academies, the ACS, and the U.S. CSB. The attitudes, procedures, and 
administrative structures likely to reduce calamities in research labs and other facets of university 
are outlined (Beverly). Table 5.3 presents the APLU core values for building a culture of safety.  
(APLU) 
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Table 5.3.  APLU Core Institutional Values Foundational to a Culture of Safety 
Value Description 
1 Safety is everyone’s responsibility. Each institution should commit to providing a campus 
environment that supports the health and safety practices of its community (faculty, 
students, staff, and visitors) and empowers the community to be responsible for the safety 
of others. A safe campus environment is a right of employment for all categories of 
employees. A safe campus learning environment is a right of all involved in education 
and research. 
2 Good science is safe science. Safety is a critical component of scholarly excellence and 
responsible conduct of research. 
3 Safety training and safety education are essential elements of research and education. 
They instill a culture of safety in the next generation of researchers and future faculty, and 
they are important for our students’ career development and employability. 
4 An improved culture of safety is necessary to truly reduce risk throughout the academic 
enterprise. 
5 It is best to recognize that diverse methods and flexible approaches will be used by each 
institution to develop a strong culture of safety, unique to its situation. 
 
Strong, consistent, and credible commitment from the organization’s top leadership is 
required for any effective safety regime.  Leaders must communicate with and gain buy-in from 
university members at every level, from top administrators, researchers, staff, faculty, and all 
students ranging from advanced Ph.D. candidates to the newest undergraduates. The guide urges 
making safety an explicit, prominent, and consistent institutional priority; providing and requiring 
effective and thorough training; and establishing clear and unified processes for assessing risks 
and reporting incidents and near-misses to allow learning from mistakes. To ensure that such 
learning takes place, postdocs, graduate students, undergraduates, and staff members all need to 
be explicitly empowered “to voice safety questions and concerns to their faculty supervisors, EHS 
offices, and/or safety committee” without fear of reprisal (APLU). 
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Table 5.4. APLU Guidelines to Improve Safety Culture 
Value Consideration 
INSTITUTION-WIDE DYNAMICS AND RESOURCES 
President/chancellor 
1 Renews commitment to improve the culture of safety for all academic research, 
scholarship, and teaching. 
2 Designates a campus lead and leadership team to begin the process. Considers 
appropriate committees to help implement a culture of safety, including a safety 
committee of faculty, Environmental Health and Safety (EH&S) officers, and other 
representatives who can provide formative feedback to researchers, educators, and 
staff. 
The campus lead and leadership team  
3 Conduct campus dialogues with stakeholders to develop a shared vision of safety 
that aligns with the institutional mission and to develop an action plan. 
4 Develop effective safety policies, procedures, and management systems, and identify 
the resources necessary for implementation. Establish recognition and reward 
systems and integrate these into tenure and promotion, hiring, and annual 
performance reviews. 
5 Clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders. 
6 With the faculty, embed safety communication in laboratories, classes, departments 
and throughout the wider campus. 
7 With the faculty, work to create a trusting and safe culture. Encourage the 
development of a generative culture based on open dialogue, reporting, and learning 
from near misses, as described by the National Academy of Sciences. 
  
Institution  
8 Develops a risk assessment process for laboratory safety that is integral to all activities 
conducted in the laboratory or the field. 
9 Establishes a unified administrative reporting model that connects responsibility for 
development and implementation of academic safety policies. The model should fall 
under one administrative pillar in the institution and should include faculty, EH&S 
officers, and administrative leaders. 
10 Empowers undergraduate students, graduate students, postdoctoral fellows, and staff 
to voice safety questions and concerns to their faculty supervisors, EH&S offices, 
and/or safety committee. 
11 Works to strengthen collegial and collaborative relationships between faculty and 
EH&S staff. 
12 Works to enhance effective working relationships with first responders. 
(cont.) 
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Table 5.4 (cont.) 
Value  Consideration 
Data, hazard identification, and analysis 
Institution 
13 Implements routine hazard analyses and includes them as integral components of 
undergraduate and graduate education; thesis, dissertation, and funding proposals; and 
experimental design for all experiments. 
14 Implements a process to report incidents and near misses so that the campus 
community can learn from these incidents. 
Training and learning 
Institution 
15 Provides laboratory safety education and training for students, faculty, EH&S staff, 
and department heads. 
16 Ensures undergraduate and graduate science and engineering curricula include an 
emphasis on safe practices. 
Continuous improvement 
Institution 
17 Conducts self-assessment and bench-marking using measures that can provide 
feedback on whether it is moving to a safer culture. 
18 Develops a continuous improvement system that provides feedback, reassessment, and 
on-going training and learning opportunities. 
19 Develops a system of accountability, including peer-to-peer accountability. 
20 Promotes academic and industrial/government partnerships that allow academic 
researchers to learn from strong and well-developed safety cultures in industrial and 
government laboratories. 
 
The recommendations are organized in four overarching categories: institution-wide 
dynamics and resources; data, hazard identification, and analysis; training and learning; and 
continuous improvement. (Table 5.4) The guide includes an analysis showing the alignment of the 
20 recommendations with foundational reports.   For each recommendation, the task force has 
provided reading lists, tools, strategies, illustrative examples, and/ or best practices drawn from a 
community of stakeholders for implementing these recommendations. These resources were 
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selected to help an appointed campus team navigate the process of strengthening their culture of 
safety.  The task force has provided some actions that university community members can take to 
advance a culture of safety. These delineate the roles and responsibilities of presidents, other senior 
administrators, faculty, deans, department chairs, staff, and students. 
5.5. Values for a Culture of Safety 
The way people think and behave in relation to safety defines Safety Culture. To reduce 
risk throughout the academic enterprise an improved culture of safety is necessary throughout the 
academic enterprise.  Safety culture is reflected by numerous inputs such as attitude, behavior, 
shared beliefs, training, communications, management support, and leadership.  These common 
themes run through the reports reviewed above.   
They all provide information about and methodology to improve safety culture at a 
university level.  Creating Safety Cultures in Academic Institutions stresses teaching of safety 
laboratory practices to ensure that students have the necessary tools to work safety.  Safe Science 
is an academic white paper to ensure that the community is aware of the issues.  In a format where 
a problem is described, an overall conclusion is offered, and finally a recommended course of 
action.  Guide to Implementing a Safety Culture offers a straight direct manual for how to build a 
strong viable safety culture. 
The basic conclusion is that safety is everyone’s responsibility.  If the goal is to have a 
strong culture of safety, LSU must provide a campus environment that supports and empowers the 
health and safety practices of their community.  The flat structural organization, the concept of 
academic freedom, and a general laissez-faire attitude toward safety makes this a difficult process.  
This process must start at upper management with strong commitment and supporting actions to 
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improve safety.  The process also needs to be approached in the lab level.  Students must have the 
proper safety tools, training, and the support of their principle investigator and his management 
personnel.  In short, to improve Safety Culture, there needs to be a renewed commitment 
to make safety a core value for all academic research, scholarship, and teaching. 
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CHAPTER 6.  LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY SAFETY CLIMATE SURVEY  
The purpose of this chapter is to estimate the safety climate at Louisiana State University 
utilizing data from an existing survey.  LSU suffered a natural disaster from hurricane Gustav 
making landfall in 2008 (LPB). This event resulted in the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) providing funding for the university to develop a Hazard Mitigation Plan.  Hazard 
mitigation planning is a systematic process to identify natural and man-made hazards threatening 
communities and to reduce potential adverse impacts through strategies that reduce risks and 
vulnerabilities.  This university developed a Disaster Resistant University (DRU) plan pursuant to 
the requirements of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Gail).  Several surveys, including a survey 
of research personnel about laboratory safety, were conducted in 2011 to support the development 
of the Hazard Mitigation Plan.   
6.1 Introduction  
Both of the terms, safety climate and safety culture have been used to describe workplace 
safety in efforts to improve safety.   Reviews from technical, social, and psychological viewpoints 
have led to the general consensus that a positive safety culture improves job safety, and a safety 
climate survey can be used as a metric to assess safety performance (Ali el at.).  Safety climate is 
a “snapshot” measurement of employees’ perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs about risk and safety.  
Methods to quantitatively measure safety climate have been developed and are considered as one 
of the best indicators of general workplace safety.  Safety climate has also been considered as a 
manifestation of the more broadly defined safety culture (Shein). 
Sections of this chapter was originally published in the Journal of Chemical Health and Safety (23) (4): 4-12).  
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 Zohar (2010) reviewed and summarized numerous safety climate studies performed for 
industry that used various types and numbers of questions (Zohar 2010).  Since safety climate 
studies measure perception of the group’s overall safety level, some researchers have suggested 
that determination of safety climate can be used as a safety performance indicator.  There are 
indications that safety climate has a positive effect of safety behavior, but studies showing direct 
correlations have not resulted in clear cut conclusions Cooper).  Safety climate research has 
focused on the methodology to improve measurement scales and predictive validity with regard to 
a variety of safety outcomes.  Zohar (2010) claims that research has validated safety climate as a 
robust leading indicator or predictor of safety outcomes (Zohar 2010).  
Wu, Liu, and Lu (2007) published a quantitative scaling system to estimate the safety 
climate at several university and college laboratories in Taiwan.  A questionnaire was utilized to 
rank safety concerns on a scale of one to five and the estimation of safety climate was the mean of 
the rankings.  A score of five indicated a high perception of the organization’s safety climate while 
a one indicated a low safety climate.  Items measured included the employee's perception of 
safety climate, chief executive officer's safety commitment and action, manager's safety 
commitment and action, employee's safety commitment, perceived risk, and emergency response 
(Wu at el.).    Gutierrez, Emery, Whitehead, and Felknor (2013) completed similar study using five 
dimensions of safety perception to measure safety climate at five major universities in the United 
States.  The five dimensions included perceptions of risks being managed, employee's safety 
commitment, department and supervisor's commitment, recognition of safety performance, and 
administration's safety commitment (Gutierrez at el.).. 
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In practice, researchers tend to use safety culture and safety climate interchangeably but 
safety climate studies tend to focus on the way that people perceive safety and does not address 
actual behavioral or situational aspects of safety.  Safety climate should not be viewed as an 
alternative to safety culture because safety climate is an aspect of safety culture and is dependent 
on the overall prevailing safety culture (Gadd). However, in the case of academia, safety climate 
may be the only indicator that is readily available due to the lack of resources for determination of 
metrics for behavioral and management studies in academia (Copper)  The results of a safety 
climate study for LSU utilizing a 2011 laboratory safety survey for the Hazard Mitigation Plan is 
presented.  
6.2. Climate Survey Methodology  
A survey of laboratory personnel was conducted in 2011 by students in a graduate level 
environmental science course as part of supporting data for the Hazard Mitigation Plan 
development. The original intent of the laboratory questions was aimed at estimating the impact 
of a hurricane on research laboratories and preparing for future events.  In an effort to quantify the 
safety climate at this university, the survey data was compared to the concepts previously utilized 
for universities to put numerical values on safety climate (Wu at el.).  The initial survey data was 
reviewed and culled to 26 questions relating to laboratory safety concerns in an effort to estimate 
safety climate levels.   
The surveyed group consisted of principal investigators, researchers (post degree 
positions), staff (non-academia researchers), and graduate students that worked within research 
laboratories.   A list of known laboratory personnel was generated using a random sorting method.  
Approximately 150 people were contacted and 85 responded.  The participants were asked fifty 
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questions about their perception of their laboratory including training, facilities, safety equipment, 
hazards, chemical and waste handling, previous events, overall feeling of safety, and areas for 
improvement.    
The survey was conducted via personal interviews.  While extremely time consuming, this 
method allows for elaboration of questions and personal insight regarding the questions.  However, 
the open-ended format also increases the difficulty of coding the questions for accurate statistical 
analysis.  For example, the initial survey contained three questions concerning the use of personnel 
protective equipment (PPE).  The important question about what PPE was being used could not be 
coded and was not used in the climate survey. Another important question regarding individuals 
feeling unsafe had a negative answer and had to be coded differently. The data was coded by 
assigning a numerical value to the responses.   Multi response questions were scored using on a 
Likert-type scale of 1–5, with “no response” assigned a neutral value of three.  Dichotomous 
questions that were answered with “yes” or “no” were also assigned a Likert-type scale of one for 
the negative response and five for the positive response.  The assigned scores ranging from one to 
five were aggregated to reveal strengths and weaknesses linked to the level of safety perception. 
A measure of one represents a very poor safety climate, while five represents an excellent safety 
climate.  
The questions were divided into three groups that correspond to the existing safety climate 
studies performed at other universities.  The primary demographics collected consisted of 
university rank, time of service, building, and department.  Perception of safety was determined 
by answers to questions concerning potential hazards, hazardous events, feeling unsafe, emergency 
response, and security.   The commitment of direct supervision to safety was determined by 
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answers to questions concerning PPE use, enforcement of PPE use, training, inspections, 
housekeeping, standard operating procedure (SOP) use, and access to material safety data sheets 
(MSDS).  Upper management commitment to safety was indicated by the existence of practices 
that support safety such as fire drills, fire extinguisher inspections, and chemical inventory.  
Providing physical safety equipment for the laboratory was also considered in the evaluation of 
the commitment of upper management to safety.   
The data was analyzed using SAS 9.3.  Each question was analyzed separately to determine 
overall mean and the mean by both rank and time of service in the laboratory.  Total frequency 
and two-way frequency were completed by rank and time of service.  ANOVA was completed for 
each question to determine if there were significant differences between rank and time of service 
on each question.  An initial estimate of the safety climate parameter of each safety commitment 
group was provided by the mean of each group assuming equal weight for each question.  Since 
the data contained only two applicable demographic variables, a multivariate regression was not 
performed.  The Cronbach alpha coefficient was determined as a reliability analysis to assess the 
internal consistency of each group.  A factor analysis was performed for each group of questions 
to determine the principle components (questions that are significant in the estimation of safety 
climate).  The safety climate rating of each group was re-estimated using only the principle 
components.  The mean of each safety dimension group was determined assuming equal weight 
for each of the principle components.   The overall safety climate value was estimated from the 
mean of all the principle components assuming equal weight for each component.  
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6.3. Climate Survey Results 
 Demographic information collected from the survey is displayed below in the pie graphs. 
Figure 6.1 shows the academic position of the laboratory personnel who responded to the 
questionnaire and Figure 6.2 demonstrates the length of service in the respective laboratory.  The 
survey participants were identified as graduate students (35%), faculty (24%), researchers (35%), 
and staff (6%).  The length of service demographic indicates that 15% of those surveyed had been  
 
Figure 6.1. Position of Survey Personnel 
 
Figure 6.2.  Length of Service of Survey Personnel 
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in the laboratory for over 6 years, 27% with 3 to 6 years of service, 40% with 1 to 3 years of 
service, and 18% had less than a year of research experience in the laboratory.   Figure 6.3 shows 
the length of service in the laboratory for each ranking.   
 
Figure 6.3. Percentage of Laboratory Personnel by Length of Service and Position 
A goal of the survey was to obtain a representative sample of the whole university to 
determine overall safety and emergency response readiness.  Figure 6.4 gives an indication of the  
 
Figure 6.4. Departments Surveyed 
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departments utilized in the laboratory survey.   The Biological Sciences and Engineering 
Departments, each represented 17% of the total responders.  Agricultural Sciences represented 
13% of the total.  Almost 12% of the responders did not indicate the department in which they 
worked.  Overall, the survey provided a good representation of LSU demographics. 
Table 6.1. Upper Management Commitment to Safety 
Analysis 
Group 
Number Question  Analysis 
Label 
N Mean Std 
Dev 
Cronbach 
 Alpha  
Eigen 
Value 
PHY Q.9 Are fire drills 
performed? 
DRILL 85 3.56 1.76 0.28 1.57 




SHOWER 85 3.63 1.81 0.32 1.39 




EYE 85 4.13 1.62 0.12 1.13 
PHY Q.13 Does the lab 
have hood vents? 
HOOD 85 4.72 1.03 0.31 1.06 
PHY Q.16 Are there fire 
detectors 
suppression 
equipment in the 
lab? 
F_DETECT 85 4.01 1.53 0.19 0.91 




EXTIN 85 4.11 1.22 0.25 0.8 
PHY Q.20 Are chemicals 
inventoried? 
CHEM 85 4.48 1.2 0.35 0.41 




3.99 1.57 0.29 --- 




4.01 1.64 --- --- 
 
 Table 6.1 lists the survey questions that were used to represent upper management’s 
commitment to safety as well as the results of the statistical analysis.  These questions where 
grouped together under the PHY (physical) term for analysis.  Upper management provides the 
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physical safety equipment for the laboratory.  The upper management safety support is also 
indicated by practices that support safety such as fire drills, fire extinguisher inspections, and 
chemical inventory.  There were no significant ANOVA differences in the PHY group.  The mean 
of the PHY group assuming an equal weight for all the questions is 3.99 ± 1.57.  Considering only 
the principle components, the mean of the PHY group is 4.01 ± 1.64. 
 The Department (DEPT) group represents the commitment of direct supervision to safety 
and includes questions concerning PPE use, training, inspections, housekeeping, SOP use, and 
MSDS access. (Table 6.2) There were no significant ANOVA differences in the DEPT group. The 
mean of the DEPT commitment to safety group assuming an equal weight to every question is 3.67 
± 1.66.  Considering only the principle components, the mean of the DEPT commitments to safety 
group is 3.48 ± 1.74. 
 Perception (PREC) of safety included questions concerning potential hazards, hazardous 
events, feeling unsafe, response, and security (Table 6.3).   The only significant ANOVA 
difference in the PREC group was between time of service and the number of hazard events.  
Responders with over 6 years of service saw a significant increase in hazardous events.  The mean 
of the PREC group assuming an equal weight to every question is 3.51 ± 1.45.  Considering only 
the principle components, the mean of the PREC group is 3.74 ± 1.71. 
Multivariate regression was not performed because there were only two applicable 
demographic parameters, length of service and rank.  Additionally, the only significant difference 
in the ANOVA analysis was length of service and number of accidents.  
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Table 6.2. Direct Supervision Commitment to Safety 
Analysis 
Group 
Number Question  Analysis 
Label 






DEPT  Q.14.1 Is PPE required to 
work in lab? 
PPE 85 4.74 0.97 0.49 2.32 
DEPT  Q.14.1 Is the PPE 
requirement 
strictly enforced? 
ENFORCE 85 3.94 1.65 0.41 1.32 
DEPT  Q.18 Has the lab staff 
been trained on 
the proper use of 
extinguishers? 
EX_TRAIN 85 3.31 1.73 0.46 1.1 
DEPT  Q.22 Are there general 
safety 
inspections?  
GEN 85 3.52 1.55 0.42 1.09 
DEPT  Q.23 How would you 




HK 85 1.92 1.36 0.58 1.03 





SOP 85 4.27 1.3 0.43 0.77 
DEPT  Q.30.1 Are there written 
emergency SOPs? 
WRITTEN 85 3.44 1.61 0.41 0.74 




ACCESS 85 3.94 1.14 0.44 0.64 
DEPT  Q.34 Are material 
safety data sheets 
(MSDS) available 
on demand? 
MSDS 85 4.79 0.82 0.5 0.54 
DEPT  Q.6 Were you 
required to 
complete a safety 
training course 
prior to working 
in the lab? 
TRAIN 85 2.85 1.97 0.49 0.45 
DEPT  Summary  Total 
Components  
  850 3.67 1.66 0.49 --- 
DEPT  Summary  Principle 
Components  
  425 3.48 1.74 --- --- 
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Table 6.3. Worker Perception of Safety 
Analysis 
Group 
Number Question  Analysis 
Label 
N Mean Std 
Dev 
Cronbach 
 Alpha  
Eigen 
Value 
PREC Q.15 Does the lab have 
potential for fires 
or explosions? 
FIRE 85 2.69 1.91 0.02 1.86 






the lab or its 
staff? 
EVENTS 85 4.36 1.45 -0.03 1.1 
PREC Q.26 Have you ever 
felt unsafe in your 
lab due to a 
hazardous event?   
FEEL 85 4.15 1.17 0.15 1.03 
PREC Q.27 How would you 
rate your lab’s 
response to 
potential hazards 
in the past? 
RATE 85 3.91 0.78 0.23 0.97 
PREC Q.28 How well do you 
feel/think your 
lab was for 
prepared for the 
hurricane? 
HURR 85 3.62 1.03 0.21 0.82 
PREC Q.42 What is the 
general security 
of the lab? 
SECUR 85 2.11 0.66 0.11 0.69 
PREC Q.44 Are you aware of 
the potential for 
adjoining areas 
that would pose a 
significant risk 
during a lab 
emergency? 
RISK 85 2.86 1.53 0.14 0.56 
PREC Summary  Total 
Components  
  595 3.51 1.45 0.15 --- 
PREC Summary  Principle 
Components  
  255 3.74 1.71 --- --- 
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 To assess the internal consistency within each group, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 
determined for each group via SAS reliability analysis. The Cronbach alpha coefficient is the 
average value of the reliability coefficients that can be obtained from all the possible combinations 
when split into two half tests.  The raw values and not the normalize values of Cronbach alpha 
coefficient are presented in this paper.  The Cronbach alpha value reported for each question is the 
coefficient for the group if that individual item is removed.  The sets of questions used to determine 
the departmental commitment (DEPT) to safety had a Cronbach alpha coefficient of 0.49.   While 
the perception of safety (PREC) and the commitment management (PHY) have even lower values 
of 0.15 and 0.29, respectively.  Since guidelines set a value of 0.7 as minimally acceptable, these 
values indicate that the internal consistencies between questions are very poor and would need to 
be reworded for any future survey (O’Rourke & Hatcher).  
Table 6.4. Summary Values of Safety Climate 
Analysis 
Group 
Number Components  N Mean Std 
Dev 
Cronbach  Alpha  
PHY Summary  Total Components  595 3.99 1.57 0.29 
PHY Summary  Principle Components  340 4.01 1.64 --- 
PREC Summary  Total Components  595 3.51 1.45 0.15 
PREC Summary  Principle Components  255 3.74 1.71 --- 
DEPT  Summary  Total Components  850 3.67 1.66 0.49 
DEPT  Summary  Principle Components  425 3.48 1.74 --- 
Estimated Safety Climate from  Principle Components  1020 3.72 1.71 --- 
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To complete a construct validity analysis, a factor analysis was performed for each group of 
questions to determine the principle components of the group.  Based on the Kaiser Guttman rule, 
only the questions that had Eigen-values over one are significant in the estimation of the indicators 
for safety climate. (O’Rourke & Hatcher).  
The estimation for the PHY group utilized four of the seven questions. The estimation for 
the PREC group utilized three of the seven questions.  The estimation for the DEPT group utilized 
five of the ten questions.  Assuming an equal weight of all the significant questions, the values of 
the perceived safety climate at this University are 3.72 ± 1.71 (Table 6.4).  Although the mean of 
all significant questions was used as an estimate of safety climate, the factor analysis also indicated 
that a significate portion of the survey questions should be reworded.   
6.4. Climate Surrey Discussion  
The values of the safety climate survey for LSU are similar to the American universities 
described in Gutierrez’s publication (Gutierrez at el.).  LSU is also comparable to those universities 
in terms of facility, staff, student size, and amount of research dollars spent.   Tables 6.1-6.3 
describe the mean value of each question and the mean value of each safety group, both with and 
without consideration of component significance.  Table 6.4 is a summary of each safety climate 
group and the overall safety climate value.   
Based on the present study, the safety climate rating for LSU is estimated at 3.72 ± 1.71, 
on a scale of 1–5, with 5 indicating very high perception of safety.   The average safety climate 
value presented for the Taiwanese universities by Wu et al. (2007) was approximately 4.0, which 
was reported as representing a “high” value for safety climate.  This study concentrated on defining 
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the different types of factors that can influence a safety climate value.   Additionally, the study 
utilized a 46 question survey and included over 100 universities (Wu at el.).  Gutierrez, et al. (2013) 
looked at five universities in the United States utilizing a 26 question survey administrated through 
CSHEMA (Campus Safety Health and Environmental Management Association).   Safety climate 
values for the five universities ranged from 3.57 ± 0.92 to 4.16 ± 0.60.  These results are reported 
as indicative of an overall “high” perception of safety on these campuses.   Thus, it appears that 
LSU also displays a high perception of the safety climate based on the present literature. 
While the scales were normalized and questions partially duplicated, direct comparison to 
the safety climate values in the work of Wu et al. (2007) and Gutierrez et al. (2013) is problematic.  
There are differences in the survey questions and methods which relates back to the concerns posed 
by Guldenmund about comparison of climate safety data and Zohar’s call to develop better model 
for safety climate studies (Guldenmung, Zohar 2010).   The survey at LSU was conducted via 
personal interviews.  While extremely time consuming, this method allows for expansion of 
questions and personal insight regarding the questions.  However, the open-ended format also 
increases the difficulty of coding the questions for accurate statistical analysis.  This study lacks 
the level of detail of the Taiwanese study due to fewer questions about safety concerns and 
parameters.   This study only duplicates three of the five safety dimensions used in the American 
study.  The PREC section of this study closely duplicates perceptions of risks being managed in 
the American study.  The DEPT section of this study duplicates department and supervisor's 
commitment to safety in the American study.  The PHY section mimics the administration's safety 
commitment.  Recognition of safety performance and employee's safety commitment parameters 
found in the American study were not included in this study.   
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The significant numerical factors used in determination of the managerial level of safety 
commitment (PHY) at this University were related to providing physical safety items in the 
laboratory like fire suppression, chemical vent hoods, and safety showers which are required under 
building codes. Likewise, the inspection of fire extinguishers and fire drill are items required by 
local fire codes.    At best, the answers in the PHY section provide an estimated indication of the 
actual safety commitment of management. The level of perceived management safety support in 
the American study ranged from 3.72 to 4.14 while the value of management safety support level 
at this University was 4.01 ± 1.64.   
The significant numerical factors for estimation of the perception of safety in the laboratory 
were the potential for fire, past hazardous events, and feeling unsafe in the laboratory.  
Approximately half of the people interviewed believe that there was potential for fire in their 
laboratory.  The number of hazardous events was skewed toward longer length of service and 
showed the only significant ANOVA parameter.   The results of the survey indicate that most 
people feel safe in their laboratory.  Survey responses also indicate that laboratory personnel feel 
that they were relatively prepared for emergencies.  However, the questions about laboratory 
security and potential hazards from other labs indicate the belief that outside hazards have a 
potential to impact their laboratory.  While security was not normally considered as a function of 
safety professionals, its importance increases as regulatory oversight increases. In some cases, 
possible concerns about outside forces could distract from internal safety issues.  The level of 
perceived safety management of risks in the American study ranged from 4.45 to 4.68 while the 
perception level at this University was only 3.74 ± 1.71.   
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In the present study, the significant numerical factors used in determination of the 
departmental level of safety commitment were related to PPE, safety inspections, and 
housekeeping.  Almost all interviewees responded that PPE is required in their laboratory, but the 
scores dropped on the questions concerning enforcement and training for use of PPE.  The survey 
indicated that safety inspections were being conducted, but the types of inspections were not 
covered.  In general, laboratory personnel have the perception that general laboratory 
housekeeping is a problem.   A reasonable number of the responses indicated the existence of 
SOP’s in the laboratory, but the survey did not address additional details concerning formats or 
enforced use.  Approximately half of the responders indicated that no form of safety training was 
required before beginning work in the laboratory.  The level of perceived departmental safety 
support in the American study ranged from 3.31 to 4.19 while the value of departmental safety 
support level at this University was 3.48 ± 1.74.   
Based on careful evaluation of this safety climate survey, both the reliability analysis and 
the factor analysis indicated that the survey could be designed better to quantify safety climate for 
LSU.  In a repeat of the survey, questions also need to be reworked to address the conceptual 
aspects of safety climate.  All dichotomous questions should be converted to multilevel questions 
and use the Likert scale.  
The relative merit of a safety climate study should be considered.  While a valuable safety 
measurement tool, climate surveys only measure one part of safety culture.  Their value as a tool 
increases when the survey is done on a yearly basis and yearly changes can be noted.  Additionally, 
the academia community needs to develop a database from several universities so that baseline 
values are established.  Researches have to recognize the limitations of safety climate surveys.  
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The values of the reported studies at universities indicate that there is a perceived high level of 
safety which almost seems intuitive in nature.  People take pride in their work and become 
accustomed to their daily work environment.  Unless there is a workplace problem or event, they 
feel safe and would tend to perceive their safety in a positive manner. Actually, they are only one 
event away from losing that perception of safety.  It is a duty of an EHS professional to help 
maintain a positive outlook and strive to increase researcher’s attitudes toward increased safety 
levels.  
6.5. Climate Survey Conclusion 
The determination of metrics to estimate a safety level at a university is not an easy task 
and these metrics are hard to define and often difficult to collect.   The goal to quantitatively 
estimate the safety climate at this LSU based on an existing survey was achieved.  Professionals 
on the EHS staff found the results to match their intuitive perceptions of the safety at their 
university and the values correspond with published values at other universities.  However, the 
question of the relative merit of safety climate studies to measure safety culture remains open to 
debate.  Behavioral and situational aspects of safety culture have not been fully considered in 
academia.  Methods to address these concerns at an academic setting need to be furthered 
developed and validated.  Until then, the recommendations presented by the National Research 
Council to improve safety culture should be considered as the best opportunity to actually enhance 
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CHAPTER 7.  CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF SAFETY CULTURE AT 
LOUISIANNA STATE UNIVERSITY\ 
 
The overall purpose of my dissertation research is to determine the nature of and level of 
safety culture in the research community at Louisiana State University.   Safety culture focuses on 
the way people think and/or behave in relation to safety. Safety culture is an abstract concept that 
considers safety in a holistic manner.   Most models for improvement consider safety culture as 
being the end achievement of various inputs such as attitude, behavior, shared beliefs, training, 
communications, management support, and leadership.   
A shortcoming with most safety culture models is the lack of their integration into general 
models of organizational culture.  A model for safety culture presented by Cooper (2000) proposes 
that interactive and reciprocal relationships exist between psychological, situational and behavioral 
factors in safety culture as well as in organizational culture (Cooper).  Safety culture can be 
considered a product of multiple goal-directed interactions between people (psychological), jobs 
(behavioral), and the organization (situational).  There is perpetual dynamic interplay among 
people and their environments (Davies). -People’s perceptions about safety can be assessed 
through safety climate questionnaires to provide a measure of the psychological dimension. The 
behavioral aspects of safety culture can be measured through self-reporting procedures or the use 
of observational safety behavioral checklists and trained personnel to observe, quantify, and 
provide feedback.  However, there honesty concerns with the self-reporting procedures and the 
observational procedures tend to be highly time consuming and not cost effective (Cooper).   
A three component model consisting of Safety Climate, Safety Attitudes, and Safety 
Behavior is proposed to define Safety Culture. (Figure 7.1) A questionnaire was utilized to 
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measure the proposed model.  The Climate sections provides the situational aspect by looking at 
the perception of safety and the overall commitments to safety.  The Attitude section provides 
insight into the psychological nature of safety culture.  The Behavior section provides insight into 
how people behave in a research situation.  
 
Figure 7.1. Safety Culture Conceptual Model  
 
The general concept of structural equation modeling (SEM) is to develop a model based 
on a conceptual overview of the process and then use statistical techniques to determine if the 
model fits.  Safety culture is an abstract concept that is hard to measure.  Safety climate studies 
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have been used to provide a snapshot picture of safety culture but fail because they do not address 
the psychological and behavioral aspects of safety culture.   Structural equation modeling (SEM) 
is a general linear and cross-sectional statistical modeling technique used to determine whether a 
certain model is valid   In this case, the primary interest is focused on the latent constructs which 
are psychological variables like Safety Climate, Safety Attitude, and Safety Behavior rather than 
on the manifest variables used to measure these constructs. Measurement of these latent constructs 
is recognized as difficult and error-prone.  The SEM technique explicitly models measurement 
error to derive unbiased estimates for the relations between latent constructs. To this end, SEM 
allows multiple measures to be associated with a single latent construct.  The model assumes a 
structure of the covariance matrix of the measures.  Once the model's parameters have been 
estimated, the resulting model-implied covariance matrix can then be compared to an empirical or 
data-based covariance matrix. If the two matrices are consistent with one another, then the 
structural equation model can be considered a plausible explanation for relations between the 
measures (Rigdon). 
7.1. Data Collection Method for CFA 
In September, 2015, a peer from Utah State University contacted me for help with a 
dissertation project.  He was trying to develop a model linking training, attitudes, and behavior to 
Safety Culture.  The model would then be confirmed using structural equation modeling.  I was 
happy to help since I was interested in similar research. The EHS Assistant database was used to 
find LSU researchers that had recently completed the three basic on-line training courses (Basic 
Lab Safety, Hazard Communication, and Emergency Response). The EHS Assistant is a 
commercial database that LSU utilizes to maintain chemical/biological inventories, on-line safety 
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training, and compliance issues.  It a permit based system where each Principle Investigator is 
assigned a permit and in turn laboratory space and personnel are assigned to that permit.  
Approximately 120 researchers representing a mix of faculty, staff, graduate student, and 
undergraduates received a hard copy of the Utah State Survey.  EHS collected the surveys and 
forwarded them to Utah State. Several additional schools were included in the Utah State survey 
effort.  In January 2016, an electronic copy of the LSU data already coded for use in preliminary 
analysis was received (Jorgenson).  The attitude and behavior sections of the Utah/LSU data was 
subjected to exploratory factor analysis to determine potential factor loadings for a LSU Safety 
Culture Survey. The principles factor method was used to extract the factors, which was followed 
by a varimax (oblique) rotation.  Two, three and four factor loadings were considered.  All 
statistical work was completed using SAS 9.4. 
A questionnaire was developed to measure safety culture at LSU. The survey and contact 
process was approved by the LSU Institutional Review Board.  The first section of the survey 
covered basic demographics, including position at the university, gender, associated school or 
college, location, and length of time in research.  The level of training and accident experience 
were also included in the first part of the survey.  The second section was based on the CSHEMA 
safety climate survey that was originally presented by Gutiérrez in 2013 (Gutiérrez at el.). The 
climate survey looks at management support for safety, department support for safety, personal 
support for safety, perception of safety, and recognition of safety actions.  CHEMSA is currently 
assisting universities in determination of their safety climates and is collecting the metrics to build 
a bench marking database for reference.  However, to date, no psychometric properties analysis 
has been published on the CHEMSA survey.  The Climate sections provides the situational aspect 
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as a latent construct for Safety Culture by looking at the perception of safety and the overall 
commitments to safety.   
The third section comprises an attitude survey to define another latent construct for safety 
culture.  It is loosely based on the “Safety Attitude Questioner” used in the medical field to improve 
hospital performance by measuring caregiver’s attitudes in patient safety related domains (Sexton).  
The attitude section was modified to consider attitudes of researchers in academic labs by Utah 
State personnel (Jorgensen 1).  The Utah State Attitude questions were used in the LSU Survey 
with only minor changes.  With the exception of CSHEMA, there are very few safety standards 
that can be used as bench marks.   The rational for using the Utah State attitude survey is that the 
data can be used in benchmarking efforts and the preliminary data could be used in an exploratory 
factors analysis.  Using the same data in the exploratory factor analysis and then in a corresponding 
confirmatory factor analysis is a poor statistical practice because in that case the CFA does not 
confirm a theoretical model, it just validates the EFA.   Based on literature reviews and EFA 
analysis of the Utah/LSU data, there are three factors that represent overall safety attitude which 
are institution, team, and personal attitudes.  
The fourth section focuses on behavior as the third part of the model for safety culture.  
Initially the survey was designed using vignette (matrix) methods, which have been used in 
psychological studies (Alexander).  The general method involves the presentation of a situation 
where participants are asked to declare the likelihood of reacting to the situation with a given set 
of possible options ranging from safe to unsafe.  The scenarios used in the survey were based on 
actual incidents from Utah State University.  Again the questions used in the LSU Survey were 
the Utah State questions with minor changes.  
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The people who were requested to complete the LSU survey were determined using the 
EHS Assistant.   An excel spreadsheet was generated containing each lab worker’s name, worker 
designation, department, principle investigator, email, and lab position.  The initial list contained 
approximately 2,400 names.  People with incomplete information and undergraduate workers were 
removed from the list.  Since the target group are scientific “wet” lab researchers all departments 
not doing “wet” lab work was eliminated as potential recipients of the survey.  A final pass was 
made to remove personnel with special circumstance such as retired, recently deceased, or indicted 
for criminal charges.  On March 29, 2016, a cover email containing the links to the survey was 
sent to 1088 researchers at LSU via mail merge.  The email was successfully received by 1033 
people.  After a week, there were 126 survey money responses. A reminder Email was sent to the 
same group on April 7, 2016 which resulted in an additional 106 responses.  On April 18th, a third 
email was sent.  The survey was closed an April 28th with a total of 306 responses.   Survey monkey 
was set up so that all responses were confidential.  Accepting that the survey precipitants were 
“cherry picked”, there was still only a 30% response to the survey.  In general, the responses tended 
to be very positive. 
The data was downloaded from survey monkey in the form of a PDF file, Power Point 
Presentation, and a comma delineated file (CVS).  The CVS file for the climate and attitude 
sections was coded using a seven point Likert scale with the assumption that the scale is linear.  
Both positive and negative questions were included in the questioner to look at relative bias.  On 
the positive questions a value of seven corresponded to the highest positive question while on 
the negative questions, a value of one corresponded to the most positive result.  Missing data 
was replaced with the average Likert scale value for that question.   
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In the behavior section, the initial concept was that each scenario would represent 
planning, practice, and negligence, respectively.  The vignette based behavior data was initially 
coded using a weighted two scale axis.  The vertical axis used a Likert scale from highly unlikely 
to highly likely.  The neutral value was left out of the survey questionnaire.  Additionally, each 
of the four proposed solutions to the problem was ranked from very safe to very unsafe which 
created a sliding scale and areas of reverse coding to account for the possible range of reactions. 
(Smith, 2012) However, the vignette data was not conducive to statistical analysis due to the matrix 
construction itself and poor wording of some of the questions. For example, in response to a 
container venting on a bench top, one option was to pick up the container and put it in the hood.  
While putting something in a hood to prevent exposure is good, picking up a reacting bottle is a 
bad idea.  There was a great deal of feedback on the scenario questions that they were not realistic 
and they were chemical based.  In the future, the existing scenarios and questions will need to 
be reworked and scenarios developed for other disciplines.  
The behavior data was recoded using a much simpler approach.  Industry have 
characterized actions as safe or unsafe for over forty years.  Using a Likert scale, safe act answers 
were give a value of seven corresponding to highly likely.  Unsafe act answers were given a 
value of one corresponding to highly likely.  The recoded behavior data was reviewed for 
completeness.  Several responders did not complete the section or did not understand that each 
question had to be answered.  Where appropriate, an average value was inserted, otherwise the 
data was left blank.  At this point, simple statistics were completed using the SAS Mean and 
FREQ procedures.    
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7.2.  Result of Safety Culture Study 
Demographic results are presented below alone with the graphical presentation.  The 
distribution of personnel rank answering the survey is fairly balanced with faculty at 34%, 
graduate students at 40%, and researchers at 8% and staff at 18%. (Figure 7.2) There were 
slightly more males (56%) responding than females (44%).   
 
Figure 7.2. University Position  
The major scientific work in the in the university are represented with the College of 
Science at 36%, the Agriculture Center with 25%, School of Veterinary Medicine at 14%, 
College of Engineering at 13%, and the College of Energy Coast and Environment at 13%. 
(Figure 7.3) Likewise, there is a good distribution of campus building with Animal Food Science 
/Vet Science at 4%, Choppin/ CMB at 20%, Energy Coastal Environmental at 11%, Howe 
Russell/ Nicholson at 2%, Life Sciences Complex at 25%, Miller/ Sturgis/ RNR at 9%, Patrick 
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of experience of the personnel surveyed tended to be very high with 36% indicating that they 
had over 15 years of experience in the laboratory, 9% with 10 to 15 years, 12% with 6 to 10 
years, 21% with 3 to 6 years, and only 21% with less than 3 years.  (Figure 7.5) 
 
Figure 7.3. Associated School or College 
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Russell/ Nicholson at 2%, Life Sciences Complex at 25%, Miller/ Sturgis/ RNR at 9%, 
Patrick Taylor/ Chem E/ ERAD at 10%, and the Vet Medicine Complex at 12%. (Figure 7.4) 
The level of experience of the personnel surveyed tended to be very high with 36% indicating 
that they had over 15 years of experience in the laboratory, 9% with 10 to 15 years, 12% with 6 
to 10 years, 21% with 3 to 6 years, and only 21% with less than 3 years.  (Figure 7.5) 
 
Figure 7.5.  Experience Level 
The safety training question allowed multiple answers and the largest category was On-
line safety training provided by EHS at 79% responding, closely followed by on the job training 
in the laboratory at 62%, formal research laboratory safety training at 42%, other on-line safety 
training at 38%, as part of a college science course at 37%, and only 2% responded none. (Figure 
7.6).  The question concerning accidents in the laboratory also allowed multiple answers.  Over 
55% of the responders claimed to have never had any sort of incident while 40% stated that they 
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Figure 7.6.  Laboratory Safety Training 
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 Table 7.1 provides a summary of the survey questions, their short name, how they were 
coded, the factor assigned, the mean, and standard deviation. 
Table 7.1.  Summary of Survey Questions  
           
Number Question Name  Coding Factor Mean SD  
Climate Questions 
Q8 If or when I have had a work-related 
safety concern, my safety concern was 
adequately addressed. 
RESPONSE Positive F1 5.8 1.11 
Q9 I am aware of the ways that I can report 
incidents, hazards or near misses. 
AWARNESS Positive F1 5.8 1.23 
Q10 I feel free to report hazardous conditions, 
unsafe behaviors, or safety violations. 
REPORTING Positive F1 6 1.01 
Q11 The safety training I receive at work helps 
me stay safe on my job. 
TRAINING Positive F2 5.8 1.08 
Q12 My work unit is involved in the campus 
safety programs focused on my safety. 
INVOLVEMENT Positive F2 5.5 1.25 
Q13 My department or work unit has taken 
steps over the last 12 months to make my 
work place safe  
PROMOTION Positive F2 5.5 1.34 
Q14 Individuals in my work unit have access 
to the appropriate standard operating 
procedures, tools, and equipment to 
perform their duties. 
SYSTEM Positive F3 6 0.94 
Q15 Individuals in my work unit consistently 
utilize the appropriate standard operating 
procedures, tools, and equipment to 
perform their duties. 
UTILIZE Positive F3 5.7 1.15 
Q16 My department/work unit recognizes 
individual safety achievement through 
rewards and incentives. 
RECONIZE Positive F4 3.4 1.77 
Q17 I have a general sense that campus 
leadership promotes the importance of 
maintaining a safe working/learning 
environment. 
LEADERSHIP Positive F4 5.2 1.34 
Attitude Questions            
Q18 I look out for the safety of my colleagues. CONCERN_1 Positive F7 6.3 0.81 
(Cont.) 
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Table 7.1.  (Cont.) 
Number Question Name  Coding Factor Mean SD 
Q19 When accidents or near misses occur, 
they are seldom reported to the Lab 
Manager, PI or the Department. 
ACCEDENTS_2 Negative F8 4.8 1.73 
Q20 I feel that it is important that ALL safety 
measures are completed before starting an 
experiment. 
MEASURES Positive F6 6.25 0.80 
Q21 Wearing gloves and a lab coat is only 
necessary when working with hazardous 
materials. 
PPE Negative F8 5 2.09 
Q22 I have no responsibility for the health and 
safety of other persons in my lab. 
CONCERN_2 Negative F8 6.4 1.13 
Q23 I am always provided what I need to 
ensure safety in the lab. 
NEEDS Positive F6 5.8 1.25 
Q24 Individuals in my lab would be hesitant to 
report behavior that is unsafe. 
HESITANT Negative F6 5.3 1.67 
Q25 Accidents, injuries, and near misses in my 
lab are seen by the group as opportunities 
for change. 
REPORTING Positive F6 5 1.48 
Q26 I feel it is important to review the 
literature for safety techniques about 
activities in my lab. 
LITERATURE Positive F7 5.6 1.24 
Q27 I feel that unless a chemical is really 
dangerous, it is acceptable to discard it 
down the drain or into the garbage. 
DISCARD Negative F8 6.1 1.24 
Behavior Questions            
Number Question Name  Coding Factor Mean SD 
Dev  
Scenario 1 You are working alone in your lab when you find a 4-L amber glass bottle labeled as Experiment 113b 
sitting on another person's lab bench. You hear and see that the container is venting gas from around the 
lid. Please review the following possible immediate responses and mark the likelihood of your 
attempting each of the given options 
B1A Open the lid to relieve the pressure OPEN Negative F10 6.1 1.42 
B1B Pick up the container, move it to the 
hood, and close the hood sash 
PICKUP Negative F10 3.3 2.22 
B1C Close and lock the door, then go find the 
person responsible for the bottle and have 
them deal with it 
LEAVE Positive F11 4.9 2.04 
 (Cont.) 
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 Table 7.1. (Cont.) 
  
Number Question Name  Coding Factor Mean SD  
B1D Report the condition to your supervisor REPORT Positive F11 6 1.43 
Scenario 
2 
You are conducting an experiment that you have never done before (nor has anyone that you know 
personally), using chemicals that you are not familiar with. This experiment calls for heating a chemical 
that you know very little about, but believe that it is flammable and appears to have a high vapor pressure 
(it evaporates quickly). This procedure was meticulously detailed in a very well written study that you 
recently read in a highly respected and peer-reviewed journal. Based on this information what is the 
likelihood for your addressing this situation with the provided possible actions? 
B2A Write up a step by step procedure and have 
it certified by the EH&S office 
EHS Positive F11 4.1 2.12 
B2B Work with your PI or Department Head to 
develop an SOP 
SOP Positive F11 5.4 1.7 
B2C Run the experiment using equipment and 
methods as close to those described in the 
paper as possible 
RUN Negative F10 2.9 1.89 
B2D Conduct a literature review to determine the 
physical, chemical, and toxicological 
properties of the chemical before running 
the experiment 
REVIEW Negative F10 6.2 1.27 
Scenario 
3 
You are performing a time-sensitive procedure using a series of very expensive chemicals that includes a 
highly volatile and extremely toxic substance. Because of these recognized hazards, you are doing the 
experiment in a chemical fume hood. After about an hour, you begin to feel ill so you leave the lab to 
walk around and get a bit of "fresh air". After being out of the lab for a short time, you begin to feel better 
so you return to work. Almost immediately upon returning to the fume hood, you begin to feel ill again. 
Given this scenario, the time sensitivity of the experiment, and the amount of effort and expense to set up 
the experiment, how likely would you be to do each of the following options? 
B3A Quench (stop) the reaction, close the fume 
hood, and call to have the fume hood 
evaluated and fixed 
QUENCH Positive F11 5.8 1.53 
B3B You finish the experiment because the 
reaction is almost complete, therefore it will 
be OK to tough it out. 
FINISH Negative F10 5.5 1.62 
B3C Ask a fellow lab mate to observe both the 
experiment and you for potential problems 
while you finish 
CONTACT Negative F10 4.9 1.93 
B3D Leave the reaction and the laboratory 
immediately. Contact your PI and ask what 
you should do 
OBSERVE Positive F11 5.7 1.61 
 
An important advance in social science research has been the development of Structural 
equation modeling software in which prediction of latent or unobserved variables are 
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hypothesized. A latent variable is a hypothetical construct, a variable that cannot be directly 
observed. The existence of a latent variable can only be inferred by the way that it influences 
manifest variables that can be directly observed.  The overall goal of Structural Equation Modeling 
is to predict specific relationships between latent variables. This is a two-part process where a 
measurement model is developed and tested using confirmatory factor analysis to verify that 
indicator variables effectively measure the underlying constructs of interest and that the 
measurement model demonstrates an acceptable fit to data. After optimizing the measurement 
model, it can be modified to predict specific relationships between latent variables allows the 
testing of hypotheses that certain latent constructs predict other latent constructs (O’Rourke & 
Hatcher).   
In the case of the climate section of the model, the general outline and divisions presented 
by Gutiérrez were used as the climate model (Gutiérrez at el.).  The model depicted below is a 
second order latent variable model because the latent variables are a hypothetical construct that is 
not directly observed.  The model has to be both linear and additive.  Latent variables are identified 
by short names such as F1 and F2 (F for latent Factor). Each latent factor has a disturbance term 
(D) represents the effects on endogenous variables due to such things as omitted variables, 
measurement error, and misspecification of equations.  The latent variable is inferred from its 
influence on manifest variables. Variables Q8 through Q10 measure the perception of how risk is 
managed (F1), Q11 through Q13 measure the employment commitment to safety (F2), Q14 and 
Q15 measure departmental commitment to safety (F4), and Q18 and Q17 measure management 
commitment to safety (F3).  F1, F2, F3, and F4 define Safety Climate (F5). In the figure manifest 
variables (represented by rectangles) are the variables that were collected from questionnaires 
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completed by participants. Although the hypothetical constructs (represented by ovals) generally 
represent the variables of greatest interest, they are not directly measured. Error variance is 
separated from the core measurement of latent variables using a residual term (indicated by the 
symbol E for Error term) to each manifest variable.   A unique path way coefficients were created 
for a given independent variable and the corresponding latent factor as indicated by an “L” term.  
All latent factors generally are allowed to covay which means that covariance estimates will be 
calculated for every pairing of F variables and represented by a “C” term.  The equations used to 
describe the model are linear and additive relationships and the data is normally distributed. The 
sample size is acceptable and the model is over identified.  
In the original climate model had five factors, the model below only has four.  Manifest 
variables recognize and leadership were combined because each was associated with their own 
latent factor.  It is recommended that each latent variable be assessed with at least three indicators. 
Technically, a latent factor may be assessed with just two indicators under certain conditions and 
is fairly common in the social sciences. However, a single variable representing a factor is not 
acceptable. (O’Rourke & Hatcher).   
In the case of the attitude model, the factors and related variables were based on exploratory 
factor analysis of the attitude data produced in the UTAH survey.  The three components of 
Institution, Team, and Personal were based on literature review (Cheyne).  Institution Attitude (F8) 
is represented by Accents_2 (Q19), PPE (Q21), and Discard (Q27).   Personal Attitude (F7) is 
represented by Concern_1 (Q18), Measures (Q20), and Literature (Q26).  Team Attitude (F6) is 
represented by Concern_2 (Q22), Needs (Q23), Hesitant (Q24), and Reporting (Q25).   




Figure 7.8. Safety Culture Initial Measurement Model  
As stated above, the Behavior data had to be recoded to a simpler format.  Each potential 
scenario action was reviewed to determine if it was safe or unsafe.  Unsafe Acts (F10) is 
represented by Open (B1A), Pickup (B1B), Run (B2C), Review (B2D), Finish (B3B), and Contact 
(B3C).  Safe Acts (F11) represented by Leave (B1C), Report (B1D), EHS (B2A), SOP (B2B), 
Quench (B3A), and Observe (B3D).  
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Internal Consistency is an issue when questionnaires are used in research.  Indices of 
reliability are the most popular measures of internal consistency.  Internal consistency is the extent 
to which the individual items that constitute a test correlate with one another or with the test total. 
In the social sciences, the most widely used index of internal consistency is the coefficient alpha, 
also known as Cronbach’s alpha. The general rule of thumb is that the coefficient alpha values 
should be over 0.70.  However, some social scientists report coefficient alphas under .70 and still 
utilize the data effectively (O’Rourke & Hatcher).  Estimates of internal consistency as measured 
by Cronbach’s alpha using SAS 9.4 PROC ALPHA COOR are within acceptable limits for all the 
culture study variables. The Cronbach Alpha Coefficient based the standardized data is 0.816. 
7.3. CFA Measurement Model Run One 
Based on the Figure 7.8 above, the initial culture model was run in SAS 9.4 using PROC 
CALIS with COV, RESIDUAL, and MODIFICATION options.  The covariance option specifies 
that analyses will be performed on a covariance matrix (not a correlation matrix), the residual 
option requests that the absolute and normalized covariance matrix be printed, and the 
modification option requests Lagrange Multiplier and Wald test modification indices are calculated.  
These indices are useful when determining how the model might be modified if it does not 
demonstrate an adequate fit.  The LINEQS statement was used to indicate which manifest variables 
load on which latent factors using a series of equations.  The VARIANCE statement was used to 
specify which parameters are to be estimated and which are to be fixed.  In a CFA the variances of 
latent factors are set at 1 to address the problem of scale indeterminacy.  Since the latent factors are 
hypothetical constructs there is no established metric or scale which makes it impossible to 
distinguish what is actual relationship between factor variance and factor loading.  The COV 
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statement is used to identify pairs of variables that are expected to covary.  The parameter 
estimation is done by comparing the actual covariance matrices representing the relationships 
between variables and the estimated covariance matrices of the best fitting model. This is 
obtained through numerical maximization of a fit criterion as provided by maximum 
likelihood estimation (O’Rourke & Hatcher). 
The initial model parameters were estimated via the McDonald method and default initial 
values. Then the Levenberg-Marquardt Optimization was utilized for optimization and a 
summary is provided above.  The optimization technique used by CALIS requires the repeated 
computation of the function value (optimization criterion) and the gradient element (first-order 
partial derivatives) until both parameters meet the define requirements (O’Rourke & Hatcher).  It 
took the program 168 iterations before the convergence criterion has been satisfied.  It should be 
noted that SAS log file had a warning that while all predicted variances for the latent variables 
were positive, the corresponding predicted covariance matrix is not positive definite. It has one 
negative eigenvalue. 
 In a CFA, one proves that a data set will verify the proposed model.  If the model provides 
a reasonably good approximation, it should do a good job of accounting for the observed 
relationships in the dataset. In other words, the model should provide a good fit to data. The process 
begins by reviewing significance tests for factor loadings, overall goodness-of-fit indices (e.g., 
SRMR, CFI, and RMSEA), and then proceeds to other indices such as R2 values and modification 
indices (O’Rourke & Hatcher). 
 CFA models need to have a sufficient number of observations relative to degrees of 
freedom to minimize the likelihood of Type II errors. It is necessary for the model to possess 
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sufficient statistical power to reject poorly fitting model and have confidence in reported goodness- 
of-fit indices. (O’Rourke & Hatcher).  Based on a sample size of 290 and 413 degrees of freedom 
the model’s statistical power using the MacCallum method.   The model has a statistical power of 
1.0.  This value is above the recommended power of 0.80 which indicates with the model 
acceptable statistical power. (O’Rourke & Hatcher). 
It customary to examine the chi-square statistic to test of the null hypothesis that the model 
fits exactly in the population (i.e., p > .05).  This statistic is generally significant when the model 
provides a good fit to data.  However, CFA models tend to be more complex than path models and 
the chi-square statistic should not be seen as a bona fide goodness-of-fit index.  Chi-square values 
are useful primarily when modifying models to ensure that changes are statistically significant.   
Since the chi-square is dependent on the degrees of freedom, the ration of the two is considered a 
fit index (O’Rourke & Hatcher).   The chi-square/df of this model is 2.27 which is a little bit higher 
than the acceptable level of 2 which is based on a general rule of thumb.  
There is no universal consensus as to which goodness-of-fit indices provide the best 
reflection of model fit, but it is common practice to report one absolute index (e.g., Standardized 
RMR), one parsimony index (e.g., RMSEA), and one incremental index (e.g., CFI).  SRMR values 
less than .055 are ideal. In contrast, CFI values between .90 and .94 suggest adequate fit, but values 
greater than .94 are more ideal. Similar to the SRMR, smaller RMSEA values reflect good model 
fit.  A RMSEA value above .10 is deemed to be poor; values between .08 and .10 are deemed to 
be mediocre, and values between .055 and .08 suggest fair model fit; whereas values less than .055 
are viewed as most ideal. In addition, the range of RMSEA confidence limits should be relatively 
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narrow; 90% confidence limits between .090 ≥ RMSEA CL90 ≥ .000 are adequate whereas limits 
between .054 ≥ RMSEA CL90 ≥ .000 are ideal (O’Rourke & Hatcher). 
Overall, these values provide a mixed indication that the overall structure of the culture 
model fits the data.  The Bentler Comparative Fit Index of 0.720 suggests that the model does not 
fit.    Standardized RMR of 0.0936 is considered as mediocre.  However, the RMSEA Estimate  
of 0.0663 indicates a fair fit of the model and the 90% confidence limits of + 0.0056 appear to 
relatively narrow.  
A path analysis was conducted to identify the variables that determine variability in the 
dependent variables. The goodness of fit indices does not necessarily reflect the extent to which 
the independent variables in the model account for variability in the dependent variables.  PROC 
CALIS also reports R2 values for all endogenous variables included in the model. These R2 
values indicate the percent of variance in the endogenous variables accounted for by their 
antecedents.  R2 values may range from 0 to 1 with larger values indicating a greater percent of 
explained variance (O’Rourke & Hatcher).   For example, the Perception of Risk Managed (F1) 
is the antecedent for three variables, Response (Q8), Awareness (Q9), and Reporting (Q9).  Q8 
accounts for 28%, Q9 accounts for 43%, and Q10 accounts for 47% of the estimated variance 
associated with F1.  
The model’s path coefficients from a latent factor to an indicator variable represents a 
factor loading term.   If the factor loading term is nonsignificant, it indicates that the corresponding 
variable does not significantly contribute to measurement of the underlying factor and can be 
deleted from the model. It is general practice to interpret and report standardized path coefficients 
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and covariance estimates along with their respective t values instead of unstandardized estimates 
and standard errors.  The t values represent large-sample t tests of the null hypothesis that factor 
loading are equal to zero in the population (O’Rourke & Hatcher). 
In the case of the Culture section, the obtained t values in the output show that all factor 
loadings for the climate section are significant at p < .0001.  All of obtained t values the attitude 
section with the exception of Q25 (reporting) are significant at p < .0001.   Q25 (p = .0056), B1A 
(p = .009) and B2C (p = 0.005) also prove the null hypothesis because t values greater than 2.58 
are significant at p < .01.  B1B, B2D, and B1C fail to prove the null hypothesis and can be 
considered as insignificant factor loadings.   The R2 values for endogenous variables B1B, B2D, 
and B1C account for 2%, 2%, and 0.1%, respectively, of the variance in the endogenous variables 
accounted for by their antecedents.    The obtained t values in the output show that all the variances 
of the exogenous variables are significant at p < .01.   However, the t values obtained for the 
standardized results for covariances among exogenous variables indicates that several pairings fail 
to prove the null hypothesis that covariances are equal to zero in the population.   However, in the 
measurement model all latent variables are allowed to covay and none of the insignificant 
covariances will be removed (O’Rourke & Hatcher). 
PROC CALLIS completes Wald tests to determine what parameters can be deleted from the model 
without negatively affecting goodness-of-fit indices.  In a measurement model, factor loadings that can be 
dropped are the primary concern.  The Wald test indicates that the factor loading between B1C and F11 
could be dropped from the model without significantly affecting the chi-square statistic.  The Wald testes 
also indicates that there are several covariances that could be dropped.    
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The deletion of nonsignificant paths is the most justifiable model revision especially when 
it can be justified on a theoretical basis.  As discussed before the behavior survey was initially 
presented as vignettes where responses where based on a hazardous scenario.  Some of the vignette 
responses were worded poorly and caused confusion with the potential answer. For example, in 
the B1B response to a container venting on a bench top, one option was to pick up the container 
and put it in the hood.  While putting something in a hood to prevent exposure is good, picking up 
a reacting bottle is a bad idea.  Response B1C also offers two optional actions.  It is safe to leave 
the lab but going to find the responsible party is not the best course of action because there is no 
warning sign and the time frame is unknown.     In B2D, the response is to conduct a literature 
review before running a new experiment is not unsafe in itself, it does not add anything.  Journal 
publications tend to not stress hazards or include the numerous failures before success.    
7.4. CFA Measurement Model Run Two 
 Based on statistical data and backed by theory, variables B1B, B1C and B2D and the 
associated path coefficients were removed from the model.  The model was rerun as described 
above.   It took the program 76 iterations before the convergence criterion was satisfied for the 
revised model.  It should be noted that SAS log file still had the warning that the predicted 
covariance matrix is not positive definite because it had a negative eigenvalue. 
The statistical power of the revised model was checked using the MacCallum method.   
Based on a sample size of 290 and 326 degrees of freedom the model’s statistical power remained 
at 1.  The chi-square/df of this model is at 2 which is acceptable based on a general rule of thumb.  
The goodness of fit values indicate that the revised model’s overall structure of the culture model 
fits the data.  The SRMR of the revised model is 0.064.  The Bentler Comparative Fit Index of 
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0.812 is still below the acceptable level.  Standardized RMR of 0.059 is considered as a fair fit and 
the 90% confidence limits of + 0.0066 appear to relatively narrow.    
The obtained t values in the output show that all factor loadings for the model are 
significant at p < .0001 with exception of Q25, B1A and B2C. Q25 and B2C factor loadings are 
still significant at p < .01 due to the size of their t values. At p < 0.0276, B1A fails to prove the 
null hypothesis.  The obtained t values in the output for the revised model show that all the variances 
of the exogenous variables are significant at p < .0001.     
7.5. CFA Measurement Model Run Three 
 In an effort to improve model fit, B1A and the associated path coefficient were removed 
from the model.  The model was rerun as described above.  It took the program 78 iterations before 
the convergence criterion was satisfied for the revised model.  It should be noted that SAS log file 
still had the warning that the predicted covariance matrix is not positive definite because it had a 
negative eigenvalue. 
There was no change in the Goodness of Fit parameters. The obtained t values in the output 
show that all factor loadings for the model are significant at p < .0001 with exception of Q25 and 
B2C. Q25 and B2C factor loadings are still significant at p < .0008 and p < .0014 due to the size 
of their t values. The obtained t values in the output for the revised model show that all the variances 
of the exogenous variables are significant at p < .0001, with the exception of E29 with P < 0.0534 
and a t value of 1.93. 
However, the t values obtained for the standardized results for covariances among 
exogenous variables in the revised model indicates that several pairings still fail to prove the null 
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hypothesis that covariances are equal to zero in the population.   However, the number of 
significant covariances in the revised measurement model dropped to 10 from the initial model 
with 21 significant covariances. 
The revised measurement model provides s fair fit to data as measured by the SRMR, CFI, 
and RMSEA, and narrow 90% confidence limits for the RMSEA.  The revised model retains 
sufficient power to reduce the likelihood of Type II errors to less than 1 in 100. While these 
findings provide support for the revised measurement model, however, additional tests to be 
completed to assess the reliability and validity of the model.   
Reliability refers to consistency of measurement in that a model is reliable if the scores 
upon repeated testing of the same participants. Validity, on the other hand, refers to the extent to 
which an instrument measures what it is intended to measure.  PROC CALIS was be used to assess 
item reliability, composite reliability, variance extraction estimates, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity. Combined, these procedures provide evidence concerning the extent to 
which responses to indicators measure what they are intended to measure. 
Indicator reliability is defined as the square of the correlation between a latent factor and 
that indicator. Indicator reliability estimates are presented in PROC CALIS output in the squared 
multiple correlation values table.  The R2 (“R-square”) values indicates the percent of variance in 
each indicator that is accounted for by the common factor to which it was assigned and are I indices 
of item reliability.  When assessing the contribution to measurement by scale items upon their 
respective factors, R2 values greater than 0.39 are considered ideal (O’Rourke & Hatcher).  In the 
revised measurement model Q8, Q19, Q27, Q21, Q18, Q20, Q25, Q26, Q22, Q23, B2C, B3C, 
B1D, B2A, B2B, B3A, and B3D have R2 values lower than 0.39.  As such, their relevant 
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contribution to the respective latent factor is questionable.  Reliability and validity results for Run 
3 are summarized in Table 7.2.  
Table 7.2 – Model Run Three Composite Reliability and Variance Extracted 
Construct and Indicators 
Standardized 
Loading 










F1  = Q8 0.54 10.393 0.29 0.71 0.62 0.41 
PRECEPTION Q9 0.65 13.7954 0.42 0.58     
  Q10 0.72 16.3087 0.51 0.49     
F2  = Q11 0.64 15.0507 0.41 0.59 0.68 0.49 
EMPLOYEE Q12 0.73 20.2905 0.54 0.46     
  Q13 0.72 19.2735 0.51 0.49     
F3  = Q14 0.66 15.9138 0.44 0.56 0.65 0.5 
DEPARTMENT Q15 0.75 19.5725 0.56 0.44     
F4  =  Q16 0.65 13.562 0.42 0.58 0.63 0.46 
MANAGEMENT Q17 0.71 15.0982 0.5 0.5     
F8  = Q19 0.62 8.7907 0.38 0.62 0.48 0.23 
INSTITUTION' Q27 0.46 6.7723 0.21 0.79     
  Q21 0.33 4.6634 0.11 0.89     
 F7  = Q18 0.59 10.7579 0.34 0.66 0.51 0.26 
PERSON Q20 0.46 7.8678 0.21 0.79     
  Q26 0.47 8.1321 0.22 0.78     
F6  = Q22 0.25 4.2335 0.06 0.94 0.46 0.21 
TEAM Q23 0.52 10.0037 0.27 0.73     
  Q24 0.68 14.4756 0.46 0.54     
  Q25 0.21 3.3579 0.04 0.96     
F10 = B2C 0.23 3.204 0.05 0.95 0.51 0.31 
UNSAFE B3B 0.8 11.3502 0.75 0.25     
  B3C 0.47 3.204 0.21 0.79     
F11 =  B1D 0.47 7.2812 0.22 0.78 0.50 0.22 
SAFE B2A 0.59 9.7418 0.35 0.65     
  B2B 0.48 7.5193 0.23 0.77     
  B3A 0.4 6.2239 0.16 0.84     
  B3D 0.4 5.9912 0.16 0.84     
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It is appropriate to compute a composite reliability index for each latent factor included in 
the model. The composite reliability index is analogous to the coefficient alpha, and reflects the 
internal consistency of indicators measuring a given factor. Like the Cronbach alpha coefficient, 
the composite reliability index values should generally be greater than 0.69 (O’Rourke & Hatcher).  
In this model, none of the composite reality index values meet the level of acceptable criteria.  This 
indicates that the variables do not really describe the corresponding latent factor.   
The variance extracted is estimated to assess the amount of variance captured by factors in 
relation to variance attributable to measurement error.  An estimates value of greater the 0.50 is an 
acceptable level of the variance extracted estimates. An estimate less than 0.50 indicate that 
measurement error is larger than variance captured by the factor (O’Rourke & Hatcher). In this 
model the variance extracted estimates ranged from a low of 0.22 to a high of 0.50.  This also calls 
into questions concerning the validity of the latent construct as well as its indicators. 
7.6. CFA Measurement Model Run Four 
 Based on the Indicator Reliability I (IR), all variables with an IR value below 0.2 were 
removed from the model.  Removing components Q21, Q22, Q25, B2C, B3A, and B3 should 
improve model fit and still leave at least two components per factor.  The model was rerun as 
described above.  It took the program 50 iterations before the convergence criterion was satisfied 
for the revised model.  It should be noted that SAS log file still had the warning that the predicted 
covariance matrix is not positive definite because it had a negative eigenvalue. 
The modifications to the model improved the Goodness of Fit parameters as seen in Table 
7.3. The obtained t values in the output show that all factor loadings for the model are significant 
at p < .0001. The obtained t values in the output for the revised model show that all the variances of 
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the exogenous variables are significant at p < .0001, with the exception of E28 with P < 0.0534 and 
a t value of 1.93.  The t values obtained for the standardized results for covariances among 
exogenous variables in the revised model indicates that 11 pairings still fail to prove the null 
hypothesis that covariances are equal to zero in the population.    
Table 7.3. Model Improvement Summary 
 
Fit Summary    Run 1 Run 
2/3 
Run 4 
Modeling Info Number of Observations 290 290 290 
Absolute Index Chi-Square 937.24 607.54 313.25 
  Chi-Square DF 413 299 158 
  Standardized RMR 
(SRMR) 
0.094 0.064 0.053 
Parsimony Index RMSEA Estimate 0.066 0.06 0.058 
  RMSEA Lower 90% 
Confidence Limit 
0.061 0.053 0.048 
  RMSEA Upper 90% 
Confidence Limit 
0.072 0.067 0.068 
Incremental Index Bentler Comparative Fit 
Index 
0.721 0.821 0.895 
 
 A composite reliability index and indicator reliability for each latent factor was calculated 
for the run four model.   The values for indicator reliability range from 0.21 to 0.56.   The R2 values 
is an indication reliability of an indicator variable and values above 0.39 are considered as ideal. 
In the revised run four model Q8, Q19, Q27, Q18, Q20, Q26, Q23, B3C, B1D, B2A, and B2B, 
have R2 values lower than 0.39.  A composite reliability index and indicator reliability for each 
latent factor was calculated for the run four model.   The composite reliability index estimates the 
reliability of scale responses and should generally be greater than 0.69. The composite reliability 
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index values for the run four model range from 0.50 to 0.68.   The variance extracted is estimated 
to assess the amount of variance captured by factors in relation to variance attributable to 
measurement error.  An estimates value of greater the 0.50 is an acceptable level of the variance 
extracted estimates. In run four of model the variance extracted estimates ranged from a low of 
0.26 to a high of 0.50 as shown in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4. Model Run Four Composite Reliability and Variance Extracted 
Construct and Indicators 
Standardized 
Loading 










F1  = Q8 0.54 10.393 0.29 0.71 0.62 0.41 
PRECEPTION Q9 0.65 13.7954 0.42 0.58     
  Q10 0.72 16.3087 0.51 0.49     
F2-  = Q11 0.64 15.0507 0.41 0.59 0.68 0.49 
EMPLOYEE Q12 0.73 20.2905 0.54 0.46     
  Q13 0.72 19.2735 0.51 0.49     
F3  = Q14 0.66 15.9138 0.44 0.56     
DEPARTMENT Q15 0.75 19.5725 0.56 0.44     
F4  =  Q16 0.65 13.562 0.42 0.58 0.63 0.46 
MANAGEMENT Q17 0.71 15.0982 0.5 0.5     
F8  = Q19 0.62 8.7907 0.38 0.62 0.48 0.29 
INSTITUTION' Q27 0.46 6.7723 0.21 0.79     
 F7  = Q18 0.59 10.7579 0.34 0.66 0.5 0.26 
PERSON Q20 0.46 7.8678 0.21 0.79     
  Q26 0.47 8.1321 0.22 0.78     
F6  = Q23 0.52 10.0037 0.27 0.73 0.56 0.36 
TEAM Q24 0.68 14.4756 0.46 0.54     
F10 = B3B 0.8 11.3502 0.75 0.25 0.6 0.45 
UNSAFE B3C 0.47 3.204 0.21 0.79     
F11 =  B1D 0.47 7.2812 0.22 0.78 0.52 0.27 
SAFE B2A 0.59 9.7418 0.35 0.65     
  B2B 0.48 7.5193 0.23 0.77     
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Removal of the variables with IR levels below 0.2 resulted in a greatly improved model fit, 
even so it can only be described as fair.  It is not possible to remove any additional variables and 
retain the basic requirements of a CFA model.  Therefore, run four model will be accepted as the 
final measurement model 
Factor loading values are shown in Table 7.5, Standardized Effects in Linear Equations. 
The obtained t values in the output show that all factor loadings for the model are significant at p 
< .0001.  The obtained t values in the output for the run four model show that all the variances of the 
exogenous variables are significant at p < .0001, with the exception of E28 with P < 0.0534 and a t 
value of 2.16 
 The t values obtained for the standardized results for covariances among exogenous 
variables in the revised model indicates that 11 pairings still fail to prove the null hypothesis that 
covariances are equal to zero in the population.  As such they represent significant covariances.    
Table 7.5. Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
        Error     
Q8 F1 LQ8F1 -0.54368 0.052 -10.455 <.0001 
Q9 F1 LQ9F1 -0.64464 0.04684 -13.763 <.0001 
Q10 F1 LQ10F1 -0.71564 0.04387 -16.312 <.0001 
Q11 F2 LQ11F2 -0.64371 0.04196 -15.339 <.0001 
Q12 F2 LQ12F2 -0.73014 0.03645 -20.031 <.0001 
Q13 F2 LQ13F2 -0.71551 0.03734 -19.162 <.0001 
Q14 F3 LQ14F3 -0.66449 0.04122 -16.12 <.0001 
Q15 F3 LQ15F3 -0.74146 0.03839 -19.312 <.0001 
Q16 F4 LQ16F4 -0.64649 0.04819 -13.416 <.0001 
Q17 F4 LQ17F4 -0.71394 0.04727 -15.105 <.0001 
(Cont.,) 
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Table 7.5 (Cont.) 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
       Error     
F5 F1 PF5F1 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
F5 F2 PF5F2 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
F5 F3 PF5F3 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
F5 F4 PF5F4 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
Q19 F8 LQ19F8 -0.61216 0.08417 -7.2732 <.0001 
F5 F1 PF5F1 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
Q27 F8 LQ27F8 -0.41041 0.07049 -5.8225 <.0001 
Q18 F7 LQ18F7 -0.60184 0.05415 -11.115 <.0001 
Q26 F7 LQ26F7 -0.45322 0.05775 -7.8481 <.0001 
Q23 F6 LQ23F6 -0.54034 0.05281 -10.232 <.0001 
Q24 F6 LQ24F6 -0.63429 0.05185 -12.233 <.0001 
F9 F6 PF9F6 0.06959 0.0000826 842.4 <.0001 
F9 F7 PF9F7 0.06951 0.0000825 842.4 <.0001 
F9 F8 PF9F8 0.06954 0.0000825 842.4 <.0001 
B3B F10 LB3BF10 -0.82962 0.08676 -9.5624 <.0001 
B3C F10 LB3CF10 -0.46038 0.06605 -6.9703 <.0001 
B1D F11 LB1DF11 -0.56354 0.06717 -8.3897 <.0001 
B2A F11 LB2AF11 -0.5283 0.06704 -7.8802 <.0001 
B2B F11 LB2BF11 -0.56844 0.06721 -8.4575 <.0001 
F12 F10 PF12F10 0.07033 0.0000319 2203.5 <.0001 
F12 F11 PF12F7 0.07025 0.0000319 2203.5 <.0001 
F13 F5 PF13F5 0.38335 0.0003918 978.4 <.0001 
F13 F9 PF13F9 0.37881 0.0003621 1046.2 <.0001 
F13 F12 P13F12 0.37433 0.0003073 1218.3 <.0001 
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Table 7.6. Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable Variable Parameter Estimate Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
Type Error 
Error E8 vare8 0.70441 0.05655 12.457 <.0001 
  E9 vare9 0.58444 0.06039 9.6777 <.0001 
  E10 vare10 0.48786 0.06279 7.7694 <.0001 
  E11 vare11 0.58564 0.05403 10.8399 <.0001 
  E12 vare12 0.46689 0.05323 8.7713 <.0001 
  E13 vare13 0.48804 0.05343 9.1334 <.0001 
  E14 vare14 0.55846 0.05478 10.1942 <.0001 
  E15 vare15 0.45024 0.05694 7.9077 <.0001 
  E16 vare16 0.58205 0.06231 9.3418 <.0001 
  E17 vare17 0.49029 0.06749 7.2646 <.0001 
  E18 vare18 0.63779 0.06517 9.7861 <.0001 
  E20 vare20 0.79477 0.05233 15.1881 <.0001 
  E21 vare21 0.68243 0.07571 9.0142 <.0001 
  E22 vare22 0.7209 0.07084 10.1769 <.0001 
  E23 vare23 0.70804 0.05707 12.4066 <.0001 
  E24 vare24 0.59768 0.06578 9.0862 <.0001 
  E25 vare25 0.67687 0.07641 8.8583 <.0001 
  E26 vare26 0.79459 0.05235 15.1799 <.0001 
  E27 vare27 0.83157 0.05786 14.3731 <.0001 
  E28 vare28 0.31174 0.14395 2.1656 0.0303 
  E29 vare29 0.78805 0.06081 12.9583 <.0001 
Disturbance D5 VARD5 0.94205 0.00208 453.8 <.0001 
  D9 vard9 0.96629 0.00229 421.2 <.0001 
  D12 vard12 0.98838 0.0008971 1101.8 <.0001 
  D13 vard13 0.55404 0.0009166 604.4 <.0001 
 
  




Table 7.7. Standardized Results for Covariances among Exogenous Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
Error 
F1 F11 CF1F11 0.20127 0.09184 2.1915 0.0284 
F2 F10 CF2F10 0.05213 0.08054 0.6472 0.5175 
F2 F11 CF2F11 0.31548 0.08529 3.6988 0.0002 
F3 F10 CF3F10 0.1364 0.08495 1.6056 0.1084 
F3 F11 CF3F11 0.28746 0.09145 3.1433 0.0017 
F4 F8 CF4F8 0.28702 0.10943 2.6229 0.0087 
F4 F10 CF4F10 -0.0333 0.08728 -0.3815 0.7029 
F6 F11 CF6F11 0.37084 0.10278 3.6082 0.0003 
F8 F10 CF8C10 0.35786 0.10671 3.3536 0.0008 
F8 F11 CF8F11 0.08583 0.1166 0.7361 0.4617 
F10 F11 CF10F11 0.1756 0.09185 1.9119 0.0559 
 
7.7. CFA Model Discussion 
The planned analysis was to follow a two-step procedure based on the approach described 
by Anderson and Gerbing (1988). In the first step, confirmatory factor analysis was used to develop 
a measurement model that demonstrated an acceptable fit to data.  The initial model had a Bentler 
Comparative Fit Index of 0.720 and a standardized RMR of 0.0936.  This model fit could only be 
considered as mediocre and could not be considered as validation of the conceptual safety culture 
model.  Variables B1B, B2D, and B1C fail to prove the null hypothesis and can be considered as 
insignificant factor loadings. The deletion of nonsignificant paths is the most justifiable model 
revision. Pickup (B1B) and Review (B2D) were removed as indicators for Unsafe Acts (F10).   
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Leave (B1C) was removed from Safe Acts (F11). The removals also be justified on a theoretical 
basis due to poor wording in these vignettes responses that caused confusion with the potential 
answer.  
 
Figure 7.9. Final Safety Culture Measurement Model 
In Model Run Two, the variables B1B, B1C and B2D and the associated path coefficients 
were removed and the model was rerun.  The goodness of fit parameter for the second model 
improved with a Bentler Comparative Fit Index of 0.812 and a standardized RMR of 0.059.  
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However, at p < 0.0276, Open (B1A) fails to prove the null hypothesis and can be considered as 
insignificant factor loading.   
In Model Run Three, B1A and the associated path coefficients were removed and the model 
was rerun.  The goodness of fit parameters did not change, so indicator reliability and composite 
reliability of the model were calculated.  Reliability refers to consistency of measurement and 
validity indicates the extent to which an instrument measures what it is intended to measure.   The 
composite reliability index reflects the internal consistency of indicators measuring a given factor 
and should have a value greater than 0.69.  In Model Run Three the composite reliability ranges 
from 0.48 to 0.68.  As such, there are potential concerns the variables do not really describe the 
corresponding latent factor.  Indicator reliability values greater than 0.39 are considered ideal.  In 
Model Run Three Q8, Q19, Q27, Q21, Q18, Q20, Q25, Q26, Q22, Q23, B2C, B3C, B1D, B2A, 
B2B, B3A, and B3D have IR values lower than 0.39.  As such, their relevant contribution to the 
respective latent factor is questionable.   
In Model Four, variables Q21, Q22, Q25, B2C, B3A, and were removed and the model 
rerun.  The removed variables have an IR value below 0.2 and were not impacting the associated 
factor.  Their removal improved the goodness of fit parameters (Bentler Comparative Fit Index of 
0.895 and a standardized RMR of 0.058) and still have at least two components per factor.  The so 
indicator reliability and composite reliability of Model Run Four were recalculated without any 
significant improvement so the questions concerning reliability and validity remain.  Even with 
greatly improved model fit, even so the model can only be described as fair.  It is not possible to 
remove any additional variables and retain the basic requirements of a CFA model.  Therefore, run 
four model will be accepted as the final measurement model.  The final measurement model could 
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not be used a SEM model to determine the relations ships between the latent variables.  The SEM 
model would not converge to a final matrix and additional calculations were not possible. 
This work confirms that the conceptual safety culture model is valid and safety culture can 
be described in terms of safety climate, safety attitude, and safety behavior.  The issue with the 
model are related to the initial survey questions.  The safety climate section shows excellent 
psychometric properties.  It was based on a CSHEMA survey that well established and gone 
through several revisions.  The psychometric properties of the attitude and behavior survey 
sections were deficient.  The pilot attitude data did not sync with the final attitude data.  While an 
interesting concept the vignette data did not function well upon analysis due to the dual scaling 
and general confusion on the people taking the survey. While the concept was proved, there is a 
great deal of additional research required.  Fine tuning of both the attitude and behavioral 
questionnaires is required.  An additional consideration is to increase the number of variables used 
to describe the factors.    
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CHAPTER 8.  CONCLUSIONS 
The overall purpose of my dissertation research is to determine the nature of and level of 
safety culture in the research community at Louisiana State University.   Safety culture focuses on 
the way people think and/or behave in relation to safety. Safety culture is an abstract concept that 
considers safety in a holistic manner.   Most models for improvement consider safety culture as 
being the end achievement of various inputs such as attitude, behavior, shared beliefs, training, 
communications, management support, and leadership. All three major safety culture reports, 
Creating Safety Cultures in Academic Institutions: a report of the Safety Culture Task Force of 
the ACS Committee on Chemical Safety, Safe Science: Promoting A Culture of Safety in Academic 
Chemical Research, and APLU Guide to Implementing a Safety Culture in Our Universities 
expand on the individual roles of academic personnel in improving Safety Culture.  
Upper management leadership is key to improving Safety Culture to the point that the 
process is in jeopardy of failing without that support.  At LSU, the role of management support 
has been delegated to the Research Safety Committee (RSC) that has been developed in the last 
few years.  It is already in existence and staffed with key decision makers from LSU and the Ag 
Center, facility, and EHS personal. The APLU report calls for the formation of an institutional lead 
and leadership team responsible for facilitating the building of a culture of safety.  Although the 
LSU RSC should be responsible for this task, it is not clear if this was mandated in the 
establishment of the committee or the subsequent actions by the RSC committee. 
The role of the RSC should be to provide the leadership to promote safety culture at the 
university by engaging all stakeholders to build and implement an inclusive, collaborative plan 
with the institution through effective dialogue.  This process should develop a relationship with 
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departments and faculty to create a trusting and safe culture by encouraging the development of a 
generative culture based on open dialogue, reporting, and learning from near misses.  The previous 
history of communications to the general campus has not achieved these goals.  As a simple 
example, the zero drug tolerance policy has made graduate students warry of reporting incidents, 
let alone near misses.  To date, only small steps have been made in the advancement to ensure that 
safety communication is embedded in laboratories, classes, departments and throughout the wider 
campus.  
Deans and Department Heads/Chairs have a significant role in developing the safety 
culture.  The level of support is as different as the individuals in that role ranging from safety first 
to a laissez faire approach toward safety.  In theory, these academic units should work 
collaboratively with researchers, the RSC, and EHS toward the common goal of supporting a 
culture of safety as a bridge to effectively communicate the importance of a strong safety culture 
to all members of their department and/or college.  As an example of both positive and negative 
aspects of safety commitment is the promotion of safety culture is the Nomex lab coat program for 
high hazard chemistry workers.  A pilot program was funded by RISK/EHS and the results indicate 
that it improved the unit’s safety culture and encouraged workers to wear all their PPE on a 
consistent basis.  However, the program did not generate enough upper level support (College and 
ORED) to ensure future funding.  The Chemistry Chair believed in the program to the point that 
program was expanded to the whole department and internally funded at a loss in departmental 
operating budget. 
Faculty are fundamental in any process to improve safety culture because they manage 
their research area and ultimately are the responsible party for safety in their lab.  Again there is a 
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wide range of safety attitudes among the faculty.  Some facilitate open dialogues about safety, 
conduct a hazard analysis prior to conducting any experimental procedure, and act as a role model 
for good safety behavior.   On the other hand, there are faculty who have poor safety awareness.  
For example, a professor who responded that training on the use of liquid nitrogen is not necessary 
because the process has been done a thousand times and nobody has ever been hurt.    Another 
example is the assistant professor who states that his lab personnel do not need lab coats because 
they only do micro-chemistry.  And even a chaired professor who ignored written standard 
operating procedures to move a full refrigerator with a biohazard sticker.  Until upper management 
makes safety a higher priority, there will be faculty that hinder the development of a culture of 
safety. 
Depending on the Principle Investigator, undergraduate and graduate students, 
postdoctoral scholars, and research personnel are generally not encouraged to voice safety 
questions and concerns to their faculty supervisors or EHS.  Early in my Chemical Safety role, I 
was lecturing a young researcher about something she was doing wrong.  Her reply was that “I do 
not have a green card and I am not afraid of you”.   Hopefully, my mentoring has improved, but 
that one statement enlightened me to the general attitude of personnel in academic research, which 
has not changed much over the last twenty years at LSU.  Undergraduate and graduate students 
are generally deficient in laboratory skills when they enter the research laboratory.  Others, 
especially older generations, learned proper chemical techniques in the lab for a quantitative 
analysis course.  Unfortunately, that course and similar courses are no longer taught on LSU 
campus and we have generations of chemists who learn safety in informal situations.  These issues 
are not limited to chemistry laboratories, but display the situation in the majority of all laboratories 
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on campus in diverse fields of study.  Most students, undergraduate and graduate, do not know 
enough to stop an unsafe procedure, how to report incidents, why standard operating procedures 
are useful, what or when to use the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), or conduct a 
hazard analysis prior to conducting any experimental procedure.  Industry spends months with new 
hires from LSU and elsewhere to install the concept of safety.   The University’s mission is 
research and teaching.  We are failing our students by not teaching them safety. 
What is the role Environmental Health & Safety Personnel in promoting a culture of safety 
at LSU?  Safe Science states the EHS should serve as safety consultants to the academic community 
and work collaboratively with research personnel to encourage open and ongoing dialogue about 
safety.  EHS consist of ten safety professionals to support campus operations with over 800 
research labs.  CSHEMA has developed equations that estimate EHS staffing and budget based on 
the ratio of research/non-research floor space.  Based on these equations, LSU should have a staff 
of 22 safety personnel and an operating budget of 1.5 million (CSHEMA).   EHS does not have 
the staff and resources to mount an effective EHS program. 
Historically, EHS has always been a small department.  Every increase in staffing has come 
from as a direct response to a serious problem, to comply with a new ruling, or a disastrous event.  
Biological safety personnel were added to ensure compliance with the Select Agent program.  
Addition of chemical personnel and the purchase of the Environmental Health and Safety 
Management Database were conditions of the Supplemental Environmental Project that was part 
of a RCRA compliance agreement.  The EHS department has not received a high enough priority 
by the LSU administration.  Since the breakup of the Office of Public safety, EHS initially reported 
to the Office of Information Technology, and currently to Facility and Property Oversite, to 
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managers without a safety background.  The education of management regarding the importance 
of the role of EHS in the University is an ongoing effort. 
The unofficial mantra of the department is “do what you can, with what you have.” Given 
the lack of resources, EHS has done a remarkable job.  Through the implementation of the EHS 
Assistant, compliance tools have been provided to researchers.  Chemical and Biological 
inventory, on-line training, and lab hazard analysis are the primary tools.  EHS and RISK have 
worked together to develop an accident reporting system and investigate all incidents. Perhaps the 
greatest good performed by the EHS department has been the outreach to the academic community 
to help educate lab personnel about safety. 
What is the status of safety culture at LSU?   LSU is firmly entrenched in culture of 
compliance and has not moved to the adoption of a culture of safety in academic laboratories.  
Safety efforts are aimed at compliance with regulations on radiation safety, bio-safety, and 
hazardous waste disposal.  These regulations have enforcement provisions.  LSU is exempt from 
OSHA regulations, although OSHA regulations are followed via Policy State PS-19, and there are 
no enforcement provisions for chemical research.  Unfortunately, there is very little support at 
LSU to improve the culture of safety simplify because as shown by the climate survey analysis, 
most researchers perceive that their labs are safe without further training.   
Institutes only change their culture in response to some type of failure or poor performance, 
and organizations seeking to change their safety culture are often doing so because of some 
significant safety-related problem or perceived vulnerability (Schein). In short, the only way LSU 
is going to improve safety culture is as the result of a significant laboratory accident.  
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RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
LSU DATA 
RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The CONTENTS Procedure 
Data Set Name WORK.TEST_1 Observations 306 
Member Type DATA Variables 39 
Engine V9 Indexes 0 
Created 08/03/2017 12:14:55 Observation Length 368 
Last Modified 08/03/2017 12:14:55 Deleted Observations 0 
Protection  Compressed NO 
Data Set Type  Sorted NO 
Label    
Data Representation WINDOWS_64   
Encoding wlatin1  Western (Windows)   
 
Engine/Host Dependent Information 
Data Set Page Size 65536 
Number of Data Set 
Pages 
2 
First Data Page 1 
Max Obs per Page 177 
Obs in First Data Page 164 




Filename C:\Users\Machine\AppData\Local\Temp\SAS Temporary Files\_TD12916_LAPTOP-
OV06L7T4_\test_1.sas7bdat 
Release Created 9.0401M2 
Host Created X64_8HOME 
 
Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes 
# Variable Type Len Format Informat Label 
28 B1A Num 8   OPEN 
29 B1B Num 8   PICKUP 
30 B1C Num 8   LEAVE 
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Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes 
# Variable Type Len Format Informat Label 
31 B1D Num 8   REPORT 
32 B2A Num 8   EHS 
33 B2B Num 8   SOP 
34 B2C Num 8   RUN 
35 B2D Num 8   REVIEW 
36 B3A Num 8   QUENCH 
37 B3B Num 8   FINISH 
38 B3C Num 8   CONTACT 
39 B3D Num 8   OBSERVE 
2 F2 Num 8   EMPLOYEE 
3 Q1 Char 16 $16. $16. Q1 
4 Q2 Char 6 $6. $6. Q2 
5 Q3 Char 19 $19. $19. Q3 
6 Q4 Char 35 $35. $35. Q4 
7 Q5 Char 19 $19. $19. Q5 
8 Q8 Num 8   RESPONSE 
9 Q9 Num 8   AWARNESS 
10 Q10 Num 8   REPORTING 
11 Q11 Num 8   TRAINING 
12 Q12 Num 8   INVOLVEMENT 
13 Q13 Num 8   PROMOTION 
14 Q14 Num 8   SYSTEM 
15 Q15 Num 8   UTILIZE 
16 Q16 Num 8   RECONIZE 
17 Q17 Num 8   LEADERSHIP 
18 Q18 Num 8   CONCERN_1 
19 Q19 Num 8   ACCEDENTS_2 
20 Q20 Num 8   MEASURES 
21 Q21 Num 8   PPE 
22 Q22 Num 8   CONCERN_2 
23 Q23 Num 8   NEEDS 
24 Q24 Num 8   HESITANT 
25 Q25 Num 8   REPORTING 
26 Q26 Num 8   LITERATURE 
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Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes 
# Variable Type Len Format Informat Label 
27 Q27 Num 8   DISCARD 
1 _ Num 8   3 
 
LSU DATA 
RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The Means Procedure 

















































































































































































































































RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The COOR Procedure 
30  
Variables: 
Q8       Q9       Q10      Q11      Q12      Q13      Q14      Q15      Q16      Q17      Q18      
Q19      Q20      Q21      Q22      Q23      Q24      Q25      Q26      Q27      B1A      B1B      
B1D      B2A      B2B      B2C      B3A      B3B      B3C      B3D 
 




Variable N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum Label 
Q8 290 5.75862 1.11160 1670 1.00000 7.00000 RESPONSE 
Q9 290 5.72069 1.24836 1659 1.00000 7.00000 AWARNESS 
Q10 290 5.99310 1.02222 1738 2.00000 7.00000 REPORTING 
Q11 290 5.83793 1.09003 1693 1.00000 7.00000 TRAINING 
Q12 290 5.48621 1.25398 1591 2.00000 7.00000 INVOLVEMENT 
Q13 290 5.46876 1.32806 1586 1.00000 7.00000 PROMOTION 
Q14 290 6.02772 0.92967 1748 2.00000 7.00000 SYSTEM 
Q15 290 5.69655 1.13652 1652 1.00000 7.00000 UTILIZE 
Q16 290 3.40628 1.77006 987.82000 1.00000 7.00000 RECONIZE 
Q17 290 5.22497 1.34959 1515 1.00000 7.00000 LEADERSHIP 
Q18 290 6.27931 0.79002 1821 3.00000 7.00000 CONCERN_1 
Q19 290 4.80221 1.73277 1393 1.00000 7.00000 ACCEDENTS_2 
Q20 290 6.25690 0.80006 1815 1.00000 7.00000 MEASURES 
Q21 290 4.97241 2.08950 1442 1.00000 7.00000 PPE 
Q22 290 6.43448 1.13646 1866 1.00000 7.00000 CONCERN_2 
Q23 290 5.72672 1.27174 1661 1.00000 7.00000 NEEDS 
Q24 290 5.36207 1.66272 1555 1.00000 7.00000 HESITANT 
Q25 290 4.99310 1.49044 1448 1.00000 7.00000 REPORTING 
Q26 290 5.65172 1.22238 1639 1.00000 7.00000 LITERATURE 
Q27 290 6.10734 1.25292 1771 1.00000 7.00000 DISCARD 
B1A 290 6.05965 1.41908 1757 1.00000 7.00000 OPEN 
B1B 290 3.28676 2.22170 953.16066 1.00000 7.00000 PICKUP 
B1D 290 6.02790 1.42855 1748 1.00000 7.00000 REPORT 
B2A 290 4.12759 2.12277 1197 1.00000 7.00000 EHS 
B2B 290 5.44138 1.70436 1578 1.00000 7.00000 SOP 
B2C 290 2.86507 1.89494 830.87000 1.00000 7.00000 RUN 
B3A 290 5.75000 1.53393 1668 1.00000 7.00000 QUENCH 
B3B 290 5.45134 1.61879 1581 1.00000 7.00000 FINISH 
B3C 290 4.90941 1.92924 1424 1.00000 7.00000 CONTACT 
B3D 290 5.65628 1.60769 1640 1.00000 7.00000 OBSERVE 
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Cronbach Coefficient Alpha with Deleted Variable 
Deleted 
Variable 
Raw Variables Standardized Variables 
Label 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
Q8 0.387199 0.767643 0.414071 0.806850 RESPONSE 
Q9 0.399739 0.766378 0.432494 0.806138 AWARNESS 
Q10 0.511471 0.763991 0.529809 0.802344 REPORTING 
Q11 0.418709 0.766639 0.462172 0.804988 TRAINING 
Q12 0.420164 0.765498 0.474449 0.804510 INVOLVEMENT 
Q13 0.430631 0.764600 0.471873 0.804610 PROMOTION 
Q14 0.371583 0.769292 0.429974 0.806236 SYSTEM 
Q15 0.533314 0.761974 0.576996 0.800482 UTILIZE 
Q16 0.323905 0.768873 0.354775 0.809125 RECONIZE 
Q17 0.385856 0.766478 0.421756 0.806553 LEADERSHIP 
Q18 0.409564 0.769278 0.449896 0.805464 CONCERN_1 
Q19 0.292450 0.770642 0.304038 0.811055 ACCEDENTS_2 
Q20 0.354875 0.770619 0.366486 0.808678 MEASURES 
Q21 0.153871 0.780854 0.139948 0.817183 PPE 
Q22 0.155973 0.776016 0.177956 0.815779 CONCERN_2 
Q23 0.416744 0.765535 0.453046 0.805342 NEEDS 
Q24 0.489944 0.759628 0.510017 0.803121 HESITANT 
Q25 0.162270 0.776767 0.181360 0.815652 REPORTING 
Q26 0.405263 0.766298 0.403557 0.807255 LITERATURE 
Q27 0.327180 0.769344 0.314540 0.810657 DISCARD 
B1A 0.136251 0.777680 0.104101 0.818500 OPEN 
B1B 0.026714 0.790711 0.008890 0.821959 PICKUP 
B1D 0.287542 0.770771 0.268687 0.812389 REPORT 
B2A 0.345046 0.768045 0.316055 0.810599 EHS 
B2B 0.266145 0.772065 0.265444 0.812511 SOP 
B2C 0.051465 0.785454 0.013525 0.821792 RUN 
B3A 0.207175 0.774741 0.193149 0.815215 QUENCH 
B3B 0.382281 0.765743 0.358329 0.808990 FINISH 
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Cronbach Coefficient Alpha with Deleted Variable 
Deleted 
Variable 
Raw Variables Standardized Variables 
Label 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
Correlation 
with Total Alpha 
B3C 0.173043 0.778458 0.165948 0.816223 CONTACT 
B3D 0.193526 0.775666 0.172610 0.815977 OBSERVE 
 
LSU DATA 
RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The CALIS Procedure 




Data Set WORK.TEST_1 
N Records Read 306 
N Records Used 290 
N Obs 290 
Model Type LINEQS 
Analysis Covariances 
 
Variables in the Model 
Endogenous Manifest B1A  B1B  B1C  B1D  B2A  B2B  B2C  B2D  B3A  B3B  B3C  B3D  Q10  Q11  Q12  
Q13  Q14  Q15  Q16  Q17  Q18  Q19  Q20  Q21  Q22  Q23  Q24  Q25  Q26  Q27  
Q8  Q9 
 Latent f12  f13  f5  f9 
Exogenous Manifest  
 Latent F1  f10  F11  f2  f3  f4  f6  f7  f8 
 Error e28  E29  E34  E35  E36  E37  E31  E30  E38  E32  E33  E39  e10  e11  e12  
e13  e14  e15  e16  e17  e18  e19  e20  e21  e22  e23  e24  e25  e26  e27  
e8  e9  D12  d13  D5  D9 
Number of Endogenous Variables = 36 
Number of Exogenous Variables  = 45 
 
Initial Estimates for Linear Equations 
Q8 =  LQ8f1 (.) F1 +  1 e8             
Q9 =  LQ9F1 (.) F1 +  1 e9             
Q10 =  lq10f1 (.) F1 +  1 e10             
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Initial Estimates for Linear Equations 
Q11 =  LQ11F2 (.) f2 +  1 e11             
Q12 =  lq12f2 (.) f2 +  1 e12             
Q13 =  LQ13F2 (.) f2 +  1 e13             
Q14 =  LQ14F3 (.) f3 +  1 e14             
Q15 =  LQ15F3 (.) f3 +  1 e15             
Q16 =  LQ16F4 (.) f4 +  1 e16             
Q17 =  lq17f4 (.) f4 +  1 e17             
f5 =  PF5F1 (.) F1 + PF5F2 (.) f2 + PF5F3 (.) f3 + PF5F4 (.) f4 +  1 D5 
Q19 =  LQ19F8 (.) f8 +  1 e19             
Q27 =  lq27f8 (.) f8 +  1 e27             
Q21 =  lq21f8 (.) f8 +  1 e21             
Q18 =  LQ18F7 (.) f7 +  1 e18             
Q20 =  LQ20F7 (.) f7 +  1 e20             
Q26 =  lq26f7 (.) f7 +  1 e26             
Q22 =  lq22f6 (.) f6 +  1 e22             
Q23 =  lq23f6 (.) f6 +  1 e23             
Q24 =  lq24F6 (.) f6 +  1 e24             
Q25 =  lq25F6 (.) f6 +  1 e25             
f9 =  PF9F6 (.) f6 + PF9F7 (.) f7 + PF9F8 (.) f8 +  1 D9     
B1A =  LB1AF10 (.) f10 +  1 e28             
B1B =  LB2AF10 (.) f10 +  1 E29             
B2D =  LB2DF10 (.) f10 +  1 E30             
B2C =  LB2CF10 (.) f10 +  1 E31             
B3B =  LB3BF10 (.) f10 +  1 E32             
B3C =  LB3CF10 (.) f10 +  1 E33             
B1C =  LB1CF11 (.) F11 +  1 E34             
B1D =  LB1DF11 (.) F11 +  1 E35             
B2A =  LB2AF11 (.) F11 +  1 E36             
B2B =  LB2BF11 (.) F11 +  1 E37             
B3A =  LB3AF11 (.) F11 +  1 E38             
B3D =  LB3DF11 (.) F11 +  1 E39             
f12 =  PF12F10 (.) f10 + PF12F7 (.) F11 +  1 D12         
f13 =  pf13f5 (.) f5 + p13f9 (.) f9 + p13f12 (.) f12 +  1 d13     
 
LSU DATA 
RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Descriptive Statistics 




Variable Mean Std Dev 
Q8 RESPONSE 5.75862 1.11160 
Q9 AWARNESS 5.72069 1.24836 
Q10 REPORTING 5.99310 1.02222 
Q11 TRAINING 5.83793 1.09003 
Q12 INVOLVEMENT 5.48621 1.25398 
Q13 PROMOTION 5.46876 1.32806 
Q14 SYSTEM 6.02772 0.92967 
Q15 UTILIZE 5.69655 1.13652 
Q16 RECONIZE 3.40628 1.77006 
Q17 LEADERSHIP 5.22497 1.34959 
Q18 CONCERN_1 6.27931 0.79002 
Q19 ACCEDENTS_2 4.80221 1.73277 
Q20 MEASURES 6.25690 0.80006 
Q21 PPE 4.97241 2.08950 
Q22 CONCERN_2 6.43448 1.13646 
Q23 NEEDS 5.72672 1.27174 
Q24 HESITANT 5.36207 1.66272 
Q25 REPORTING 4.99310 1.49044 
Q26 LITERATURE 5.65172 1.22238 
Q27 DISCARD 6.10734 1.25292 
B1A OPEN 6.05965 1.41908 
B1B PICKUP 3.28676 2.22170 
B1C LEAVE 4.92686 2.03725 
B1D REPORT 6.02790 1.42855 
B2A EHS 4.12759 2.12277 
B2B SOP 5.44138 1.70436 
B2C RUN 2.86507 1.89494 
B2D REVIEW 6.15862 1.27078 
B3A QUENCH 5.75000 1.53393 
B3B FINISH 5.45134 1.61879 
B3C CONTACT 4.90941 1.92924 
B3D OBSERVE 5.65628 1.60769 
 
 




RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Optimization 
Initial Estimation Methods 
1 Instrumental Variables Method 
2 McDonald Method 




N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
1 LQ8f1 0.64318 0.02093 
2 LQ9F1 0.74628 0.02404 
3 lq10f1 0.73613 0.02400 
4 LQ11F2 0.73145 0.02308 
5 lq12f2 0.89564 0.02790 
6 LQ13F2 0.95698 0.02988 
7 LQ14F3 0.63033 0.01958 
8 LQ15F3 0.82057 0.02513 
9 LQ16F4 1.16440 0.03684 
10 lq17f4 0.94366 0.03023 
11 PF5F1 0.50000 0 
12 PF5F2 0.50000 0 
13 PF5F3 0.50000 0 
14 PF5F4 0.50000 0 
15 LQ19F8 1.22385 0.04085 
16 lq27f8 0.61382 0.02049 
17 lq21f8 0.52554 0.01623 
18 LQ18F7 0.47260 0.01555 
19 LQ20F7 0.34212 0.01116 
20 lq26f7 0.54230 0.01734 
21 lq22f6 0.31400 0.00954 
22 lq23f6 0.68819 0.02054 
23 lq24F6 1.09142 0.03230 
24 lq25F6 0.28205 0.00830 
25 PF9F6 0.50000 0 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
26 PF9F7 0.50000 0 
27 PF9F8 0.50000 0 
28 LB1AF10 0.83026 0.02963 
29 LB2AF10 0.41855 0.01343 
30 LB2DF10 0.15032 0.00544 
31 LB2CF10 0.67252 0.02261 
32 LB3BF10 0.81181 0.02775 
33 LB3CF10 0.25645 0.00680 
34 LB1CF11 0.95721 0.03301 
35 LB1DF11 -0.07977 -0.00180 
36 LB2AF11 -0.26246 -0.00713 
37 LB2BF11 -0.15279 -0.00409 
38 LB3AF11 -0.20848 -0.00690 
39 LB3DF11 -0.11410 -0.00348 
40 PF12F10 0.50000 0 
41 PF12F7 0.50000 0 
42 pf13f5 0.50000 0 
43 p13f9 0.50000 0 
44 p13f12 0.50000 0 
45 vare8 50.00000 0.01939 
46 vare9 50.00000 0.01922 
47 vare10 50.00000 0.01943 
48 vare11 50.00000 0.01938 
49 vare12 50.00000 0.01916 
50 vare13 50.00000 0.01905 
51 vare14 50.00000 0.01955 
52 vare15 50.00000 0.01931 
53 vare16 50.00000 0.01839 
54 vare17 50.00000 0.01903 
55 vare18 50.00000 0.01969 
56 vare19 50.00000 0.01836 
57 vare20 50.00000 0.01971 
58 vare21 50.00000 0.01819 
59 vare22 50.00000 0.01946 
60 vare23 50.00000 0.01924 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
61 vare24 50.00000 0.01861 
62 vare25 50.00000 0.01909 
63 vare26 50.00000 0.01932 
64 vare27 50.00000 0.01926 
65 vare28 50.00000 0.01896 
66 vare29 50.00000 0.01798 
67 vare30 50.00000 0.01935 
68 vare31 50.00000 0.01843 
69 vare32 50.00000 0.01875 
70 vare33 50.00000 0.01850 
71 vare34 50.00000 0.01806 
72 vare35 50.00000 0.01918 
73 vare36 50.00000 0.01819 
74 vare37 50.00000 0.01883 
75 vare38 50.00000 0.01905 
76 vare39 50.00000 0.01896 
77 VARD5 50.00000 0 
78 vard9 50.00000 0 
79 vard12 50.00000 0 
80 vard13 50.00000 0 
81 cF1F2 0.68541 -0.00295 
82 CF1F3 0.66013 -0.00132 
83 CF1F4 0.53697 -0.00223 
84 CF1F6 0.70328 -0.00592 
85 CF1F7 0.58317 -0.0006899 
86 CF1F9 0.43353 -0.00171 
87 CF1F1 0.23735 -0.0009935 
88 CF2F3 0.79183 -0.00241 
89 CF2F4 0.75155 -0.00483 
90 CF2F7 0.69793 -0.00128 
91 CF2F8 0.28243 -0.00149 
92 CF2F10 -0.08975 0.0006775 
93 CF2F11 -0.29490 0.0008174 
94 CF3F4 0.74095 -0.00225 
95 CF3F6 0.93914 -0.00239 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
96 CF3F7 0.78125 -0.0006881 
97 CF3F8 0.35884 -0.0009345 
98 CF3F10 -0.04285 0.0001977 
99 CF3F11 -0.45935 0.0006567 
100 CF4F6 0.54124 -0.00265 
101 CF4F7 0.45650 -0.0007775 
102 CF4F8 0.20196 -0.00100 
103 CF4F10 -0.22869 0.00155 
104 CF4F11 -0.29393 0.0008451 
105 CF6F7 0.70578 -0.00102 
106 CF6F8 0.75503 -0.00386 
107 CF6F10 0.26668 -0.00131 
108 CF6F11 -0.52259 0.00128 
109 CF7F8 0.43859 -0.0007266 
110 CF7F10 0.48479 -0.0008836 
111 CF7F11 -0.48899 0.0004185 
112 CF8C10 0.25366 -0.00143 
113 CF8F11 -0.27264 0.0007289 
114 CF10F11 -0.39878 0.00119 
115 _Add1 -0.20966 0.0003381 




RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Optimization 
Levenberg-Marquardt Optimization 
 
Scaling Update of More (1978) 
 
Parameter Estimates 115 
Functions (Observations) 528 
 




Active Constraints 0 Objective Function 81.436427146 
Max Abs Gradient Element 0.0408542075 Radius 1 
 
 



















1 * 0 4 0  75.55917 5.8773 0.0356 4.545 1.139 
2 * 0 6 0  75.28203 0.2771 0.0241 0.0717 0.956 
3 * 0 8 0  74.76107 0.5210 0.0246 0.0328 0.982 
4 * 0 10 0  73.69054 1.0705 0.0255 0.0159 1.030 
5 * 0 12 0  70.21313 3.4774 0.0640 0.00476 1.063 
6 * 0 15 0  69.42782 0.7853 0.0296 0.0366 0.884 
7 * 0 17 0  67.88752 1.5403 0.0313 0.0153 1.043 
8 * 0 19 0  64.82515 3.0624 0.0551 0.00766 1.017 
9 * 0 22 0  64.03483 0.7903 0.0361 0.0542 0.936 
10 * 0 24 0  62.61188 1.4229 0.0381 0.0230 0.997 
11 * 0 26 0  59.76812 2.8438 0.0681 0.0114 0.978 
12 * 0 28 0  52.37628 7.3918 0.1243 0.00509 1.202 
13 * 0 30 0  28.78541 23.5909 0.1748 0.00138 2.110 
14 * 0 33 0  15.60882 13.1766 0.3909 0.0113 1.780 
15 * 0 36 0  11.88005 3.7288 0.3217 0.122 1.336 
16 * 0 38 0  8.59039 3.2897 15.6766 0.0272 0.982 
17 * 0 41 0  6.64252 1.9479 1.6002 0.212 0.426 
18 * 0 43 0  6.36066 0.2819 4.9579 0.144 0.417 
19 * 0 45 0  6.24710 0.1136 5.3010 0.138 0.103 
20 * 0 48 0  5.88077 0.3663 2.1599 18.619 0.496 
21 * 0 50 0  5.78599 0.0948 0.6055 1.817 0.777 
22 * 0 52 0  5.73696 0.0490 1.7251 0.759 0.449 
23 * 0 54 0  5.69429 0.0427 1.4992 0.646 0.323 
24 * 0 56 0  5.68976 0.00453 2.6022 0.720 0.0295 
25 * 0 58 0  5.64899 0.0408 1.9257 2.721 0.201 
26 * 0 60 0  5.64170 0.00729 2.1028 1.863 0.0524 
27 * 0 62 0  5.59195 0.0497 1.1501 8.707 0.392 
28 * 0 64 0  5.57768 0.0143 0.8435 2.949 0.335 
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29 * 0 66 0  5.56429 0.0134 0.7437 3.083 0.374 
30 * 0 68 0  5.55218 0.0121 0.6363 2.604 0.438 
31 * 0 70 0  5.54012 0.0121 0.5739 2.655 0.479 
32 * 0 72 0  5.52752 0.0126 0.5265 2.198 0.554 
33 * 0 74 0  5.51587 0.0117 0.4806 2.464 0.562 
34 * 0 76 0  5.47972 0.0361 0.5731 0.628 0.802 
35 * 0 78 0  5.41907 0.0607 0.7940 0.317 0.774 
36 * 0 80 0  5.31033 0.1087 1.3008 0.124 0.792 
37 * 0 82 0  5.08571 0.2246 1.9615 0.0251 0.695 
38 * 0 84 0  5.07188 0.0138 7.1738 0.0238 0.0290 
39 * 0 86 0  4.86194 0.2099 5.4011 0.0643 0.209 
40 * 0 89 0  4.85753 0.00442 7.0084 0.698 0.0071 
41 * 0 91 0  4.64905 0.2085 3.2494 2.367 0.344 
42 * 0 93 0  4.62317 0.0259 2.9192 0.869 0.131 
43 * 0 95 0  4.59419 0.0290 2.2175 0.540 0.188 
44 * 0 97 0  4.58666 0.00753 2.3098 0.576 0.0703 
45 * 0 99 0  4.56112 0.0255 1.5599 1.597 0.285 
46 * 0 101 0  4.55257 0.00855 1.2837 0.979 0.186 
47 * 0 103 0  4.54539 0.00718 1.0667 0.599 0.211 
48 * 0 105 0  4.54092 0.00446 0.9937 0.691 0.175 
49 * 0 107 0  4.53604 0.00488 0.8393 0.475 0.229 
50 * 0 109 0  4.53265 0.00339 0.8353 0.554 0.192 
51 * 0 111 0  4.52863 0.00403 0.7155 0.424 0.255 
52 * 0 113 0  4.52550 0.00313 0.7538 0.431 0.221 
53 * 0 115 0  4.52184 0.00366 0.6542 0.409 0.275 
54 * 0 117 0  4.51875 0.00308 0.6918 0.418 0.253 
55 * 0 119 0  4.51495 0.00381 0.6063 0.362 0.316 
56 * 0 121 0  4.51173 0.00322 0.6498 0.421 0.291 
57 * 0 123 0  4.50781 0.00392 0.5590 0.378 0.357 
58 * 0 125 0  4.50429 0.00352 0.6046 0.429 0.346 
59 * 0 127 0  4.50012 0.00417 0.5087 0.402 0.415 
60 * 0 129 0  4.49613 0.00399 0.5552 0.442 0.424 
61 * 1 134 0  4.45741 0.0387 0.3816 0.0463 0.966 
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62 * 1 136 0  4.35261 0.1048 1.6331 0.0320 0.943 
63 * 1 138 0  4.21347 0.1391 0.9134 0.00529 0.470 
64 * 1 140 0  4.07043 0.1430 2.2259 0.00395 0.886 
65 * 1 142 0  3.98074 0.0897 1.2310 0.00083 0.821 
66 * 1 145 0  3.94192 0.0388 1.7285 0.00665 0.481 
67 * 1 147 0  3.91898 0.0229 1.4612 0.00631 0.270 
68 * 1 149 0  3.88761 0.0314 1.4813 0.00664 0.223 
69 * 1 151 0  3.80171 0.0859 2.0810 0.00334 0.514 
70 * 1 153 0  3.73382 0.0679 1.2402 0.00363 0.449 
71 * 1 155 0  3.70975 0.0241 1.2806 0.00211 0.264 
72 * 1 157 0  3.68112 0.0286 0.9724 0.00435 0.283 
73 * 1 159 0  3.65988 0.0212 0.7447 0.00304 0.273 
74 * 1 161 0  3.63072 0.0292 0.7396 0.00604 0.341 
75 * 1 163 0  3.59760 0.0331 0.4141 0.00146 0.477 
76 * 1 165 0  3.57744 0.0202 0.4208 0.00107 0.320 
77 * 1 167 0  3.56904 0.00841 0.4940 0.00128 0.141 
78 * 1 169 0  3.56043 0.00861 0.8032 0.00442 0.0972 
79 * 1 171 0  3.52876 0.0317 1.1072 0.0165 0.232 
80 * 1 173 0  3.48746 0.0413 1.0225 0.0147 0.318 
81 * 1 176 0  3.47971 0.00775 1.5680 0.0444 0.100 
82 * 1 178 0  3.46869 0.0110 1.0294 0.0128 0.159 
83 * 1 181 0  3.45977 0.00892 1.1760 0.177 0.194 
84 * 1 183 0  3.45392 0.00586 0.6775 0.0142 0.190 
85 * 1 185 0  3.45307 0.000848 0.9144 0.0314 0.0393 
86 * 1 187 0  3.44718 0.00589 0.5027 0.237 0.302 
87 * 1 189 0  3.44636 0.000819 0.5434 0.0318 0.0923 
88 * 1 191 0  3.44382 0.00254 0.3025 0.437 0.352 
89 * 1 193 0  3.44327 0.000549 0.2658 0.0465 0.200 
90 * 1 195 0  3.44289 0.000385 0.2151 0.0591 0.178 
91 * 1 197 0  3.44268 0.000214 0.2147 0.0469 0.136 
92 * 1 199 0  3.44248 0.000198 0.1658 0.0331 0.151 
93 * 1 201 0  3.44235 0.000130 0.1824 0.0344 0.122 
94 * 1 203 0  3.44223 0.000123 0.1377 0.0212 0.133 
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95 * 1 205 0  3.44214 0.000083 0.1607 0.0249 0.104 
96 * 1 207 0  3.44206 0.000080 0.1223 0.0137 0.112 
97 * 1 209 0  3.44201 0.000055 0.1452 0.0195 0.0858 
98 * 1 211 0  3.44190 0.000105 0.1032 0.0844 0.188 
99 * 1 213 0  3.44185 0.000049 0.1046 0.0440 0.127 
100 * 1 215 0  3.44181 0.000041 0.0829 0.0293 0.129 
101 * 1 217 0  3.44178 0.000032 0.0893 0.0309 0.118 
102 * 1 219 0  3.44175 0.000030 0.0709 0.0256 0.129 
103 * 1 221 0  3.44173 0.000025 0.0771 0.0272 0.122 
104 * 1 223 0  3.44170 0.000024 0.0621 0.0233 0.135 
105 * 1 225 0  3.44168 0.000021 0.0672 0.0245 0.131 
106 * 1 227 0  3.44166 0.000021 0.0552 0.0220 0.147 
107 * 1 229 0  3.44164 0.000019 0.0590 0.0228 0.146 
108 * 1 231 0  3.44162 0.000019 0.0495 0.0212 0.164 
109 * 1 233 0  3.44160 0.000017 0.0521 0.0216 0.167 
110 * 1 235 0  3.44159 0.000018 0.0447 0.0208 0.186 
111 * 1 237 0  3.44157 0.000017 0.0462 0.0209 0.194 
112 * 1 239 0  3.44155 0.000017 0.0405 0.0205 0.213 
113 * 1 241 0  3.44154 0.000017 0.0410 0.0204 0.226 
114 * 1 243 0  3.44152 0.000018 0.0369 0.0184 0.257 
115 * 1 245 0  3.44150 0.000017 0.0367 0.0203 0.261 
116 * 1 247 0  3.44148 0.000018 0.0337 0.0187 0.293 
117 * 1 249 0  3.44146 0.000018 0.0331 0.0185 0.315 
118 * 1 251 0  3.44145 0.000018 0.0309 0.0191 0.331 
119 * 1 253 0  3.44143 0.000018 0.0297 0.0189 0.357 
120 * 1 255 0  3.44141 0.000018 0.0282 0.0195 0.374 
121 * 2 259 0  3.44085 0.000563 0.1049 0.00057 0.945 
122 * 2 262 0  3.44020 0.000649 0.0309 0.00145 1.018 
123 * 2 264 0  3.43933 0.000868 0.1789 0.00094 0.703 
124 * 2 266 0  3.43684 0.00249 0.1748 0.00154 0.812 
125 * 2 269 0  3.43415 0.00268 0.0178 0.0101 1.048 
126 * 2 271 0  3.43067 0.00348 0.1221 0.00704 0.997 
127 * 2 273 0  3.42729 0.00338 0.2701 0.00554 0.274 
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128 * 2 275 0  3.41740 0.00989 0.2244 0.0159 0.162 
129 * 2 277 0  3.27541 0.1420 0.1106 0.00847 0.891 
130 * 2 279 0  3.24784 0.0276 0.0406 444E-16 1.219 
131 * 2 281 0  3.24448 0.00336 0.0154 444E-16 1.295 
132 * 2 283 0  3.24352 0.000964 0.0162 444E-16 1.234 
133 * 2 285 0  3.24321 0.000310 0.00474 444E-16 1.080 
134 * 2 287 0  3.24310 0.000107 0.00883 444E-16 0.844 
135 * 2 289 0  3.24306 0.000039 0.00350 444E-16 0.587 
136 * 2 291 0  3.24305 0.000016 0.00566 444E-16 0.383 
137 * 2 293 0  3.24304 7.335E-6 0.00344 444E-16 0.255 
138 * 2 295 0  3.24304 3.988E-6 0.00400 444E-16 0.188 
139 * 2 297 0  3.24303 2.44E-6 0.00294 444E-16 0.152 
140 * 2 299 0  3.24303 1.689E-6 0.00298 444E-16 0.136 
141 * 2 301 0  3.24303 1.211E-6 0.00239 444E-16 0.126 
142 * 2 303 0  3.24303 9.197E-7 0.00227 444E-16 0.123 
143 * 2 305 0  3.24303 6.95E-7 0.00190 444E-16 0.119 
144 * 2 307 0  3.24303 5.419E-7 0.00175 444E-16 0.119 
145 * 2 309 0  3.24303 4.166E-7 0.00150 444E-16 0.117 
146 * 2 311 0  3.24303 3.27E-7 0.00136 444E-16 0.117 
147 * 2 313 0  3.24303 2.531E-7 0.00118 444E-16 0.116 
148 * 2 315 0  3.24303 1.989E-7 0.00106 444E-16 0.116 
149 * 2 317 0  3.24303 1.546E-7 0.000927 444E-16 0.115 
150 * 2 319 0  3.24303 1.215E-7 0.000830 444E-16 0.116 
151 * 2 321 0  3.24303 9.459E-8 0.000727 444E-16 0.115 
152 * 2 323 0  3.24303 7.43E-8 0.000649 444E-16 0.116 
153 * 2 325 0  3.24303 5.793E-8 0.000570 444E-16 0.115 
154 * 2 327 0  3.24303 4.548E-8 0.000507 444E-16 0.115 
155 * 2 329 0  3.24303 3.55E-8 0.000447 444E-16 0.115 
156 * 2 331 0  3.24303 2.785E-8 0.000397 444E-16 0.115 
157 * 2 333 0  3.24303 2.175E-8 0.000350 444E-16 0.115 
158 * 2 335 0  3.24303 1.706E-8 0.000311 444E-16 0.115 
159 * 2 337 0  3.24303 1.333E-8 0.000274 444E-16 0.115 
160 * 2 339 0  3.24303 1.045E-8 0.000243 444E-16 0.115 
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161 * 2 341 0  3.24303 8.171E-9 0.000215 444E-16 0.115 
162 * 2 343 0  3.24303 6.404E-9 0.000190 444E-16 0.115 
163 * 2 345 0  3.24303 5.008E-9 0.000168 444E-16 0.115 
164 * 2 347 0  3.24303 3.924E-9 0.000149 444E-16 0.115 
165 * 2 349 0  3.24303 3.069E-9 0.000132 444E-16 0.115 
166 * 2 351 0  3.24303 2.404E-9 0.000116 444E-16 0.115 
167 * 2 353 0  3.24303 1.881E-9 0.000103 444E-16 0.115 
168 * 2 355 0  3.24303 1.473E-9 0.000091 444E-16 0.115 
 
Optimization Results 
Iterations 168 Function Calls 358 
Jacobian Calls 172 Active Constraints 0 
Objective Function 3.2430279309 Max Abs Gradient Element 0.0000911713 
Lambda 4.440892E-14 Actual Over Pred Change 0.1152514362 
Radius 391.23664108   
 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
LSU DATA 
RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Fit Summary 
Modeling Info Number of Observations 290 
 Number of Variables 32 
 Number of Moments 528 
 Number of Parameters 115 
 Number of Active Constraints 0 
 Baseline Model Function Value 8.2109 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square 2372.9448 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square DF 496 
 Pr > Baseline Model Chi-Square <.0001 
Absolute Index Fit Function 3.2430 




 Chi-Square 937.2351 
 Chi-Square DF 413 
 Pr > Chi-Square <.0001 
 Z-Test of Wilson & Hilferty 13.5647 
 Hoelter Critical N 143 
 Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 0.2029 
 Standardized RMR (SRMR) 0.0936 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.8354 
Parsimony Index Adjusted GFI (AGFI) 0.7896 
 Parsimonious GFI 0.6956 
 RMSEA Estimate 0.0663 
 RMSEA Lower 90% Confidence Limit 0.0607 
 RMSEA Upper 90% Confidence Limit 0.0719 
 Probability of Close Fit <.0001 
 ECVI Estimate 4.1415 
 ECVI Lower 90% Confidence Limit 3.8356 
 ECVI Upper 90% Confidence Limit 4.4777 
 Akaike Information Criterion 1167.2351 
 Bozdogan CAIC 1704.2714 
 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 1589.2714 
 McDonald Centrality 0.4050 
Incremental Index Bentler Comparative Fit Index 0.7207 
 Bentler-Bonett NFI 0.6050 
 Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Index 0.6646 
 Bollen Normed Index Rho1 0.5257 
 Bollen Non-normed Index Delta2 0.7325 
 James et al. Parsimonious NFI 0.5038 
 
LSU DATA 
RUN 1 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/3/17 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
Linear Equations 
Q8 =  0.5869 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e8             
Q9 =  0.8315 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e9             
Q10 =  0.6899 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e10             
Q11 =  -0.7268 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e11             




Q12 =  -0.9209 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e12             
Q13 =  -0.9569 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e13             
Q14 =  0.5478 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e14             
Q15 =  0.7563 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e15             
Q16 =  1.1173 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e16             
Q17 =  0.9372 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e17             
f5 =  0.5000  F1 + 0.5000  f2 + 0.5000  f3 + 0.5000  f4 + 1.0000  D5 
Q19 =  1.0379 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e19             
Q27 =  0.5445 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e27             
Q21 =  0.6848 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e21             
Q18 =  -0.4312 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e18             
Q20 =  -0.3432 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e20             
Q26 =  -0.5361 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e26             
Q22 =  0.3251 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e22             
Q23 =  0.5270 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e23             
Q24 =  1.3530 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e24             
Q25 =  0.2709 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e25             
f9 =  0.5000  f6 + 0.4999  f7 + 0.5001  f8 + 1.0000  D9     
B1A =  -0.2508 (**) f10 + 1.0000  e28             
B1B =  -0.3166 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E29             
B2D =  -0.1992 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E30             
B2C =  -0.4426 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E31             
B3B =  -1.2344 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E32             
B3C =  -0.9034 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E33             
B1C =  -0.0760 (ns) F11 + 1.0000  E34             
B1D =  0.6560 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E35             
B2A =  1.2435 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E36             
B2B =  0.7892 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E37             
B3A =  0.6188 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E38             
B3D =  0.6257 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E39             
f12 =  0.4999  f10 + 0.4999  F11 + 1.0000  D12         
f13 =  0.4999  f5 + 0.4998  f9 + 0.5000  f12 + 1.0000  d13     
 
Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q8 F1 LQ8f1 0.58687 0.07084 8.2846 <.0001 
Q9 F1 LQ9F1 0.83150 0.07750 10.7287 <.0001 
Q10 F1 lq10f1 0.68988 0.06342 10.8783 <.0001 
Q11 f2 LQ11F2 -0.72679 0.06297 -11.5415 <.0001 
Q12 f2 lq12f2 -0.92091 0.07082 -13.0044 <.0001 
Q13 f2 LQ13F2 -0.95695 0.07533 -12.7034 <.0001 
Q14 f3 LQ14F3 0.54778 0.05342 10.2538 <.0001 
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Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q15 f3 LQ15F3 0.75629 0.06488 11.6573 <.0001 
Q16 f4 LQ16F4 1.11728 0.11073 10.0899 <.0001 
Q17 f4 lq17f4 0.93722 0.08545 10.9680 <.0001 
f5 F1 PF5F1 0.50000 . . . 
f5 f2 PF5F2 0.50000 . . . 
f5 f3 PF5F3 0.50000 . . . 
f5 f4 PF5F4 0.50000 . . . 
Q19 f8 LQ19F8 1.03794 0.13777 7.5338 <.0001 
Q27 f8 lq27f8 0.54452 0.09230 5.8994 <.0001 
Q21 f8 lq21f8 0.68485 0.15438 4.4361 <.0001 
Q18 f7 LQ18F7 -0.43121 0.05283 -8.1625 <.0001 
Q20 f7 LQ20F7 -0.34325 0.05300 -6.4761 <.0001 
Q26 f7 lq26f7 -0.53605 0.08094 -6.6226 <.0001 
Q22 f6 lq22f6 0.32515 0.07531 4.3176 <.0001 
Q23 f6 lq23f6 0.52701 0.08297 6.3518 <.0001 
Q24 f6 lq24F6 1.35300 0.12098 11.1838 <.0001 
Q25 f6 lq25F6 0.27086 0.09969 2.7169 0.0066 
f9 f6 PF9F6 0.49998 . . . 
f9 f7 PF9F7 0.49993 . . . 
f9 f8 PF9F8 0.50015 . . . 
B1A f10 LB1AF10 -0.25078 0.09780 -2.5641 0.0103 
B1B f10 LB2AF10 -0.31655 0.15345 -2.0629 0.0391 
B2D f10 LB2DF10 -0.19921 0.08770 -2.2716 0.0231 
B2C f10 LB2CF10 -0.44257 0.13001 -3.4042 0.0007 
B3B f10 LB3BF10 -1.23445 0.11784 -10.4757 <.0001 
B3C f10 LB3CF10 -0.90337 0.12899 -7.0032 <.0001 
B1C F11 LB1CF11 -0.07596 0.14893 -0.5100 0.6100 
B1D F11 LB1DF11 0.65605 0.10119 6.4833 <.0001 
B2A F11 LB2AF11 1.24353 0.15033 8.2721 <.0001 
B2B F11 LB2BF11 0.78918 0.12069 6.5387 <.0001 
B3A F11 LB3AF11 0.61876 0.10920 5.6661 <.0001 
B3D F11 LB3DF11 0.62570 0.11462 5.4589 <.0001 
f12 f10 PF12F10 0.49993 . . . 
f12 F11 PF12F7 0.49989 . . . 
f13 f5 pf13f5 0.49986 . . . 
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Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f13 f9 p13f9 0.49981 . . . 
f13 f12 p13f12 0.50004 . . . 
 
Estimates for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Error e8 vare8 0.88225 0.08529 10.3441 <.0001 
 e9 vare9 0.84897 0.10085 8.4180 <.0001 
 e10 vare10 0.55660 0.06759 8.2352 <.0001 
 e11 vare11 0.67372 0.06831 9.8630 <.0001 
 e12 vare12 0.74651 0.08447 8.8377 <.0001 
 e13 vare13 0.87186 0.09592 9.0896 <.0001 
 e14 vare14 0.48965 0.05015 9.7631 <.0001 
 e15 vare15 0.57757 0.07362 7.8458 <.0001 
 e16 vare16 1.82321 0.20495 8.8959 <.0001 
 e17 vare17 0.89966 0.12251 7.3435 <.0001 
 e18 vare18 0.41296 0.04432 9.3186 <.0001 
 e19 vare19 1.84877 0.26446 6.9907 <.0001 
 e20 vare20 0.50628 0.04669 10.8430 <.0001 
 e21 vare21 3.86374 0.34848 11.0875 <.0001 
 e22 vare22 1.18582 0.10157 11.6746 <.0001 
 e23 vare23 1.33958 0.11993 11.1697 <.0001 
 e24 vare24 0.93403 0.25758 3.6261 0.0003 
 e25 vare25 2.14804 0.18064 11.8915 <.0001 
 e26 vare26 1.16785 0.10852 10.7615 <.0001 
 e27 vare27 1.25228 0.12335 10.1519 <.0001 
 e28 vare28 1.95004 0.16431 11.8681 <.0001 
 E29 vare29 4.83439 0.40547 11.9230 <.0001 
 E30 vare30 1.57467 0.13231 11.9018 <.0001 
 E31 vare31 3.39226 0.28882 11.7453 <.0001 
 E32 vare32 1.07595 0.23216 4.6346 <.0001 
 E33 vare33 2.89480 0.27387 10.5700 <.0001 
 E34 vare34 4.14451 0.34504 12.0117 <.0001 
 E35 vare35 1.60232 0.15675 10.2223 <.0001 
 E36 vare36 2.93091 0.34636 8.4620 <.0001 
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Estimates for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
 E37 vare37 2.27043 0.22296 10.1833 <.0001 
 E38 vare38 1.96293 0.18307 10.7225 <.0001 
 E39 vare39 2.18585 0.20183 10.8302 <.0001 
Latent F1  1.00000    
 f2  1.00000    
 f3  1.00000    
 f4  1.00000    
 f6  1.00000    
 f7  1.00000    
 f8  1.00000    
 f10  1.00000    
 F11  1.00000    
Disturbance D5 VARD5 50.00001 . . . 
 D9 vard9 50.00022 . . . 
 D12 vard12 50.00055 . . . 
 d13 vard13 49.99964 . . . 
 
Covariances Among Exogenous Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
F1 f2 cF1F2 -0.68179 0.05936 -11.4850 <.0001 
F1 f3 CF1F3 0.50841 0.07692 6.6097 <.0001 
F1 f4 CF1F4 0.53289 0.07769 6.8595 <.0001 
F1 f6 CF1F6 0.04811 0.04248 1.1324 0.2574 
F1 f7 CF1F7 -0.48416 0.09335 -5.1862 <.0001 
F1 f8 CF1F9 0.21365 0.09483 2.2531 0.0243 
F1 f10 CF1F1 -0.21598 0.08510 -2.5380 0.0111 
f2 f3 CF2F3 -0.67130 0.06428 -10.4433 <.0001 
f2 f4 CF2F4 -0.72766 0.06213 -11.7120 <.0001 
f2 f6 CF1F6 0.04811 0.04248 1.1324 0.2574 
f2 f7 CF2F7 0.59651 0.08352 7.1423 <.0001 
f2 f8 CF2F8 -0.04731 0.09147 -0.5172 0.6050 
f2 f10 CF2F10 -0.12215 0.08193 -1.4908 0.1360 
f2 F11 CF2F11 -0.18214 0.08648 -2.1061 0.0352 
f3 f4 CF3F4 0.68978 0.07599 9.0775 <.0001 
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Covariances Among Exogenous Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f3 f6 CF3F6 0.54576 0.07426 7.3497 <.0001 
f3 f7 CF3F7 -0.75707 0.09018 -8.3951 <.0001 
f3 f8 CF3F8 0.26580 0.10384 2.5597 0.0105 
f3 f10 CF3F10 -0.03761 0.09244 -0.4068 0.6841 
f3 F11 CF3F11 0.24105 0.09476 2.5437 0.0110 
f4 f6 CF4F6 0.09746 0.07775 1.2535 0.2100 
f4 f7 CF4F7 -0.36612 0.10203 -3.5884 0.0003 
f4 f8 CF4F8 0.10274 0.10443 0.9838 0.3252 
f4 f10 CF4F10 0.16619 0.09068 1.8327 0.0669 
f4 F11 CF4F11 0.33775 0.09159 3.6874 0.0002 
f6 f7 CF6F7 -0.32496 0.09242 -3.5161 0.0004 
f6 f8 CF6F8 0.71298 0.09300 7.6661 <.0001 
f6 f10 CF6F10 -0.38497 0.08387 -4.5900 <.0001 
f6 F11 CF6F11 0.14529 0.09022 1.6105 0.1073 
f7 f8 CF7F8 -0.32274 0.11784 -2.7389 0.0062 
f7 f10 CF7F10 0.53199 0.09712 5.4775 <.0001 
f7 F11 CF7F11 -0.51215 0.10055 -5.0934 <.0001 
f8 f10 CF8C10 -0.34566 0.10198 -3.3895 0.0007 
f8 F11 CF8F11 0.15884 0.10887 1.4590 0.1446 
f10 F11 CF10F11 -0.46962 0.08686 -5.4066 <.0001 
F11 F1 _Add1 0.15150 0.09181 1.6501 0.0989 
 






Q8 0.88225 1.22667 0.2808 
Q9 0.84897 1.54037 0.4489 
Q10 0.55660 1.03253 0.4609 
Q11 0.67372 1.20195 0.4395 
Q12 0.74651 1.59458 0.5318 
Q13 0.87186 1.78761 0.5123 
Q14 0.48965 0.78971 0.3800 
Q15 0.57757 1.14954 0.4976 
Q16 1.82321 3.07152 0.4064 
Q17 0.89966 1.77805 0.4940 
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f5 50.00001 50.82518 0.0162 
Q19 1.84877 2.92609 0.3682 
Q27 1.25228 1.54878 0.1914 
Q21 3.86374 4.33276 0.1082 
Q18 0.41296 0.59890 0.3105 
Q20 0.50628 0.62410 0.1888 
Q26 1.16785 1.45521 0.1975 
Q22 1.18582 1.29154 0.0819 
Q23 1.33958 1.61732 0.1717 
Q24 0.93403 2.76465 0.6622 
Q25 2.14804 2.22141 0.0330 
f9 50.00022 50.78302 0.0154 
B1A 1.95004 2.01293 0.0312 
B1B 4.83439 4.93459 0.0203 
B2D 1.57467 1.61435 0.0246 
B2C 3.39226 3.58813 0.0546 
B3B 1.07595 2.59981 0.5861 
B3C 2.89480 3.71088 0.2199 
B1C 4.14451 4.15028 0.00139 
B1D 1.60232 2.03272 0.2117 
B2A 2.93091 4.47728 0.3454 
B2B 2.27043 2.89323 0.2153 
B3A 1.96293 2.34579 0.1632 
B3D 2.18585 2.57736 0.1519 
f12 50.00055 50.26565 0.00527 
f13 49.99964 87.97761 0.4317 
 
Standardized Results for Linear Equations 
Q8 =  0.5299 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e8             
Q9 =  0.6700 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e9             
Q10 =  0.6789 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e10             
Q11 =  -0.6629 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e11             
Q12 =  -0.7293 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e12             
Q13 =  -0.7157 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e13             
Q14 =  0.6164 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e14             
Q15 =  0.7054 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e15             
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Standardized Results for Linear Equations 
Q16 =  0.6375 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e16             
Q17 =  0.7029 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e17             
f5 =  0.0701 (**) F1 + 0.0701 (**) f2 + 0.0701 (**) f3 + 0.0701 (**) f4 + 1.0000  D5 
Q19 =  0.6068 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e19             
Q27 =  0.4375 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e27             
Q21 =  0.3290 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e21             
Q18 =  -0.5572 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e18             
Q20 =  -0.4345 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e20             
Q26 =  -0.4444 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e26             
Q22 =  0.2861 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e22             
Q23 =  0.4144 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e23             
Q24 =  0.8137 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e24             
Q25 =  0.1817 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e25             
f9 =  0.0702 (**) f6 + 0.0702 (**) f7 + 0.0702 (**) f8 + 1.0000  D9     
B1A =  -0.1768 (**) f10 + 1.0000  e28             
B1B =  -0.1425 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E29             
B2D =  -0.1568 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E30             
B2C =  -0.2336 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E31             
B3B =  -0.7656 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E32             
B3C =  -0.4690 (**) f10 + 1.0000  E33             
B1C =  -0.0373 (ns) F11 + 1.0000  E34             
B1D =  0.4601 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E35             
B2A =  0.5877 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E36             
B2B =  0.4640 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E37             
B3A =  0.4040 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E38             
B3D =  0.3897 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E39             
f12 =  0.0705 (**) f10 + 0.0705 (**) F11 + 1.0000  D12         
f13 =  0.3799 (**) f5 + 0.3797 (**) f9 + 0.3780 (**) f12 + 1.0000  d13     
 
Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q8 F1 LQ8f1 0.52988 0.05391 9.8284 <.0001 
Q9 F1 LQ9F1 0.66996 0.04762 14.0691 <.0001 
Q10 F1 lq10f1 0.67892 0.04731 14.3494 <.0001 
Q11 f2 LQ11F2 -0.66293 0.04108 -16.1390 <.0001 
Q12 f2 lq12f2 -0.72928 0.03694 -19.7448 <.0001 
Q13 f2 LQ13F2 -0.71573 0.03774 -18.9632 <.0001 
Q14 f3 LQ14F3 0.61641 0.04688 13.1477 <.0001 
Q15 f3 LQ15F3 0.70538 0.04501 15.6719 <.0001 
Q16 f4 LQ16F4 0.63751 0.04956 12.8621 <.0001 
Q17 f4 lq17f4 0.70286 0.04889 14.3754 <.0001 
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Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f5 F1 PF5F1 0.07013 0.0000488 1436.2 <.0001 
f5 f2 PF5F2 0.07013 0.0000488 1436.2 <.0001 
f5 f3 PF5F3 0.07013 0.0000488 1436.2 <.0001 
f5 f4 PF5F4 0.07013 0.0000488 1436.2 <.0001 
Q19 f8 LQ19F8 0.60678 0.07106 8.5392 <.0001 
Q27 f8 lq27f8 0.43754 0.06808 6.4266 <.0001 
Q21 f8 lq21f8 0.32901 0.07057 4.6624 <.0001 
Q18 f7 LQ18F7 -0.55720 0.05826 -9.5646 <.0001 
Q20 f7 LQ20F7 -0.43449 0.06041 -7.1923 <.0001 
Q26 f7 lq26f7 -0.44437 0.06014 -7.3884 <.0001 
Q22 f6 lq22f6 0.28611 0.06316 4.5297 <.0001 
Q23 f6 lq23f6 0.41440 0.05888 7.0377 <.0001 
Q24 f6 lq24F6 0.81373 0.05809 14.0085 <.0001 
Q25 f6 lq25F6 0.18173 0.06562 2.7693 0.0056 
f9 f6 PF9F6 0.07016 0.0000636 1102.5 <.0001 
f9 f7 PF9F7 0.07015 0.0000636 1102.5 <.0001 
f9 f8 PF9F8 0.07018 0.0000637 1102.5 <.0001 
B1A f10 LB1AF10 -0.17675 0.06777 -2.6081 0.0091 
B1B f10 LB2AF10 -0.14250 0.06832 -2.0858 0.0370 
B2D f10 LB2DF10 -0.15679 0.06811 -2.3021 0.0213 
B2C f10 LB2CF10 -0.23364 0.06661 -3.5074 0.0005 
B3B f10 LB3BF10 -0.76560 0.05906 -12.9631 <.0001 
B3C f10 LB3CF10 -0.46895 0.05924 -7.9155 <.0001 
B1C F11 LB1CF11 -0.03729 0.07306 -0.5104 0.6098 
B1D F11 LB1DF11 0.46015 0.06398 7.1919 <.0001 
B2A F11 LB2AF11 0.58769 0.06056 9.7039 <.0001 
B2B F11 LB2BF11 0.46396 0.06386 7.2654 <.0001 
B3A F11 LB3AF11 0.40400 0.06579 6.1403 <.0001 
B3D F11 LB3DF11 0.38975 0.06625 5.8831 <.0001 
f12 f10 PF12F10 0.07051 0.0000305 2315.6 <.0001 
f12 F11 PF12F7 0.07051 0.0000304 2315.6 <.0001 
f13 f5 pf13f5 0.37993 0.0002506 1516.1 <.0001 
f13 f9 p13f9 0.37973 0.0003202 1185.8 <.0001 
f13 f12 p13f12 0.37797 0.0001943 1945.5 <.0001 
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Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Error e8 vare8 0.71922 0.05714 12.5880 <.0001 
 e9 vare9 0.55115 0.06381 8.6378 <.0001 
 e10 vare10 0.53906 0.06424 8.3907 <.0001 
 e11 vare11 0.56052 0.05446 10.2921 <.0001 
 e12 vare12 0.46815 0.05387 8.6901 <.0001 
 e13 vare13 0.48773 0.05403 9.0272 <.0001 
 e14 vare14 0.62004 0.05780 10.7275 <.0001 
 e15 vare15 0.50244 0.06350 7.9128 <.0001 
 e16 vare16 0.59359 0.06320 9.3928 <.0001 
 e17 vare17 0.50598 0.06873 7.3618 <.0001 
 e18 vare18 0.68953 0.06492 10.6210 <.0001 
 e19 vare19 0.63182 0.08623 7.3270 <.0001 
 e20 vare20 0.81122 0.05250 15.4530 <.0001 
 e21 vare21 0.89175 0.04644 19.2041 <.0001 
 e22 vare22 0.91814 0.03614 25.4036 <.0001 
 e23 vare23 0.82827 0.04880 16.9718 <.0001 
 e24 vare24 0.33785 0.09454 3.5738 0.0004 
 e25 vare25 0.96697 0.02385 40.5408 <.0001 
 e26 vare26 0.80253 0.05345 15.0139 <.0001 
 e27 vare27 0.80856 0.05958 13.5715 <.0001 
 e28 vare28 0.96876 0.02396 40.4354 <.0001 
 E29 vare29 0.97969 0.01947 50.3137 <.0001 
 E30 vare30 0.97542 0.02136 45.6731 <.0001 
 E31 vare31 0.94541 0.03113 30.3719 <.0001 
 E32 vare32 0.41386 0.09043 4.5764 <.0001 
 E33 vare33 0.78008 0.05557 14.0390 <.0001 
 E34 vare34 0.99861 0.00545 183.3 <.0001 
 E35 vare35 0.78826 0.05888 13.3873 <.0001 
 E36 vare36 0.65462 0.07118 9.1961 <.0001 
 E37 vare37 0.78474 0.05926 13.2431 <.0001 
 E38 vare38 0.83679 0.05316 15.7404 <.0001 
 E39 vare39 0.84810 0.05164 16.4231 <.0001 
Latent F1  1.00000    
 f2  1.00000    
 f3  1.00000    
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Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
 f4  1.00000    
 f6  1.00000    
 f7  1.00000    
 f8  1.00000    
 f10  1.00000    
 F11  1.00000    
Disturbance D5 VARD5 0.98376 0.00137 718.1 <.0001 
 D9 vard9 0.98459 0.00179 551.3 <.0001 
 D12 vard12 0.99473 0.0008592 1157.8 <.0001 
 d13 vard13 0.56832 0.0004019 1413.9 <.0001 
 
Standardized Results for Covariances Among Exogenous 
Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
F1 f2 cF1F2 -0.68179 0.05936 -11.4850 <.0001 
F1 f3 CF1F3 0.50841 0.07692 6.6097 <.0001 
F1 f4 CF1F4 0.53289 0.07769 6.8595 <.0001 
F1 f6 CF1F6 0.04811 0.04248 1.1324 0.2574 
F1 f7 CF1F7 -0.48416 0.09335 -5.1862 <.0001 
F1 f8 CF1F9 0.21365 0.09483 2.2531 0.0243 
F1 f10 CF1F1 -0.21598 0.08510 -2.5380 0.0111 
f2 f3 CF2F3 -0.67130 0.06428 -10.4433 <.0001 
f2 f4 CF2F4 -0.72766 0.06213 -11.7120 <.0001 
f2 f6 CF1F6 0.04811 0.04248 1.1324 0.2574 
f2 f7 CF2F7 0.59651 0.08352 7.1423 <.0001 
f2 f8 CF2F8 -0.04731 0.09147 -0.5172 0.6050 
f2 f10 CF2F10 -0.12215 0.08193 -1.4908 0.1360 
f2 F11 CF2F11 -0.18214 0.08648 -2.1061 0.0352 
f3 f4 CF3F4 0.68978 0.07599 9.0775 <.0001 
f3 f6 CF3F6 0.54576 0.07426 7.3497 <.0001 
f3 f7 CF3F7 -0.75707 0.09018 -8.3951 <.0001 
f3 f8 CF3F8 0.26580 0.10384 2.5597 0.0105 
f3 f10 CF3F10 -0.03761 0.09244 -0.4068 0.6841 
f3 F11 CF3F11 0.24105 0.09476 2.5437 0.0110 
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Standardized Results for Covariances Among Exogenous 
Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f4 f6 CF4F6 0.09746 0.07775 1.2535 0.2100 
f4 f7 CF4F7 -0.36612 0.10203 -3.5884 0.0003 
f4 f8 CF4F8 0.10274 0.10443 0.9838 0.3252 
f4 f10 CF4F10 0.16619 0.09068 1.8327 0.0669 
f4 F11 CF4F11 0.33775 0.09159 3.6874 0.0002 
f6 f7 CF6F7 -0.32496 0.09242 -3.5161 0.0004 
f6 f8 CF6F8 0.71298 0.09300 7.6661 <.0001 
f6 f10 CF6F10 -0.38497 0.08387 -4.5900 <.0001 
f6 F11 CF6F11 0.14529 0.09022 1.6105 0.1073 
f7 f8 CF7F8 -0.32274 0.11784 -2.7389 0.0062 
f7 f10 CF7F10 0.53199 0.09712 5.4775 <.0001 
f7 F11 CF7F11 -0.51215 0.10055 -5.0934 <.0001 
f8 f10 CF8C10 -0.34566 0.10198 -3.3895 0.0007 
f8 F11 CF8F11 0.15884 0.10887 1.4590 0.1446 
f10 F11 CF10F11 -0.46962 0.08686 -5.4066 <.0001 
F11 F1 _Add1 0.15150 0.09181 1.6501 0.0989 
 
Stepwise Multivariate Wald Test 
Parm 
Cumulative Statistics Univariate Increment 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
CF3F10 0.16551 1 0.6841 0.16551 0.6841 
CF2F8 0.41915 2 0.8109 0.25363 0.6145 
LB1CF11 0.67832 3 0.8783 0.25918 0.6107 
CF4F8 1.36268 4 0.8507 0.68435 0.4081 
CF4F6 2.33365 5 0.8013 0.97097 0.3244 
CF8F11 3.97197 6 0.6805 1.63832 0.2006 
CF6F11 4.89160 7 0.6732 0.91963 0.3376 
CF1F6 7.07622 8 0.5284 2.18462 0.1394 
_Add1 9.26094 9 0.4135 2.18472 0.1394 
CF2F11 12.21647 10 0.2708 2.95553 0.0856 
CF3F11 13.68129 11 0.2511 1.46482 0.2262 
CF1F9 17.21281 12 0.1418 3.53152 0.0602 
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RUN 2 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/7/17 
LSU DATA 
RUN 2 - CFA - REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/7/17 
 
The CONTENTS Procedure 
Data Set Name WORK.TEST_1 Observations 306 
Member Type DATA Variables 39 
Engine V9 Indexes 0 
Created 08/07/2017 13:13:37 Observation Length 368 
Last Modified 08/07/2017 13:13:37 Deleted Observations 0 
Protection  Compressed NO 
Data Set Type  Sorted NO 
Label    
Data Representation WINDOWS_64   
Encoding wlatin1  Western (Windows)   
 
Engine/Host Dependent Information 
Data Set Page Size 65536 
Number of Data Set 
Pages 
2 
First Data Page 1 
Max Obs per Page 177 
Obs in First Data 
Page 
164 




Filename C:\Users\Machine\AppData\Local\Temp\SAS Temporary Files\_TD11388_LAPTOP-
OV06L7T4_\test_1.sas7bdat 
Release Created 9.0401M2 
Host Created X64_8HOME 
 
Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes 
# Variable Type Len Format Informat Label 
28 B1A Num 8   OPEN 
29 B1B Num 8   PICKUP 
30 B1C Num 8   LEAVE 
31 B1D Num 8   REPORT 
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Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes 
# Variable Type Len Format Informat Label 
32 B2A Num 8   EHS 
33 B2B Num 8   SOP 
34 B2C Num 8   RUN 
35 B2D Num 8   REVIEW 
36 B3A Num 8   QUENCH 
37 B3B Num 8   FINISH 
38 B3C Num 8   CONTACT 
39 B3D Num 8   OBSERVE 
2 F2 Num 8   EMPLOYEE 
3 Q1 Char 16 $16. $16. Q1 
4 Q2 Char 6 $6. $6. Q2 
5 Q3 Char 19 $19. $19. Q3 
6 Q4 Char 35 $35. $35. Q4 
7 Q5 Char 19 $19. $19. Q5 
8 Q8 Num 8   RESPONSE 
9 Q9 Num 8   AWARNESS 
10 Q10 Num 8   REPORTING 
11 Q11 Num 8   TRAINING 
12 Q12 Num 8   INVOLVEMENT 
13 Q13 Num 8   PROMOTION 
14 Q14 Num 8   SYSTEM 
15 Q15 Num 8   UTILIZE 
16 Q16 Num 8   RECONIZE 
17 Q17 Num 8   LEADERSHIP 
18 Q18 Num 8   CONCERN_1 
19 Q19 Num 8   ACCEDENTS_2 
20 Q20 Num 8   MEASURES 
21 Q21 Num 8   PPE 
22 Q22 Num 8   CONCERN_2 
23 Q23 Num 8   NEEDS 
24 Q24 Num 8   HESITANT 
25 Q25 Num 8   REPORTING 
26 Q26 Num 8   LITERATURE 
27 Q27 Num 8   DISCARD 
1 _ Num 8   3 
 




RUN 2 - CFA - REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/7/17 
 
The MEANS Procedure 

















































































































































































































































RUN 2 - CFA - REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/7/17 
 
The CALIS Procedure 





Data Set WORK.TEST_1 
N Records Read 306 
N Records Used 290 
N Obs 290 
Model Type LINEQS 
Analysis Covariances 
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Variables in the Model 
Endogenous Manifest B1A  B1D  B2A  B2B  B2C  B3A  B3B  B3C  B3D  Q10  Q11  Q12  Q13  Q14  Q15  Q16  
Q17  Q18  Q19  Q20  Q21  Q22  Q23  Q24  Q25  Q26  Q27  Q8  Q9 
 Latent f12  f13  f5  f9 
Exogenous Manifest  
 Latent F1  F10  F11  f2  f3  f4  f6  f7  f8 
 Error E29  E33  E34  E35  E30  E36  E31  E32  E28  e10  e11  e12  e13  e14  e15  e16  
e17  e18  e19  e20  e21  e22  e23  e24  e25  e26  e27  e8  e9  D12  d13  D5  D9 
Number of Endogenous Variables = 33 
Number of Exogenous Variables  = 42 
 
Initial Estimates for Linear Equations 
Q8 =  LQ8f1 (.) F1 +  1 e8             
Q9 =  LQ9F1 (.) F1 +  1 e9             
Q10 =  lq10f1 (.) F1 +  1 e10             
Q11 =  LQ11F2 (.) f2 +  1 e11             
Q12 =  lq12f2 (.) f2 +  1 e12             
Q13 =  LQ13F2 (.) f2 +  1 e13             
Q14 =  LQ14F3 (.) f3 +  1 e14             
Q15 =  LQ15F3 (.) f3 +  1 e15             
Q16 =  LQ16F4 (.) f4 +  1 e16             
Q17 =  lq17f4 (.) f4 +  1 e17             
f5 =  PF5F1 (.) F1 + PF5F2 (.) f2 + PF5F3 (.) f3 + PF5F4 (.) f4 +  1 D5 
Q19 =  LQ19F8 (.) f8 +  1 e19             
Q27 =  lq27f8 (.) f8 +  1 e27             
Q21 =  lq21f8 (.) f8 +  1 e21             
Q18 =  LQ18F7 (.) f7 +  1 e18             
Q20 =  LQ20F7 (.) f7 +  1 e20             
Q26 =  lq26f7 (.) f7 +  1 e26             
Q22 =  lq22f6 (.) f6 +  1 e22             
Q23 =  lq23f6 (.) f6 +  1 e23             
Q24 =  lq24F6 (.) f6 +  1 e24             
Q25 =  lq25F6 (.) f6 +  1 e25             
f9 =  PF9F6 (.) f6 + PF9F7 (.) f7 + PF9F8 (.) f8 +  1 D9     
B1A =  LB1AF10 (.) F10 +  1 E29             
B2C =  LB2CF10 (.) F10 +  1 E30             
B3B =  LB3BF10 (.) F10 +  1 E31             
B3C =  LB3CF10 (.) F10 +  1 E32             
B1D =  LB1DF11 (.) F11 +  1 E33             
B2A =  LB2AF11 (.) F11 +  1 E34             
B2B =  LB2BF11 (.) F11 +  1 E35             
B3A =  LB3AF11 (.) F11 +  1 E36             
B3D =  LB3DF11 (.) F11 +  1 E28             
f12 =  PF12F10 (.) F10 + PF12F7 (.) F11 +  1 D12         
f13 =  pf13f5 (.) f5 + p13f9 (.) f9 + p13f12 (.) f12 +  1 d13     
 




RUN 2 – REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL – 8/7/17 
 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Simple Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev 
Q8 RESPONSE 5.75862 1.11160 
Q9 AWARNESS 5.72069 1.24836 
Q10 REPORTING 5.99310 1.02222 
Q11 TRAINING 5.83793 1.09003 
Q12 INVOLVEMENT 5.48621 1.25398 
Q13 PROMOTION 5.46876 1.32806 
Q14 SYSTEM 6.02772 0.92967 
Q15 UTILIZE 5.69655 1.13652 
Q16 RECONIZE 3.40628 1.77006 
Q17 LEADERSHIP 5.22497 1.34959 
Q18 CONCERN_1 6.27931 0.79002 
Q19 ACCEDENTS_2 4.80221 1.73277 
Q20 MEASURES 6.25690 0.80006 
Q21 PPE 4.97241 2.08950 
Q22 CONCERN_2 6.43448 1.13646 
Q23 NEEDS 5.72672 1.27174 
Q24 HESITANT 5.36207 1.66272 
Q25 REPORTING 4.99310 1.49044 
Q26 LITERATURE 5.65172 1.22238 
Q27 DISCARD 6.10734 1.25292 
B1A OPEN 6.05965 1.41908 
B1D REPORT 6.02790 1.42855 
B2A EHS 4.12759 2.12277 
B2B SOP 5.44138 1.70436 
B2C RUN 2.86507 1.89494 
B3A QUENCH 5.75000 1.53393 
B3B FINISH 5.45134 1.61879 
B3C CONTACT 4.90941 1.92924 
B3D OBSERVE 5.65628 1.60769 
 
LSU DATA 
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RUN 2 – REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL – 8/7/17 
 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Optimization 
 
Initial Estimation Methods 
1 Instrumental Variables Method 
2 McDonald Method 




N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
1 LQ8f1 0.65774 0.02138 
2 LQ9F1 0.75049 0.02417 
3 lq10f1 0.71699 0.02323 
4 LQ11F2 0.73407 0.02304 
5 lq12f2 0.88702 0.02754 
6 LQ13F2 0.96318 0.03005 
7 LQ14F3 0.62042 0.01933 
8 LQ15F3 0.83368 0.02556 
9 LQ16F4 1.15688 0.03608 
10 lq17f4 0.94980 0.03006 
11 PF5F1 0.50000 0 
12 PF5F2 0.50000 0 
13 PF5F3 0.50000 0 
14 PF5F4 0.50000 0 
15 LQ19F8 1.20008 0.03985 
16 lq27f8 0.63936 0.02131 
17 lq21f8 0.51084 0.01549 
18 LQ18F7 0.45895 0.01471 
19 LQ20F7 0.34224 0.01077 
20 lq26f7 0.55701 0.01706 
21 lq22f6 0.31887 0.00975 
22 lq23f6 0.67861 0.02012 
23 lq24F6 1.09723 0.03236 
24 lq25F6 0.28870 0.00843 
25 PF9F6 0.50000 0 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
26 PF9F7 0.50000 0 
27 PF9F8 0.50000 0 
28 LB1AF10 0.62611 0.02190 
29 LB2CF10 0.52425 0.01742 
30 LB3BF10 0.96450 0.03248 
31 LB3CF10 0.24731 0.00675 
32 LB1DF11 0.77067 0.02517 
33 LB2AF11 1.10576 0.03411 
34 LB2BF11 1.10953 0.03640 
35 LB3AF11 0.38413 0.01172 
36 LB3DF11 0.49675 0.01548 
37 PF12F10 0.50000 0 
38 PF12F7 0.50000 0 
39 pf13f5 0.50000 0 
40 p13f9 0.50000 0 
41 p13f12 0.50000 0 
42 vare8 50.00000 0.01938 
43 vare9 50.00000 0.01922 
44 vare10 50.00000 0.01944 
45 vare11 50.00000 0.01938 
46 vare12 50.00000 0.01917 
47 vare13 50.00000 0.01905 
48 vare14 50.00000 0.01955 
49 vare15 50.00000 0.01931 
50 vare16 50.00000 0.01840 
51 vare17 50.00000 0.01903 
52 vare18 50.00000 0.01969 
53 vare19 50.00000 0.01838 
54 vare20 50.00000 0.01971 
55 vare21 50.00000 0.01819 
56 vare22 50.00000 0.01946 
57 vare23 50.00000 0.01924 
58 vare24 50.00000 0.01861 
59 vare25 50.00000 0.01909 
60 vare26 50.00000 0.01932 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
61 vare27 50.00000 0.01925 
62 vare28 50.00000 0.01890 
63 vare29 50.00000 0.01907 
64 vare30 50.00000 0.01848 
65 vare31 50.00000 0.01868 
66 vare32 50.00000 0.01850 
67 vare33 50.00000 0.01902 
68 vare34 50.00000 0.01790 
69 vare35 50.00000 0.01849 
70 vare36 50.00000 0.01902 
71 VARD5 50.00000 0 
72 vard9 50.00000 0 
73 vard12 50.00000 0 
74 vard13 50.00000 0 
75 cF1F2 0.68662 -0.00294 
76 CF1F3 0.65670 -0.00132 
77 CF1F4 0.53839 -0.00221 
78 CF1F6 0.70119 -0.00590 
79 CF1F7 0.58128 -0.0006802 
80 CF1F9 0.43910 -0.00169 
81 CF1F10 0.29897 -0.0009590 
82 CF1F11 0.19366 -0.0009780 
83 CF2F3 0.78759 -0.00241 
84 CF2F4 0.75231 -0.00478 
85 CF2F7 0.69567 -0.00127 
86 CF2F8 0.28696 -0.00148 
87 CF2F10 -0.05052 0.0004583 
88 CF2F11 0.25812 -0.00217 
89 CF3F4 0.73935 -0.00225 
90 CF3F6 0.93408 -0.00240 
91 CF3F7 0.77456 -0.0006814 
92 CF3F8 0.36190 -0.0009246 
93 CF3F10 0.07274 -0.0000796 
94 CF3F11 0.29207 -0.00119 
95 CF4F6 0.53842 -0.00261 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
96 CF4F7 0.45970 -0.0007538 
97 CF4F8 0.20692 -0.0009823 
98 CF4F10 -0.18734 0.00117 
99 CF4F11 0.39629 -0.00370 
100 CF6F7 0.70186 -0.00100 
101 CF6F8 0.76182 -0.00382 
102 CF6F10 0.44588 -0.00176 
103 CF6F11 0.29370 -0.00198 
104 CF7F8 0.44400 -0.0007088 
105 CF7F10 0.61310 -0.0008728 
106 CF7F11 0.58214 -0.00159 
107 CF8C10 0.38026 -0.00168 
108 CF8F11 0.21093 -0.00165 
109 CF10F11 0.44991 -0.00330 




RUN 2 – REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL – 8/7/17 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Optimization 
 
Levenberg-Marquardt Optimization 
Scaling Update of More (1978) 
 
Parameter Estimates 109 
Functions (Observations) 435 
 
Optimization Start 
Active Constraints 0 Objective Function 75.287500055 
Max Abs Gradient Element 0.03984522 Radius 1 
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1 * 0 4 0  69.58390 5.7036 0.0245 4.297 1.159 
2 * 0 6 0  69.32695 0.2569 0.0244 0.0657 0.971 
3 * 0 8 0  68.82237 0.5046 0.0249 0.0311 1.006 
4 * 0 10 0  67.78543 1.0369 0.0259 0.0154 1.034 
5 * 0 12 0  64.38824 3.3972 0.0583 0.00458 1.079 
6 * 0 15 0  63.62981 0.7584 0.0304 0.0352 0.887 
7 * 0 17 0  62.14014 1.4897 0.0322 0.0150 1.039 
8 * 0 19 0  59.28951 2.8506 0.0648 0.00750 0.959 
9 * 0 22 0  58.43367 0.8558 0.0375 0.0569 0.942 
10 * 0 24 0  57.07354 1.3601 0.0398 0.0235 0.935 
11 * 0 26 0  54.27977 2.7938 0.0546 0.0113 0.955 
12 * 0 28 0  46.64028 7.6395 0.2224 0.00482 1.242 
13 * 0 30 0  20.58107 26.0592 0.2461 0.00103 2.443 
14 * 0 34 0  19.01029 1.5708 0.2846 0.358 1.148 
15 * 0 36 0  15.46979 3.5405 0.4016 0.146 1.295 
16 * 0 38 0  8.71463 6.7552 0.4781 0.0440 1.563 
17 * 0 41 0  7.49160 1.2230 0.2967 0.366 1.160 
18 * 0 43 0  5.82446 1.6671 0.1922 0.103 1.206 
19 * 0 45 0  4.14933 1.6751 1.4597 0.0178 1.207 
20 * 0 48 0  3.76666 0.3827 0.3116 0.0969 0.967 
21 * 0 50 0  3.50704 0.2596 0.5253 0.0191 0.971 
22 * 0 52 0  3.44555 0.0615 0.5668 0.00803 0.220 
23 * 0 55 0  3.13409 0.3115 0.8167 0.975 0.895 
24 * 0 57 0  2.84005 0.2940 0.5622 0.129 1.023 
25 * 0 59 0  2.72305 0.1170 0.8004 0.0191 0.878 
26 * 0 62 0  2.60212 0.1209 1.3720 0.0752 0.888 
27 * 0 64 0  2.54452 0.0576 0.6421 0.0143 0.543 
28 * 0 66 0  2.49275 0.0518 1.4765 0.00139 0.615 
29 * 0 68 0  2.47533 0.0174 0.5664 0.00008 0.353 
30 * 0 70 0  2.46797 0.00736 1.4030 0.00002 0.224 
31 * 0 72 0  2.45860 0.00937 0.5188 0.00007 0.281 
32 * 0 74 0  2.45395 0.00464 1.0342 0.00002 0.209 
33 * 0 76 0  2.44866 0.00529 0.4613 0.00005 0.261 
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34 * 0 78 0  2.44632 0.00234 0.6780 0.00001 0.181 
35 * 0 80 0  2.44402 0.00230 0.4100 0.00004 0.213 
36 * 0 82 0  2.44288 0.00113 0.4537 3.31E-6 0.158 
37 * 0 84 0  2.44201 0.000876 0.3641 0.00003 0.156 
38 * 0 86 0  2.44081 0.00120 0.1650 3.55E-6 0.293 
39 * 0 89 0  2.44030 0.000509 0.1621 0.00011 0.264 
40 * 0 91 0  2.43991 0.000389 0.0831 0.00005 0.299 
41 * 0 93 0  2.43984 0.000071 0.1176 0.00015 0.0974 
42 * 0 95 0  2.43962 0.000221 0.0540 0.00022 0.317 
43 * 0 97 0  2.43953 0.000089 0.0626 0.00049 0.207 
44 * 0 99 0  2.43937 0.000164 0.0262 0.00037 0.453 
45 * 0 101 0  2.43928 0.000086 0.0431 0.00067 0.368 
46 * 0 103 0  2.43911 0.000177 0.00854 0.00064 0.718 
47 * 0 105 0  2.43897 0.000136 0.0326 0.00103 0.714 
48 * 0 107 0  2.43872 0.000253 0.00845 0.00114 0.992 
49 * 0 109 0  2.43850 0.000216 0.0898 0.00086 0.437 
50 * 0 111 0  2.43716 0.00134 0.0834 0.00130 0.883 
51 * 0 114 0  2.43540 0.00177 0.0109 0.0111 1.096 
52 * 0 116 0  2.43315 0.00225 0.0582 0.00964 1.116 
53 * 0 118 0  2.42802 0.00513 0.1379 0.00650 0.752 
54 * 0 121 0  2.39568 0.0323 0.0602 0.0523 1.257 
55 * 0 123 0  2.35537 0.0403 0.1422 0.0513 1.086 
56 * 0 125 0  2.28033 0.0750 0.0409 444E-16 1.284 
57 * 0 127 0  2.27124 0.00909 0.0131 444E-16 1.135 
58 * 0 129 0  2.27068 0.000562 0.0116 444E-16 0.950 
59 * 0 131 0  2.27059 0.000094 0.00455 444E-16 0.705 
60 * 0 133 0  2.27056 0.000027 0.00473 444E-16 0.532 
61 * 1 137 0  2.27055 0.000011 0.00246 444E-16 0.429 
62 * 1 139 0  2.27054 5.091E-6 0.00237 444E-16 0.376 
63 * 1 141 0  2.27054 2.673E-6 0.00135 444E-16 0.349 
64 * 1 143 0  2.27054 1.459E-6 0.00130 444E-16 0.331 
65 * 1 145 0  2.27054 8.217E-7 0.000757 444E-16 0.321 
66 * 1 147 0  2.27054 4.656E-7 0.000733 444E-16 0.313 
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67 * 1 149 0  2.27054 2.672E-7 0.000432 444E-16 0.308 
68 * 1 151 0  2.27054 1.535E-7 0.000420 444E-16 0.304 
69 * 1 153 0  2.27054 8.869E-8 0.000249 444E-16 0.300 
70 * 1 155 0  2.27054 5.123E-8 0.000243 444E-16 0.297 
71 * 1 157 0  2.27054 2.97E-8 0.000144 444E-16 0.295 
72 * 1 159 0  2.27054 1.72E-8 0.000140 444E-16 0.292 
73 * 1 161 0  2.27054 9.985E-9 0.000084 444E-16 0.290 
74 * 1 163 0  2.27054 5.793E-9 0.000081 444E-16 0.288 
75 * 1 165 0  2.27054 3.365E-9 0.000049 444E-16 0.286 
76 * 1 167 0  2.27054 1.954E-9 0.000047 444E-16 0.285 
 
Optimization Results 
Iterations 76 Function Calls 170 
Jacobian Calls 79 Active Constraints 0 
Objective Function 2.270538281 Max Abs Gradient Element 0.0000472353 
Lambda 4.440892E-14 Actual Over Pred Change 0.284578936 
Radius 170.26176261   
 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
LSU DATA 
RUN 2 – REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL – 8/7/17 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
Fit Summary 
Modeling Info Number of Observations 290 
 Number of Variables 29 
 Number of Moments 435 
 Number of Parameters 109 
 Number of Active Constraints 0 
 Baseline Model Function Value 7.4837 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square 2162.8019 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square DF 406 




 Pr > Baseline Model Chi-Square <.0001 
Absolute Index Fit Function 2.2705 
 Chi-Square 656.1856 
 Chi-Square DF 326 
 Pr > Chi-Square <.0001 
 Z-Test of Wilson & Hilferty 10.0845 
 Hoelter Critical N 163 
 Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 0.1473 
 Standardized RMR (SRMR) 0.0640 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.8654 
Parsimony Index Adjusted GFI (AGFI) 0.8204 
 Parsimonious GFI 0.6949 
 RMSEA Estimate 0.0592 
 RMSEA Lower 90% Confidence Limit 0.0526 
 RMSEA Upper 90% Confidence Limit 0.0657 
 Probability of Close Fit 0.0113 
 ECVI Estimate 3.1122 
 ECVI Lower 90% Confidence Limit 2.8654 
 ECVI Upper 90% Confidence Limit 3.3894 
 Akaike Information Criterion 874.1856 
 Bozdogan CAIC 1383.2026 
 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 1274.2026 
 McDonald Centrality 0.5659 
Incremental Index Bentler Comparative Fit Index 0.8121 
 Bentler-Bonett NFI 0.6966 
 Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Index 0.7659 
 Bollen Normed Index Rho1 0.6222 
 Bollen Non-normed Index Delta2 0.8202 
 James et al. Parsimonious NFI 0.5593 
 
Linear Equations 
Q8 =  0.6007 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e8             
Q9 =  0.8061 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e9             
Q10 =  0.7315 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e10             
Q11 =  0.6967 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e11             
Q12 =  0.9221 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e12             
Q13 =  0.9531 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e13             
Q14 =  0.6151 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e14             




Q15 =  0.8525 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e15             
Q16 =  1.1501 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e16             
Q17 =  0.9598 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e17             
f5 =  0.5000  F1 + 0.5000  f2 + 0.5000  f3 + 0.5000  f4 + 1.0000  D5 
Q19 =  1.0644 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e19             
Q27 =  0.5735 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e27             
Q21 =  0.6823 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e21             
Q18 =  0.4633 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e18             
Q20 =  0.3658 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e20             
Q26 =  0.5705 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e26             
Q22 =  0.2868 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e22             
Q23 =  0.6596 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e23             
Q24 =  1.1249 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e24             
Q25 =  0.3096 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e25             
f9 =  0.5004  f6 + 0.5000  f7 + 0.5002  f8 + 1.0000  D9     
B1A =  0.2120 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E29             
B2C =  0.4331 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E30             
B3B =  1.2858 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E31             
B3C =  0.9035 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E32             
B1D =  0.6719 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E33             
B2A =  1.2484 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E34             
B2B =  0.8145 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E35             
B3A =  0.6128 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E36             
B3D =  0.6362 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E28             
f12 =  0.5007  F10 + 0.5006  F11 + 1.0000  D12         
f13 =  0.5004  f5 + 0.5004  f9 + 0.4999  f12 + 1.0000  d13     
 
Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q8 F1 LQ8f1 0.60071 0.06975 8.6124 <.0001 
Q9 F1 LQ9F1 0.80614 0.07640 10.5520 <.0001 
Q10 F1 lq10f1 0.73147 0.06193 11.8103 <.0001 
Q11 f2 LQ11F2 0.69674 0.06298 11.0620 <.0001 
Q12 f2 lq12f2 0.92208 0.06999 13.1753 <.0001 
Q13 f2 LQ13F2 0.95308 0.07457 12.7812 <.0001 
Q14 f3 LQ14F3 0.61506 0.05368 11.4576 <.0001 
Q15 f3 LQ15F3 0.85248 0.06527 13.0606 <.0001 
Q16 f4 LQ16F4 1.15014 0.11006 10.4505 <.0001 
Q17 f4 lq17f4 0.95980 0.08478 11.3211 <.0001 
f5 F1 PF5F1 0.50000 . . . 
f5 f2 PF5F2 0.50000 . . . 
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Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f5 f3 PF5F3 0.50000 . . . 
f5 f4 PF5F4 0.50000 . . . 
Q19 f8 LQ19F8 1.06437 0.13816 7.7037 <.0001 
Q27 f8 lq27f8 0.57345 0.09264 6.1899 <.0001 
Q21 f8 lq21f8 0.68226 0.15453 4.4150 <.0001 
Q18 f7 LQ18F7 0.46334 0.05205 8.9022 <.0001 
Q20 f7 LQ20F7 0.36581 0.05222 7.0047 <.0001 
Q26 f7 lq26f7 0.57048 0.07976 7.1525 <.0001 
Q22 f6 lq22f6 0.28681 0.07160 4.0057 <.0001 
Q23 f6 lq23f6 0.65965 0.07823 8.4319 <.0001 
Q24 f6 lq24F6 1.12486 0.10357 10.8610 <.0001 
Q25 f6 lq25F6 0.30964 0.09419 3.2874 0.0010 
f9 f6 PF9F6 0.50037 . . . 
f9 f7 PF9F7 0.50000 . . . 
f9 f8 PF9F8 0.50018 . . . 
B1A F10 LB1AF10 0.21202 0.09746 2.1755 0.0296 
B2C F10 LB2CF10 0.43308 0.12963 3.3408 0.0008 
B3B F10 LB3BF10 1.28583 0.12705 10.1210 <.0001 
B3C F10 LB3CF10 0.90347 0.13087 6.9036 <.0001 
B1D F11 LB1DF11 0.67189 0.10106 6.6482 <.0001 
B2A F11 LB2AF11 1.24839 0.15026 8.3085 <.0001 
B2B F11 LB2BF11 0.81449 0.12052 6.7581 <.0001 
B3A F11 LB3AF11 0.61275 0.10917 5.6128 <.0001 
B3D F11 LB3DF11 0.63622 0.11446 5.5584 <.0001 
f12 F10 PF12F10 0.50075 . . . 
f12 F11 PF12F7 0.50060 . . . 
f13 f5 pf13f5 0.50037 . . . 
f13 f9 p13f9 0.50038 . . . 
f13 f12 p13f12 0.49985 . . . 
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Estimates for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Error e8 vare8 0.87246 0.08383 10.4076 <.0001 
 e9 vare9 0.90432 0.09877 9.1557 <.0001 
 e10 vare10 0.50642 0.06504 7.7862 <.0001 
 e11 vare11 0.70588 0.06909 10.2166 <.0001 
 e12 vare12 0.72775 0.08207 8.8675 <.0001 
 e13 vare13 0.86127 0.09369 9.1929 <.0001 
 e14 vare14 0.49110 0.04975 9.8719 <.0001 
 e15 vare15 0.57480 0.07252 7.9255 <.0001 
 e16 vare16 1.81640 0.20388 8.9092 <.0001 
 e17 vare17 0.90442 0.12143 7.4478 <.0001 
 e18 vare18 0.41071 0.04421 9.2894 <.0001 
 e19 vare19 1.85907 0.26911 6.9084 <.0001 
 e20 vare20 0.50706 0.04665 10.8694 <.0001 
 e21 vare21 3.89621 0.35060 11.1129 <.0001 
 e22 vare22 1.20928 0.10190 11.8675 <.0001 
 e23 vare23 1.18218 0.10906 10.8397 <.0001 
 e24 vare24 1.49934 0.18030 8.3157 <.0001 
 e25 vare25 2.12553 0.17828 11.9224 <.0001 
 e26 vare26 1.17065 0.10844 10.7949 <.0001 
 e27 vare27 1.23790 0.12456 9.9384 <.0001 
 E28 vare28 2.18015 0.20189 10.7989 <.0001 
 E29 vare29 1.96825 0.16516 11.9170 <.0001 
 E30 vare30 3.40080 0.28909 11.7637 <.0001 
 E31 vare31 0.94567 0.26925 3.5122 0.0004 
 E32 vare32 2.89511 0.27683 10.4581 <.0001 
 E33 vare33 1.58961 0.15681 10.1375 <.0001 
 E34 vare34 2.94870 0.34713 8.4945 <.0001 
 E35 vare35 2.24190 0.22293 10.0567 <.0001 
 E36 vare36 1.97772 0.18362 10.7710 <.0001 
Latent F1  1.00000    
 f2  1.00000    
 f3  1.00000    
 f4  1.00000    
 f6  1.00000    
 f7  1.00000    
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Estimates for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
 f8  1.00000    
 F10  1.00000    
 F11  1.00000    
Disturbance D5 VARD5 50.00101 . . . 
 D9 vard9 49.99972 . . . 
 D12 vard12 50.00027 . . . 
 d13 vard13 49.99952 . . . 
 
Covariances Among Exogenous Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
F1 f2 cF1F2 0.66340 0.05983 11.0878 <.0001 
F1 f3 CF1F3 0.62422 0.06547 9.5350 <.0001 
F1 f4 CF1F4 0.54717 0.07475 7.3198 <.0001 
F1 f6 CF1F6 0.69752 0.05929 11.7655 <.0001 
F1 f7 CF1F7 0.56099 0.08511 6.5915 <.0001 
F1 f8 CF1F9 0.46282 0.09152 5.0572 <.0001 
F1 F10 CF1F10 0.34948 0.08172 4.2766 <.0001 
F1 F11 CF1F11 0.20929 0.08952 2.3379 0.0194 
f2 f3 CF2F3 0.81099 0.05175 15.6714 <.0001 
f2 f4 CF2F4 0.75586 0.05943 12.7175 <.0001 
f2 f6 CF1F6 0.69752 0.05929 11.7655 <.0001 
f2 f7 CF2F7 0.69193 0.07516 9.2057 <.0001 
f2 f8 CF2F8 0.34752 0.09079 3.8277 0.0001 
f2 F10 CF2F10 0.03599 0.08241 0.4368 0.6623 
f2 F11 CF2F11 0.23819 0.08521 2.7952 0.0052 
f3 f4 CF3F4 0.74170 0.06707 11.0591 <.0001 
f3 f6 CF3F6 0.94191 0.06607 14.2569 <.0001 
f3 f7 CF3F7 0.79462 0.07767 10.2314 <.0001 
f3 f8 CF3F8 0.39676 0.09633 4.1190 <.0001 
f3 F10 CF3F10 0.12212 0.08664 1.4095 0.1587 
f3 F11 CF3F11 0.27216 0.08940 3.0442 0.0023 
f4 f6 CF4F6 0.58934 0.08351 7.0575 <.0001 
f4 f7 CF4F7 0.42919 0.09542 4.4980 <.0001 
f4 f8 CF4F8 0.27381 0.10181 2.6893 0.0072 
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Covariances Among Exogenous Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f4 F10 CF4F10 -0.06013 0.08945 -0.6723 0.5014 
f4 F11 CF4F11 0.36768 0.08921 4.1215 <.0001 
f6 f7 CF6F7 0.70837 0.09189 7.7091 <.0001 
f6 f8 CF6F8 0.77357 0.09544 8.1049 <.0001 
f6 F10 CF6F10 0.38657 0.08908 4.3396 <.0001 
f6 F11 CF6F11 0.29517 0.09706 3.0411 0.0024 
f7 f8 CF7F8 0.44645 0.11013 4.0537 <.0001 
f7 F10 CF7F10 0.54642 0.09188 5.9471 <.0001 
f7 F11 CF7F11 0.51790 0.09526 5.4364 <.0001 
f8 F10 CF8C10 0.34419 0.09841 3.4976 0.0005 
f8 F11 CF8F11 0.19906 0.10635 1.8717 0.0612 
F10 F11 CF10F11 0.44204 0.08617 5.1300 <.0001 
 






Q8 0.87246 1.23331 0.2926 
Q9 0.90432 1.55418 0.4181 
Q10 0.50642 1.04146 0.5137 
Q11 0.70588 1.19133 0.4075 
Q12 0.72775 1.57799 0.5388 
Q13 0.86127 1.76963 0.5133 
Q14 0.49110 0.86940 0.4351 
Q15 0.57480 1.30152 0.5584 
Q16 1.81640 3.13923 0.4214 
Q17 0.90442 1.82565 0.5046 
f5 50.00101 53.07268 0.0579 
Q19 1.85907 2.99196 0.3786 
Q27 1.23790 1.56675 0.2099 
Q21 3.89621 4.36169 0.1067 
Q18 0.41071 0.62539 0.3433 
Q20 0.50706 0.64087 0.2088 
Q26 1.17065 1.49610 0.2175 
Q22 1.20928 1.29154 0.0637 
Q23 1.18218 1.61732 0.2690 
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Q24 1.49934 2.76465 0.4577 
Q25 2.12553 2.22141 0.0432 
f9 49.99972 51.71523 0.0332 
B1A 1.96825 2.01320 0.0223 
B2C 3.40080 3.58835 0.0523 
B3B 0.94567 2.59902 0.6361 
B3C 2.89511 3.71136 0.2199 
B1D 1.58961 2.04105 0.2212 
B2A 2.94870 4.50719 0.3458 
B2B 2.24190 2.90529 0.2283 
B3A 1.97772 2.35319 0.1596 
B3D 2.18015 2.58493 0.1566 
f12 50.00027 50.72323 0.0143 
f13 49.99952 90.25038 0.4460 
 
Standardized Results for Linear Equations 
Q8 =  0.5409 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e8             
Q9 =  0.6466 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e9             
Q10 =  0.7168 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e10             
Q11 =  0.6383 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e11             
Q12 =  0.7340 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e12             
Q13 =  0.7165 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e13             
Q14 =  0.6596 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e14             
Q15 =  0.7472 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e15             
Q16 =  0.6491 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e16             
Q17 =  0.7104 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e17             
f5 =  0.0686 (**) F1 + 0.0686 (**) f2 + 0.0686 (**) f3 + 0.0686 (**) f4 + 1.0000  D5 
Q19 =  0.6153 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e19             
Q27 =  0.4581 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e27             
Q21 =  0.3267 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e21             
Q18 =  0.5859 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e18             
Q20 =  0.4569 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e20             
Q26 =  0.4664 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e26             
Q22 =  0.2524 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e22             
Q23 =  0.5187 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e23             
Q24 =  0.6765 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e24             
Q25 =  0.2078 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e25             
f9 =  0.0696 (**) f6 + 0.0695 (**) f7 + 0.0696 (**) f8 + 1.0000  D9     
B1A =  0.1494 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E29             
B2C =  0.2286 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E30             
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Standardized Results for Linear Equations 
B3B =  0.7976 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E31             
B3C =  0.4690 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E32             
B1D =  0.4703 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E33             
B2A =  0.5880 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E34             
B2B =  0.4778 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E35             
B3A =  0.3994 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E36             
B3D =  0.3957 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E28             
f12 =  0.0703 (**) F10 + 0.0703 (**) F11 + 1.0000  D12         
f13 =  0.3837 (**) f5 + 0.3788 (**) f9 + 0.3747 (**) f12 + 1.0000  d13     
 
Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q8 F1 LQ8f1 0.54091 0.05217 10.3681 <.0001 
Q9 F1 LQ9F1 0.64663 0.04678 13.8227 <.0001 
Q10 F1 lq10f1 0.71676 0.04388 16.3361 <.0001 
Q11 f2 LQ11F2 0.63834 0.04230 15.0917 <.0001 
Q12 f2 lq12f2 0.73404 0.03620 20.2791 <.0001 
Q13 f2 LQ13F2 0.71645 0.03726 19.2282 <.0001 
Q14 f3 LQ14F3 0.65964 0.04141 15.9292 <.0001 
Q15 f3 LQ15F3 0.74724 0.03820 19.5597 <.0001 
Q16 f4 LQ16F4 0.64914 0.04781 13.5767 <.0001 
Q17 f4 lq17f4 0.71035 0.04690 15.1462 <.0001 
f5 F1 PF5F1 0.06863 0.0000756 907.3 <.0001 
f5 f2 PF5F2 0.06863 0.0000756 907.3 <.0001 
f5 f3 PF5F3 0.06863 0.0000756 907.3 <.0001 
f5 f4 PF5F4 0.06863 0.0000756 907.3 <.0001 
Q19 f8 LQ19F8 0.61534 0.07009 8.7796 <.0001 
Q27 f8 lq27f8 0.45814 0.06739 6.7982 <.0001 
Q21 f8 lq21f8 0.32668 0.07043 4.6382 <.0001 
Q18 f7 LQ18F7 0.58590 0.05439 10.7724 <.0001 
Q20 f7 LQ20F7 0.45695 0.05764 7.9271 <.0001 
Q26 f7 lq26f7 0.46640 0.05733 8.1350 <.0001 
Q22 f6 lq22f6 0.25237 0.06044 4.1757 <.0001 
Q23 f6 lq23f6 0.51870 0.05136 10.0985 <.0001 
Q24 f6 lq24F6 0.67652 0.04721 14.3286 <.0001 
Q25 f6 lq25F6 0.20775 0.06145 3.3808 0.0007 
f9 f6 PF9F6 0.06958 0.0000711 978.3 <.0001 
f9 f7 PF9F7 0.06953 0.0000711 978.3 <.0001 
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Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f9 f8 PF9F8 0.06955 0.0000711 978.3 <.0001 
B1A F10 LB1AF10 0.14943 0.06785 2.2023 0.0276 
B2C F10 LB2CF10 0.22862 0.06649 3.4383 0.0006 
B3B F10 LB3BF10 0.79759 0.06569 12.1422 <.0001 
B3C F10 LB3CF10 0.46897 0.06034 7.7715 <.0001 
B1D F11 LB1DF11 0.47030 0.06345 7.4124 <.0001 
B2A F11 LB2AF11 0.58803 0.06023 9.7625 <.0001 
B2B F11 LB2BF11 0.47785 0.06320 7.5604 <.0001 
B3A F11 LB3AF11 0.39945 0.06576 6.0741 <.0001 
B3D F11 LB3DF11 0.39572 0.06588 6.0064 <.0001 
f12 F10 PF12F10 0.07031 0.0000299 2348.3 <.0001 
f12 F11 PF12F7 0.07029 0.0000299 2348.3 <.0001 
f13 f5 pf13f5 0.38371 0.0003886 987.4 <.0001 
f13 f9 p13f9 0.37878 0.0003335 1135.9 <.0001 
f13 f12 p13f12 0.37473 0.0003035 1234.6 <.0001 
 
Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Error e8 vare8 0.70741 0.05644 12.5341 <.0001 
 e9 vare9 0.58187 0.06050 9.6177 <.0001 
 e10 vare10 0.48626 0.06290 7.7310 <.0001 
 e11 vare11 0.59252 0.05400 10.9723 <.0001 
 e12 vare12 0.46119 0.05314 8.6788 <.0001 
 e13 vare13 0.48670 0.05339 9.1158 <.0001 
 e14 vare14 0.56487 0.05463 10.3395 <.0001 
 e15 vare15 0.44163 0.05709 7.7353 <.0001 
 e16 vare16 0.57862 0.06207 9.3212 <.0001 
 e17 vare17 0.49540 0.06663 7.4350 <.0001 
 e18 vare18 0.65672 0.06373 10.3043 <.0001 
 e19 vare19 0.62136 0.08626 7.2037 <.0001 
 e20 vare20 0.79120 0.05268 15.0186 <.0001 
 e21 vare21 0.89328 0.04602 19.4118 <.0001 
 e22 vare22 0.93631 0.03051 30.6929 <.0001 
 e23 vare23 0.73095 0.05328 13.7178 <.0001 
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Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
 e24 vare24 0.54233 0.06388 8.4894 <.0001 
 e25 vare25 0.95684 0.02553 37.4749 <.0001 
 e26 vare26 0.78247 0.05348 14.6310 <.0001 
 e27 vare27 0.79011 0.06175 12.7954 <.0001 
 E28 vare28 0.84341 0.05214 16.1752 <.0001 
 E29 vare29 0.97767 0.02028 48.2156 <.0001 
 E30 vare30 0.94773 0.03040 31.1715 <.0001 
 E31 vare31 0.36386 0.10478 3.4725 0.0005 
 E32 vare32 0.78007 0.05660 13.7820 <.0001 
 E33 vare33 0.77882 0.05968 13.0505 <.0001 
 E34 vare34 0.65422 0.07084 9.2355 <.0001 
 E35 vare35 0.77166 0.06040 12.7750 <.0001 
 E36 vare36 0.84044 0.05254 15.9971 <.0001 
Latent F1  1.00000    
 f2  1.00000    
 f3  1.00000    
 f4  1.00000    
 f6  1.00000    
 f7  1.00000    
 f8  1.00000    
 F10  1.00000    
 F11  1.00000    
Disturbance D5 VARD5 0.94212 0.00208 453.6 <.0001 
 D9 vard9 0.96683 0.00198 489.2 <.0001 
 D12 vard12 0.98575 0.0008395 1174.2 <.0001 
 d13 vard13 0.55401 0.0008925 620.7 <.0001 
 
Standardized Results for Covariances Among Exogenous 
Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
F1 f2 cF1F2 0.66340 0.05983 11.0878 <.0001 
F1 f3 CF1F3 0.62422 0.06547 9.5350 <.0001 
F1 f4 CF1F4 0.54717 0.07475 7.3198 <.0001 
F1 f6 CF1F6 0.69752 0.05929 11.7655 <.0001 
F1 f7 CF1F7 0.56099 0.08511 6.5915 <.0001 
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Standardized Results for Covariances Among Exogenous 
Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
F1 f8 CF1F9 0.46282 0.09152 5.0572 <.0001 
F1 F10 CF1F10 0.34948 0.08172 4.2766 <.0001 
F1 F11 CF1F11 0.20929 0.08952 2.3379 0.0194 
f2 f3 CF2F3 0.81099 0.05175 15.6714 <.0001 
f2 f4 CF2F4 0.75586 0.05943 12.7175 <.0001 
f2 f6 CF1F6 0.69752 0.05929 11.7655 <.0001 
f2 f7 CF2F7 0.69193 0.07516 9.2057 <.0001 
f2 f8 CF2F8 0.34752 0.09079 3.8277 0.0001 
f2 F10 CF2F10 0.03599 0.08241 0.4368 0.6623 
f2 F11 CF2F11 0.23819 0.08521 2.7952 0.0052 
f3 f4 CF3F4 0.74170 0.06707 11.0591 <.0001 
f3 f6 CF3F6 0.94191 0.06607 14.2569 <.0001 
f3 f7 CF3F7 0.79462 0.07767 10.2314 <.0001 
f3 f8 CF3F8 0.39676 0.09633 4.1190 <.0001 
f3 F10 CF3F10 0.12212 0.08664 1.4095 0.1587 
f3 F11 CF3F11 0.27216 0.08940 3.0442 0.0023 
f4 f6 CF4F6 0.58934 0.08351 7.0575 <.0001 
f4 f7 CF4F7 0.42919 0.09542 4.4980 <.0001 
f4 f8 CF4F8 0.27381 0.10181 2.6893 0.0072 
f4 F10 CF4F10 -0.06013 0.08945 -0.6723 0.5014 
f4 F11 CF4F11 0.36768 0.08921 4.1215 <.0001 
f6 f7 CF6F7 0.70837 0.09189 7.7091 <.0001 
f6 f8 CF6F8 0.77357 0.09544 8.1049 <.0001 
f6 F10 CF6F10 0.38657 0.08908 4.3396 <.0001 
f6 F11 CF6F11 0.29517 0.09706 3.0411 0.0024 
f7 f8 CF7F8 0.44645 0.11013 4.0537 <.0001 
f7 F10 CF7F10 0.54642 0.09188 5.9471 <.0001 
f7 F11 CF7F11 0.51790 0.09526 5.4364 <.0001 
f8 F10 CF8C10 0.34419 0.09841 3.4976 0.0005 
f8 F11 CF8F11 0.19906 0.10635 1.8717 0.0612 
F10 F11 CF10F11 0.44204 0.08617 5.1300 <.0001 
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Stepwise Multivariate Wald Test 
Parm 
Cumulative Statistics Univariate Increment 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
CF2F10 0.19075 1 0.6623 0.19075 0.6623 
CF4F10 1.30149 2 0.5217 1.11073 0.2919 
CF3F10 4.36487 3 0.2247 3.06338 0.0801 
CF8F11 7.77740 4 0.1001 3.41253 0.0647 
CF1F11 11.54476 5 0.0416 3.76736 0.0523 
CF2F11 14.99021 6 0.0203 3.44545 0.0634 
CF3F11 16.36126 7 0.0220 1.37105 0.2416 
CF6F11 17.49444 8 0.0254 1.13318 0.2871 
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RUN 3 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/15/17 
LSU DATA 
Run 3 CFA - FULL MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/15/17 
*********************** 
 
The CONTENTS Procedure 
 
Data Set Name WORK.TEST_1 Observations 306 
Member Type DATA Variables 39 
Engine V9 Indexes 0 
Created 08/15/2017 14:37:53 Observation Length 368 
Last Modified 08/15/2017 14:37:53 Deleted Observations 0 
Protection  Compressed NO 
Data Set Type  Sorted NO 
Label    
Data Representation WINDOWS_64   
Encoding wlatin1  Western (Windows)   
 
Engine/Host Dependent Information 
Data Set Page Size 65536 
Number of Data Set 
Pages 
2 
First Data Page 1 
Max Obs per Page 177 
Obs in First Data 
Page 
164 




Filename C:\Users\Machine\AppData\Local\Temp\SAS Temporary Files\_TD7200_LAPTOP-
OV06L7T4_\test_1.sas7bdat 
Release Created 9.0401M2 
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RUN 3 - CFA - REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/15/17 
The CALIS Procedure  








Variables in the Model 
Endogenous Manifest B1D  B2A  B2B  B2C  B3A  B3B  B3C  B3D  Q10  Q11  Q12  Q13  Q14  Q15  Q16  Q17  
Q18  Q19  Q20  Q21  Q22  Q23  Q24  Q25  Q26  Q27  Q8  Q9 
 Latent f12  f13  f5  f9 
Exogenous Manifest  
 Latent F1  F10  F11  f2  f3  f4  f6  f7  f8 
 Error E32  E33  E34  E31  E35  E29  E30  E28  e10  e11  e12  e13  e14  e15  e16  e17  
e18  e19  e20  e21  e22  e23  e24  e25  e26  e27  e8  e9  D12  d13  D5  D9 
Number of Endogenous Variables = 32 
Number of Exogenous Variables  = 41 
 
 
Initial Estimates for Linear Equations 
Q8 =  LQ8f1 (.) F1 +  1 e8             
Q9 =  LQ9F1 (.) F1 +  1 e9             
Q10 =  lq10f1 (.) F1 +  1 e10             
Q11 =  LQ11F2 (.) f2 +  1 e11             
Q12 =  lq12f2 (.) f2 +  1 e12             
Q13 =  LQ13F2 (.) f2 +  1 e13             
Q14 =  LQ14F3 (.) f3 +  1 e14             
Q15 =  LQ15F3 (.) f3 +  1 e15             
Q16 =  LQ16F4 (.) f4 +  1 e16             
Q17 =  lq17f4 (.) f4 +  1 e17             
f5 =  PF5F1 (.) F1 + PF5F2 (.) f2 + PF5F3 (.) f3 + PF5F4 (.) f4 +  1 D5 
Q19 =  LQ19F8 (.) f8 +  1 e19             
Q27 =  lq27f8 (.) f8 +  1 e27             




Data Set WORK.TEST_1 
N Records Read 306 
N Records Used 290 
N Obs 290 
Model Type LINEQS 
Analysis Covariances 
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Initial Estimates for Linear Equations 
Q18 =  LQ18F7 (.) f7 +  1 e18             
Q20 =  LQ20F7 (.) f7 +  1 e20             
Q26 =  lq26f7 (.) f7 +  1 e26             
Q22 =  lq22f6 (.) f6 +  1 e22             
Q23 =  lq23f6 (.) f6 +  1 e23             
Q24 =  lq24F6 (.) f6 +  1 e24             
Q25 =  lq25F6 (.) f6 +  1 e25             
f9 =  PF9F6 (.) f6 + PF9F7 (.) f7 + PF9F8 (.) f8 +  1 D9     
B3B =  LB3BF10 (.) F10 +  1 E29             
B3C =  LB3CF10 (.) F10 +  1 E30             
B2C =  LB2CF10 (.) F10 +  1 E31             
B1D =  LB1DF11 (.) F11 +  1 E32             
B2A =  LB2AF11 (.) F11 +  1 E33             
B2B =  LB2BF11 (.) F11 +  1 E34             
B3A =  LB3AF11 (.) F11 +  1 E35             
B3D =  LB3DF11 (.) F11 +  1 E28             
f12 =  PF12F10 (.) F10 + PF12F7 (.) F11 +  1 D12         
f13 =  pf13f5 (.) f5 + p13f9 (.) f9 + p13f12 (.) f12 +  1 d13     
                      
LSU DATA 
RUN 3 - CFA - REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/15/17 
The CALIS Procedure  
Covariance Structure Analysis: Optimization 
Initial Estimation Methods 
1 Instrumental Variables Method 
2 McDonald Method 




N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
1 LQ8f1 0.65388 0.02126 
2 LQ9F1 0.75053 0.02418 
3 lq10f1 0.72100 0.02340 
4 LQ11F2 0.73523 0.02304 
5 lq12f2 0.88294 0.02735 
6 LQ13F2 0.96619 0.03012 
7 LQ14F3 0.61814 0.01923 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
8 LQ15F3 0.83675 0.02568 
9 LQ16F4 1.15510 0.03600 
10 lq17f4 0.95127 0.03012 
11 PF5F1 0.50000 0 
12 PF5F2 0.50000 0 
13 PF5F3 0.50000 0 
14 PF5F4 0.50000 0 
15 LQ19F8 1.18969 0.03960 
16 lq27f8 0.64706 0.02169 
17 lq21f8 0.51071 0.01559 
18 LQ18F7 0.45812 0.01488 
19 LQ20F7 0.33857 0.01075 
20 lq26f7 0.56044 0.01743 
21 lq22f6 0.31236 0.00962 
22 lq23f6 0.68857 0.02052 
23 lq24F6 1.08205 0.03205 
24 lq25F6 0.29665 0.00879 
25 PF9F6 0.50000 0 
26 PF9F7 0.50000 0 
27 PF9F8 0.50000 0 
28 LB3BF10 0.71251 0.02382 
29 LB3CF10 0.44873 0.01404 
30 LB2CF10 1.29111 0.04462 
31 LB1DF11 0.78749 0.02586 
32 LB2AF11 1.17392 0.03664 
33 LB2BF11 1.00011 0.03262 
34 LB3AF11 0.42052 0.01323 
35 LB3DF11 0.52084 0.01647 
36 PF12F10 0.50000 0 
37 PF12F7 0.50000 0 
38 pf13f5 0.50000 0 
39 p13f9 0.50000 0 
40 p13f12 0.50000 0 
41 vare8 50.00000 0.01939 
42 vare9 50.00000 0.01922 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
43 vare10 50.00000 0.01944 
44 vare11 50.00000 0.01938 
45 vare12 50.00000 0.01917 
46 vare13 50.00000 0.01905 
47 vare14 50.00000 0.01955 
48 vare15 50.00000 0.01931 
49 vare16 50.00000 0.01840 
50 vare17 50.00000 0.01903 
51 vare18 50.00000 0.01969 
52 vare19 50.00000 0.01839 
53 vare20 50.00000 0.01971 
54 vare21 50.00000 0.01819 
55 vare22 50.00000 0.01946 
56 vare23 50.00000 0.01924 
57 vare24 50.00000 0.01862 
58 vare25 50.00000 0.01909 
59 vare26 50.00000 0.01932 
60 vare27 50.00000 0.01925 
61 vare28 50.00000 0.01890 
62 vare29 50.00000 0.01880 
63 vare30 50.00000 0.01846 
64 vare31 50.00000 0.01804 
65 vare32 50.00000 0.01901 
66 vare33 50.00000 0.01785 
67 vare34 50.00000 0.01856 
68 vare35 50.00000 0.01901 
69 VARD5 50.00000 0 
70 vard9 50.00000 0 
71 vard12 50.00000 0 
72 vard13 50.00000 0 
73 cF1F2 0.68616 -0.00295 
74 CF1F3 0.65585 -0.00132 
75 CF1F4 0.53866 -0.00221 
76 CF1F6 0.70667 -0.00590 
77 CF1F7 0.58056 -0.0006845 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
78 CF1F9 0.44133 -0.00169 
79 CF1F10 0.21321 -0.00102 
80 CF1F11 0.19573 -0.00101 
81 CF2F3 0.78644 -0.00241 
82 CF2F4 0.75240 -0.00478 
83 CF2F7 0.69560 -0.00127 
84 CF2F8 0.28861 -0.00148 
85 CF2F10 -0.13004 0.00108 
86 CF2F11 0.25338 -0.00212 
87 CF3F4 0.73890 -0.00224 
88 CF3F6 0.93933 -0.00240 
89 CF3F7 0.77309 -0.0006838 
90 CF3F8 0.36245 -0.0009257 
91 CF3F10 -0.03747 0.0002006 
92 CF3F11 0.29016 -0.00119 
93 CF4F6 0.54281 -0.00260 
94 CF4F7 0.45973 -0.0007468 
95 CF4F8 0.20865 -0.0009756 
96 CF4F10 -0.16209 0.00130 
97 CF4F11 0.40197 -0.00375 
98 CF6F7 0.70641 -0.00101 
99 CF6F8 0.76472 -0.00378 
100 CF6F10 0.24095 -0.00135 
101 CF6F11 0.29433 -0.00200 
102 CF7F8 0.44621 -0.0007181 
103 CF7F10 0.30690 -0.0006155 
104 CF7F11 0.59521 -0.00166 
105 CF8C10 0.22932 -0.00144 
106 CF8F11 0.21459 -0.00171 
107 CF10F11 0.28029 -0.00292 








RUN 3 - CFA - REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/15/17 
The CALIS Procedure  
Covariance Structure Analysis: Optimization 
Levenberg-Marquardt Optimization 
 
Scaling Update of More (1978) 
 
Parameter Estimates 107 
Functions (Observations) 406 
 
Optimization Start 
Active Constraints 0 Objective Function 72.865899136 
Max Abs Gradient Element 0.0446224683 Radius 1 
 



















1 * 0 4 0  67.26424 5.6017 0.0301 4.214 1.154 
2 * 0 6 0  67.00903 0.2552 0.0245 0.0657 0.964 
3 * 0 8 0  66.51221 0.4968 0.0250 0.0307 1.002 
4 * 0 10 0  65.49022 1.0220 0.0260 0.0151 1.034 
5 * 0 12 0  62.14447 3.3457 0.0611 0.00449 1.075 
6 * 0 15 0  61.38895 0.7555 0.0306 0.0356 0.868 
7 * 0 17 0  59.92149 1.4675 0.0326 0.0149 1.036 
8 * 0 19 0  57.19689 2.7246 0.0758 0.00741 0.918 
9 * 0 22 0  56.29451 0.9024 0.0393 0.0585 0.938 
10 * 0 24 0  54.95072 1.3438 0.0404 0.0236 0.912 
11 * 0 26 0  52.22113 2.7296 0.0807 0.0111 0.927 
12 * 0 28 0  44.71602 7.5051 0.2349 0.00493 1.249 
13 * 0 30 0  16.03510 28.6809 0.3088 0.00068 2.716 
14 * 0 34 0  14.16716 1.8679 0.3717 0.376 1.206 
15 * 0 36 0  10.35911 3.8081 0.5269 0.140 1.372 
16 * 0 38 0  5.54541 4.8137 0.4894 0.0225 1.455 
17 * 0 41 0  4.91947 0.6259 0.5275 0.157 1.018 
18 * 0 43 0  4.18429 0.7352 0.6231 0.0501 0.987 
19 * 0 45 0  3.82609 0.3582 0.5361 0.00886 0.523 
20 * 0 48 0  3.32461 0.5015 0.2787 1.164 0.829 
    
217 
 



















21 * 0 50 0  2.94657 0.3780 0.2321 0.140 0.988 
22 * 0 52 0  2.72765 0.2189 0.3940 0.0234 0.675 
23 * 0 54 0  2.57605 0.1516 1.0883 0.00898 0.683 
24 * 0 56 0  2.43615 0.1399 0.7630 0.00222 0.837 
25 * 0 59 0  2.39434 0.0418 0.2408 0.0160 0.720 
26 * 0 61 0  2.37300 0.0213 0.1279 0.0177 0.871 
27 * 0 63 0  2.36686 0.00614 0.1935 0.0123 0.149 
28 * 0 65 0  2.29214 0.0747 0.1509 0.00204 0.787 
29 * 0 67 0  2.27952 0.0126 0.5310 0.00002 0.532 
30 * 0 70 0  2.27573 0.00379 0.1588 0.00011 0.585 
31 * 0 72 0  2.27483 0.000905 0.1557 0.00017 0.490 
32 * 0 74 0  2.27441 0.000417 0.1391 0.00023 0.423 
33 * 0 76 0  2.27435 0.000064 0.1852 0.00038 0.0778 
34 * 0 78 0  2.27335 0.000993 0.0494 0.00119 0.761 
35 * 0 81 0  2.27305 0.000301 0.0420 0.00342 0.533 
36 * 0 83 0  2.27266 0.000387 0.0351 0.00348 0.628 
37 * 0 85 0  2.27234 0.000326 0.0406 0.00517 0.500 
38 * 0 87 0  2.27170 0.000639 0.0304 0.00528 0.735 
39 * 0 89 0  2.27112 0.000580 0.0419 0.00835 0.623 
40 * 0 92 0  2.26951 0.00161 0.0494 0.00576 1.004 
41 * 0 95 0  2.26790 0.00161 0.0357 0.0177 1.066 
42 * 0 97 0  2.26443 0.00347 0.0895 0.00968 1.090 
43 * 0 100 0  2.25704 0.00739 0.0332 0.0365 1.324 
44 * 0 102 0  2.24595 0.0111 0.1180 0.0263 1.206 
45 * 0 104 0  2.20284 0.0431 0.1087 444E-16 1.739 
46 * 0 106 0  2.16154 0.0413 0.0710 444E-16 1.647 
47 * 0 108 0  2.14429 0.0172 0.0935 444E-16 1.512 
48 * 0 110 0  2.13560 0.00869 0.0294 444E-16 1.564 
49 * 0 112 0  2.12934 0.00627 0.0804 444E-16 1.526 
50 * 0 114 0  2.12421 0.00513 0.0252 444E-16 1.504 
51 * 0 116 0  2.11968 0.00453 0.0684 444E-16 1.543 
52 * 0 118 0  2.11566 0.00402 0.0227 444E-16 1.581 
53 * 0 120 0  2.11213 0.00353 0.0534 444E-16 1.647 
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54 * 0 122 0  2.10919 0.00294 0.0213 444E-16 1.681 
55 * 0 124 0  2.10690 0.00229 0.0369 444E-16 1.719 
56 * 0 126 0  2.10523 0.00167 0.0178 444E-16 1.727 
57 * 0 128 0  2.10409 0.00114 0.0229 444E-16 1.741 
58 * 0 130 0  2.10335 0.000738 0.0126 444E-16 1.741 
59 * 0 132 0  2.10289 0.000462 0.0134 444E-16 1.748 
60 * 0 134 0  2.10261 0.000282 0.00803 444E-16 1.749 
61 * 1 138 0  2.10244 0.000169 0.00762 444E-16 1.752 
62 * 1 140 0  2.10234 0.000100 0.00490 444E-16 1.754 
63 * 1 142 0  2.10228 0.000059 0.00434 444E-16 1.756 
64 * 1 144 0  2.10225 0.000035 0.00292 444E-16 1.757 
65 * 1 146 0  2.10223 0.000020 0.00247 444E-16 1.758 
66 * 1 148 0  2.10222 0.000012 0.00172 444E-16 1.759 
67 * 1 150 0  2.10221 6.868E-6 0.00141 444E-16 1.759 
68 * 1 152 0  2.10221 3.99E-6 0.00101 444E-16 1.760 
69 * 1 154 0  2.10220 2.317E-6 0.000811 444E-16 1.760 
70 * 1 156 0  2.10220 1.344E-6 0.000590 444E-16 1.760 
71 * 1 158 0  2.10220 7.792E-7 0.000466 444E-16 1.760 
72 * 1 160 0  2.10220 4.516E-7 0.000343 444E-16 1.761 
73 * 1 162 0  2.10220 2.616E-7 0.000269 444E-16 1.761 
74 * 1 164 0  2.10220 1.516E-7 0.000200 444E-16 1.761 
75 * 1 166 0  2.10220 8.778E-8 0.000155 444E-16 1.761 
76 * 1 168 0  2.10220 5.083E-8 0.000116 444E-16 1.761 
77 * 1 170 0  2.10220 2.943E-8 0.000089 444E-16 1.761 
78 * 1 172 0  2.10220 1.704E-8 0.000067 444E-16 1.761 
 
Optimization Results 
Iterations 78 Function Calls 175 
Jacobian Calls 81 Active Constraints 0 
Objective Function 2.1021996361 Max Abs Gradient Element 0.0000671935 
Lambda 4.440892E-14 Actual Over Pred Change 1.76079388 
Radius 9.1905941E12   
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Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
LSU DATA 
RUN 3 - CFA - REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/15/17 
The CALIS Procedure  
Covariance Structure Analysis: Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Fit Summary 
Modeling Info Number of Observations 290 
 Number of Variables 28 
 Number of Moments 406 
 Number of Parameters 107 
 Number of Active Constraints 0 
 Baseline Model Function Value 7.3016 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square 2110.1750 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square DF 378 
 Pr > Baseline Model Chi-Square <.0001 
Absolute Index Fit Function 2.1022 
 Chi-Square 607.5357 
 Chi-Square DF 299 
 Pr > Chi-Square <.0001 
 Z-Test of Wilson & Hilferty 9.8058 
 Hoelter Critical N 162 
 Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 0.1475 
 Standardized RMR (SRMR) 0.0639 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.8688 
Parsimony Index Adjusted GFI (AGFI) 0.8219 
 Parsimonious GFI 0.6873 
 RMSEA Estimate 0.0598 
 RMSEA Lower 90% Confidence Limit 0.0529 
 RMSEA Upper 90% Confidence Limit 0.0666 
 Probability of Close Fit 0.0101 
 ECVI Estimate 2.9253 
 ECVI Lower 90% Confidence Limit 2.6881 
 ECVI Upper 90% Confidence Limit 3.1926 
 Akaike Information Criterion 821.5357 
 Bozdogan CAIC 1321.2130 
 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 1214.2130 
 McDonald Centrality 0.5875 
Incremental Index Bentler Comparative Fit Index 0.8219 
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 Bentler-Bonett NFI 0.7121 
 Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Index 0.7748 
 Bollen Normed Index Rho1 0.6360 
 Bollen Non-normed Index Delta2 0.8296 
 James et al. Parsimonious NFI 0.5633 
Fit Summary 
Modeling Info Number of Observations 290 
 Number of Variables 28 
 Number of Moments 406 
 Number of Parameters 107 
 Number of Active Constraints 0 
 Baseline Model Function Value 7.3016 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square 2110.1750 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square DF 378 
 Pr > Baseline Model Chi-Square <.0001 
Absolute Index Fit Function 2.1022 
 Chi-Square 607.5357 
 Chi-Square DF 299 
 Pr > Chi-Square <.0001 
 Z-Test of Wilson & Hilferty 9.8058 
 Hoelter Critical N 162 
 Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 0.1475 
 Standardized RMR (SRMR) 0.0639 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.8688 
Parsimony Index Adjusted GFI (AGFI) 0.8219 
 Parsimonious GFI 0.6873 
 RMSEA Estimate 0.0598 
 RMSEA Lower 90% Confidence Limit 0.0529 
 RMSEA Upper 90% Confidence Limit 0.0666 
 Probability of Close Fit 0.0101 
 ECVI Estimate 2.9253 
 ECVI Lower 90% Confidence Limit 2.6881 
 ECVI Upper 90% Confidence Limit 3.1926 
 Akaike Information Criterion 821.5357 
 Bozdogan CAIC 1321.2130 
 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 1214.2130 
 McDonald Centrality 0.5875 
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Incremental Index Bentler Comparative Fit Index 0.8219 
 Bentler-Bonett NFI 0.7121 
 Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Index 0.7748 
 Bollen Normed Index Rho1 0.6360 
 Bollen Non-normed Index Delta2 0.8296 
 James et al. Parsimonious NFI 0.5633 
 
LSU DATA 
RUN 3 - CFA - REVISED MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/15/17 
The CALIS Procedure  
Covariance Structure Analysis: Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Linear Equations 
Q8 =  0.6018 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e8             
Q9 =  0.8055 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e9             
Q10 =  0.7311 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e10             
Q11 =  0.6958 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e11             
Q12 =  0.9223 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e12             
Q13 =  0.9541 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e13             
Q14 =  0.6147 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e14             
Q15 =  0.8529 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e15             
Q16 =  1.1509 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e16             
Q17 =  0.9591 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e17             
f5 =  0.5000  F1 + 0.5000  f2 + 0.5000  f3 + 0.5000  f4 + 1.0000  D5 
Q19 =  1.0658 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e19             
Q27 =  0.5712 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e27             
Q21 =  0.6854 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e21             
Q18 =  0.4638 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e18             
Q20 =  0.3642 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e20             
Q26 =  0.5712 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e26             
Q22 =  0.2903 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e22             
Q23 =  0.6546 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e23             
Q24 =  1.1324 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e24             
Q25 =  0.3076 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e25             
f9 =  0.5005  f6 + 0.5008  f7 + 0.4998  f8 + 1.0000  D9     
B3B =  1.3920 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E29             
B3C =  0.8496 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E30             
B2C =  0.3936 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E31             
B1D =  0.6622 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E32             
B2A =  1.2460 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E33             
B2B =  0.8109 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E34             
B3A =  0.6253 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E35             
B3D =  0.6348 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E28             




f12 =  0.4993  F10 + 0.4992  F11 + 1.0000  D12         





Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q8 F1 LQ8f1 0.60181 0.06975 8.6278 <.0001 
Q9 F1 LQ9F1 0.80548 0.07643 10.5384 <.0001 
Q10 F1 lq10f1 0.73107 0.06196 11.7984 <.0001 
Q11 f2 LQ11F2 0.69579 0.06301 11.0433 <.0001 
Q12 f2 lq12f2 0.92233 0.06998 13.1796 <.0001 
Q13 f2 LQ13F2 0.95412 0.07455 12.7986 <.0001 
Q14 f3 LQ14F3 0.61471 0.05368 11.4506 <.0001 
Q15 f3 LQ15F3 0.85286 0.06527 13.0664 <.0001 
Q16 f4 LQ16F4 1.15087 0.11019 10.4448 <.0001 
Q17 f4 lq17f4 0.95910 0.08488 11.2992 <.0001 
f5 F1 PF5F1 0.50000 . . . 
f5 f2 PF5F2 0.50000 . . . 
f5 f3 PF5F3 0.50000 . . . 
f5 f4 PF5F4 0.50000 . . . 
Q19 f8 LQ19F8 1.06579 0.13820 7.7120 <.0001 
Q27 f8 lq27f8 0.57124 0.09259 6.1696 <.0001 
Q21 f8 lq21f8 0.68535 0.15447 4.4369 <.0001 
Q18 f7 LQ18F7 0.46383 0.05215 8.8948 <.0001 
Q20 f7 LQ20F7 0.36422 0.05231 6.9626 <.0001 
Q26 f7 lq26f7 0.57123 0.07988 7.1508 <.0001 
Q22 f6 lq22f6 0.29032 0.07156 4.0569 <.0001 
Q23 f6 lq23f6 0.65456 0.07818 8.3723 <.0001 
Q24 f6 lq24F6 1.13240 0.10352 10.9385 <.0001 
Q25 f6 lq25F6 0.30761 0.09418 3.2663 0.0011 
f9 f6 PF9F6 0.50052 . . . 
f9 f7 PF9F7 0.50082 . . . 
f9 f8 PF9F8 0.49979 . . . 
B3B F10 LB3BF10 1.39195 0.14169 9.8238 <.0001 
B3C F10 LB3CF10 0.84958 0.13189 6.4415 <.0001 
B2C F10 LB2CF10 0.39361 0.12599 3.1242 0.0018 




B1D F11 LB1DF11 0.66222 0.10110 6.5499 <.0001 
B2A F11 LB2AF11 1.24602 0.15022 8.2944 <.0001 
B2B F11 LB2BF11 0.81087 0.12053 6.7277 <.0001 
B3A F11 LB3AF11 0.62531 0.10908 5.7325 <.0001 
B3D F11 LB3DF11 0.63485 0.11447 5.5461 <.0001 
f12 F10 PF12F10 0.49927 . . . 
f12 F11 PF12F7 0.49924 . . . 
f13 f5 pf13f5 0.49997 . . . 
f13 f9 p13f9 0.50018 . . . 
f13 f12 p13f12 0.49961 . . . 
 
Estimates for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Error e8 vare8 0.87115 0.08380 10.3961 <.0001 
 e9 vare9 0.90542 0.09885 9.1592 <.0001 
 e10 vare10 0.50702 0.06510 7.7889 <.0001 
 e11 vare11 0.70717 0.06916 10.2245 <.0001 
 e12 vare12 0.72726 0.08206 8.8629 <.0001 
 e13 vare13 0.85926 0.09362 9.1786 <.0001 
 e14 vare14 0.49148 0.04976 9.8774 <.0001 
 e15 vare15 0.57407 0.07253 7.9149 <.0001 
 e16 vare16 1.81460 0.20424 8.8848 <.0001 
 e17 vare17 0.90568 0.12167 7.4434 <.0001 
 e18 vare18 0.41025 0.04431 9.2588 <.0001 
 e19 vare19 1.85601 0.26933 6.8913 <.0001 
 e20 vare20 0.50821 0.04674 10.8731 <.0001 
 e21 vare21 3.89194 0.35047 11.1049 <.0001 
 e22 vare22 1.20725 0.10176 11.8636 <.0001 
 e23 vare23 1.18887 0.10925 10.8818 <.0001 
 e24 vare24 1.48231 0.18025 8.2236 <.0001 
 e25 vare25 2.12678 0.17836 11.9241 <.0001 
 e26 vare26 1.16979 0.10854 10.7780 <.0001 
 e27 vare27 1.24045 0.12451 9.9631 <.0001 
 E28 vare28 2.18188 0.20192 10.8055 <.0001 
 E29 vare29 0.65943 0.33925 1.9438 0.0519 
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Estimates for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
 E30 vare30 2.99141 0.28050 10.6645 <.0001 
 E31 vare31 3.43397 0.28968 11.8543 <.0001 
 E32 vare32 1.60248 0.15699 10.2077 <.0001 
 E33 vare33 2.95453 0.34697 8.5152 <.0001 
 E34 vare34 2.24774 0.22299 10.0801 <.0001 
 E35 vare35 1.96217 0.18324 10.7082 <.0001 
Latent F1  1.00000    
 f2  1.00000    
 f3  1.00000    
 f4  1.00000    
 f6  1.00000    
 f7  1.00000    
 f8  1.00000    
 F10  1.00000    
 F11  1.00000    
Disturbance D5 VARD5 50.00070 . . . 
 D9 vard9 49.99893 . . . 
 D12 vard12 49.99859 . . . 
 d13 vard13 50.00106 . . . 
 
Covariances Among Exogenous Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
F1 f2 cF1F2 0.66329 0.05984 11.0844 <.0001 
F1 f3 CF1F3 0.62443 0.06547 9.5371 <.0001 
F1 f4 CF1F4 0.54750 0.07477 7.3224 <.0001 
F1 f6 CF1F6 0.69404 0.05927 11.7098 <.0001 
F1 f7 CF1F7 0.56156 0.08512 6.5975 <.0001 
F1 f8 CF1F9 0.46225 0.09151 5.0515 <.0001 
F1 F10 CF1F10 0.33715 0.07861 4.2887 <.0001 
F1 F11 CF1F11 0.20953 0.08964 2.3376 0.0194 
f2 f3 CF2F3 0.81047 0.05177 15.6559 <.0001 
f2 f4 CF2F4 0.75570 0.05944 12.7127 <.0001 
f2 f6 CF1F6 0.69404 0.05927 11.7098 <.0001 
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Covariances Among Exogenous Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f2 f7 CF2F7 0.69215 0.07517 9.2083 <.0001 
f2 f8 CF2F8 0.34725 0.09074 3.8267 0.0001 
f2 F10 CF2F10 0.04576 0.07762 0.5895 0.5555 
f2 F11 CF2F11 0.23638 0.08535 2.7696 0.0056 
f3 f4 CF3F4 0.74166 0.06707 11.0577 <.0001 
f3 f6 CF3F6 0.93778 0.06599 14.2109 <.0001 
f3 f7 CF3F7 0.79472 0.07768 10.2300 <.0001 
f3 f8 CF3F8 0.39668 0.09629 4.1194 <.0001 
f3 F10 CF3F10 0.12701 0.08182 1.5523 0.1206 
f3 F11 CF3F11 0.27284 0.08948 3.0491 0.0023 
f4 f6 CF4F6 0.58468 0.08348 7.0036 <.0001 
f4 f7 CF4F7 0.42867 0.09546 4.4906 <.0001 
f4 f8 CF4F8 0.27316 0.10181 2.6831 0.0073 
f4 F10 CF4F10 -0.03447 0.08442 -0.4083 0.6831 
f4 F11 CF4F11 0.36768 0.08934 4.1157 <.0001 
f6 f7 CF6F7 0.70594 0.09175 7.6941 <.0001 
f6 f8 CF6F8 0.77483 0.09517 8.1412 <.0001 
f6 F10 CF6F10 0.38707 0.08551 4.5266 <.0001 
f6 F11 CF6F11 0.29319 0.09699 3.0229 0.0025 
f7 f8 CF7F8 0.44630 0.11012 4.0528 <.0001 
f7 F10 CF7F10 0.51252 0.09025 5.6788 <.0001 
f7 F11 CF7F11 0.51944 0.09535 5.4477 <.0001 
f8 F10 CF8C10 0.32336 0.09413 3.4351 0.0006 
f8 F11 CF8F11 0.20030 0.10643 1.8821 0.0598 
F10 F11 CF10F11 0.42748 0.08375 5.1041 <.0001 
 






Q8 0.87115 1.23332 0.2937 
Q9 0.90542 1.55421 0.4174 
Q10 0.50702 1.04149 0.5132 
Q11 0.70717 1.19130 0.4064 
Q12 0.72726 1.57796 0.5391 
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Q13 0.85926 1.76960 0.5144 
Q14 0.49148 0.86935 0.4347 
Q15 0.57407 1.30144 0.5589 
Q16 1.81460 3.13909 0.4219 
Q17 0.90568 1.82554 0.5039 
f5 50.00070 53.07223 0.0579 
Q19 1.85601 2.99192 0.3797 
Q27 1.24045 1.56677 0.2083 
Q21 3.89194 4.36165 0.1077 
Q18 0.41025 0.62538 0.3440 
Q20 0.50821 0.64086 0.2070 
Q26 1.16979 1.49609 0.2181 
Q22 1.20725 1.29154 0.0653 
Q23 1.18887 1.61732 0.2649 
Q24 1.48231 2.76465 0.4638 
Q25 2.12678 2.22141 0.0426 
f9 49.99893 51.71506 0.0332 
B3B 0.65943 2.59697 0.7461 
B3C 2.99141 3.71319 0.1944 
B2C 3.43397 3.58891 0.0432 
B1D 1.60248 2.04102 0.2149 
B2A 2.95453 4.50710 0.3445 
B2B 2.24774 2.90526 0.2263 
B3A 1.96217 2.35318 0.1662 
B3D 2.18188 2.58491 0.1559 
f12 49.99859 50.71019 0.0140 
f13 50.00106 90.19679 0.4456 
 
Standardized Results for Linear Equations 
Q8 =  0.5419 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e8             
Q9 =  0.6461 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e9             
Q10 =  0.7164 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e10             
Q11 =  0.6375 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e11             
Q12 =  0.7342 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e12             
Q13 =  0.7172 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e13             
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Standardized Results for Linear Equations 
Q14 =  0.6593 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e14             
Q15 =  0.7476 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e15             
Q16 =  0.6496 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e16             
Q17 =  0.7098 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e17             
f5 =  0.0686 (**) F1 + 0.0686 (**) f2 + 0.0686 (**) f3 + 0.0686 (**) f4 + 1.0000  D5 
Q19 =  0.6162 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e19             
Q27 =  0.4564 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e27             
Q21 =  0.3282 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e21             
Q18 =  0.5865 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e18             
Q20 =  0.4550 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e20             
Q26 =  0.4670 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e26             
Q22 =  0.2555 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e22             
Q23 =  0.5147 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e23             
Q24 =  0.6811 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e24             
Q25 =  0.2064 (**) f6 + 1.0000  e25             
f9 =  0.0696 (**) f6 + 0.0696 (**) f7 + 0.0695 (**) f8 + 1.0000  D9     
B3B =  0.8638 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E29             
B3C =  0.4409 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E30             
B2C =  0.2078 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E31             
B1D =  0.4635 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E32             
B2A =  0.5869 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E33             
B2B =  0.4757 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E34             
B3A =  0.4076 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E35             
B3D =  0.3949 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E28             
f12 =  0.0701 (**) F10 + 0.0701 (**) F11 + 1.0000  D12         
f13 =  0.3835 (**) f5 + 0.3787 (**) f9 + 0.3746 (**) f12 + 1.0000  d13     
 
Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q8 F1 LQ8f1 0.54190 0.05214 10.3930 <.0001 
Q9 F1 LQ9F1 0.64610 0.04683 13.7954 <.0001 
Q10 F1 lq10f1 0.71636 0.04393 16.3087 <.0001 
Q11 f2 LQ11F2 0.63748 0.04236 15.0507 <.0001 
Q12 f2 lq12f2 0.73424 0.03619 20.2905 <.0001 
Q13 f2 LQ13F2 0.71724 0.03721 19.2735 <.0001 
Q14 f3 LQ14F3 0.65928 0.04143 15.9138 <.0001 
Q15 f3 LQ15F3 0.74759 0.03820 19.5725 <.0001 
Q16 f4 LQ16F4 0.64957 0.04790 13.5620 <.0001 
Q17 f4 lq17f4 0.70985 0.04702 15.0982 <.0001 
f5 F1 PF5F1 0.06863 0.0000757 907.2 <.0001 
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Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f5 f2 PF5F2 0.06863 0.0000757 907.2 <.0001 
f5 f3 PF5F3 0.06863 0.0000757 907.2 <.0001 
f5 f4 PF5F4 0.06863 0.0000757 907.2 <.0001 
Q19 f8 LQ19F8 0.61616 0.07009 8.7907 <.0001 
Q27 f8 lq27f8 0.45637 0.06739 6.7723 <.0001 
Q21 f8 lq21f8 0.32816 0.07037 4.6634 <.0001 
Q18 f7 LQ18F7 0.58653 0.05452 10.7579 <.0001 
Q20 f7 LQ20F7 0.45497 0.05783 7.8678 <.0001 
Q26 f7 lq26f7 0.46702 0.05743 8.1321 <.0001 
Q22 f6 lq22f6 0.25546 0.06034 4.2335 <.0001 
Q23 f6 lq23f6 0.51470 0.05145 10.0037 <.0001 
Q24 f6 lq24F6 0.68105 0.04705 14.4756 <.0001 
Q25 f6 lq25F6 0.20639 0.06146 3.3579 0.0008 
f9 f6 PF9F6 0.06960 0.0000711 978.4 <.0001 
f9 f7 PF9F7 0.06964 0.0000712 978.4 <.0001 
f9 f8 PF9F8 0.06950 0.0000710 978.4 <.0001 
B3B F10 LB3BF10 0.86376 0.07610 11.3502 <.0001 
B3C F10 LB3CF10 0.44089 0.06170 7.1453 <.0001 
B2C F10 LB2CF10 0.20777 0.06485 3.2040 0.0014 
B1D F11 LB1DF11 0.46353 0.06366 7.2812 <.0001 
B2A F11 LB2AF11 0.58692 0.06025 9.7418 <.0001 
B2B F11 LB2BF11 0.47573 0.06327 7.5193 <.0001 
B3A F11 LB3AF11 0.40763 0.06549 6.2239 <.0001 
B3D F11 LB3DF11 0.39486 0.06591 5.9912 <.0001 
f12 F10 PF12F10 0.07011 0.0000289 2429.2 <.0001 
f12 F11 PF12F7 0.07011 0.0000289 2429.2 <.0001 
f13 f5 pf13f5 0.38351 0.0003861 993.2 <.0001 
f13 f9 p13f9 0.37874 0.0003326 1138.8 <.0001 
f13 f12 p13f12 0.37461 0.0002982 1256.4 <.0001 
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Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Error e8 vare8 0.70635 0.05651 12.4995 <.0001 
 e9 vare9 0.58256 0.06052 9.6261 <.0001 
 e10 vare10 0.48682 0.06293 7.7356 <.0001 
 e11 vare11 0.59361 0.05400 10.9924 <.0001 
 e12 vare12 0.46089 0.05314 8.6732 <.0001 
 e13 vare13 0.48557 0.05338 9.0960 <.0001 
 e14 vare14 0.56534 0.05463 10.3493 <.0001 
 e15 vare15 0.44110 0.05711 7.7237 <.0001 
 e16 vare16 0.57806 0.06222 9.2902 <.0001 
 e17 vare17 0.49611 0.06675 7.4327 <.0001 
 e18 vare18 0.65599 0.06396 10.2570 <.0001 
 e19 vare19 0.62034 0.08638 7.1817 <.0001 
 e20 vare20 0.79301 0.05262 15.0710 <.0001 
 e21 vare21 0.89231 0.04618 19.3205 <.0001 
 e22 vare22 0.93474 0.03083 30.3180 <.0001 
 e23 vare23 0.73509 0.05296 13.8793 <.0001 
 e24 vare24 0.53617 0.06408 8.3665 <.0001 
 e25 vare25 0.95740 0.02537 37.7357 <.0001 
 e26 vare26 0.78190 0.05364 14.5766 <.0001 
 e27 vare27 0.79172 0.06151 12.8718 <.0001 
 E28 vare28 0.84408 0.05205 16.2172 <.0001 
 E29 vare29 0.25393 0.13146 1.9315 0.0534 
 E30 vare30 0.80562 0.05441 14.8068 <.0001 
 E31 vare31 0.95683 0.02695 35.5076 <.0001 
 E32 vare32 0.78514 0.05902 13.3031 <.0001 
 E33 vare33 0.65553 0.07072 9.2693 <.0001 
 E34 vare34 0.77368 0.06020 12.8526 <.0001 
 E35 vare35 0.83384 0.05339 15.6165 <.0001 
Latent F1  1.00000    
 f2  1.00000    
 f3  1.00000    
 f4  1.00000    
 f6  1.00000    
 f7  1.00000    
 f8  1.00000    
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Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
 F10  1.00000    
 F11  1.00000    
Disturbance D5 VARD5 0.94213 0.00208 453.6 <.0001 
 D9 vard9 0.96682 0.00198 489.2 <.0001 
 D12 vard12 0.98597 0.0008118 1214.6 <.0001 
 d13 vard13 0.55436 0.0008855 626.0 <.0001 
 
Standardized Results for Covariances Among Exogenous 
Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
F1 f2 cF1F2 0.66329 0.05984 11.0844 <.0001 
F1 f3 CF1F3 0.62443 0.06547 9.5371 <.0001 
F1 f4 CF1F4 0.54750 0.07477 7.3224 <.0001 
F1 f6 CF1F6 0.69404 0.05927 11.7098 <.0001 
F1 f7 CF1F7 0.56156 0.08512 6.5975 <.0001 
F1 f8 CF1F9 0.46225 0.09151 5.0515 <.0001 
F1 F10 CF1F10 0.33715 0.07861 4.2887 <.0001 
F1 F11 CF1F11 0.20953 0.08964 2.3376 0.0194 
f2 f3 CF2F3 0.81047 0.05177 15.6559 <.0001 
f2 f4 CF2F4 0.75570 0.05944 12.7127 <.0001 
f2 f6 CF1F6 0.69404 0.05927 11.7098 <.0001 
f2 f7 CF2F7 0.69215 0.07517 9.2083 <.0001 
f2 f8 CF2F8 0.34725 0.09074 3.8267 0.0001 
f2 F10 CF2F10 0.04576 0.07762 0.5895 0.5555 
f2 F11 CF2F11 0.23638 0.08535 2.7696 0.0056 
f3 f4 CF3F4 0.74166 0.06707 11.0577 <.0001 
f3 f6 CF3F6 0.93778 0.06599 14.2109 <.0001 
f3 f7 CF3F7 0.79472 0.07768 10.2300 <.0001 
f3 f8 CF3F8 0.39668 0.09629 4.1194 <.0001 
f3 F10 CF3F10 0.12701 0.08182 1.5523 0.1206 
f3 F11 CF3F11 0.27284 0.08948 3.0491 0.0023 
f4 f6 CF4F6 0.58468 0.08348 7.0036 <.0001 
f4 f7 CF4F7 0.42867 0.09546 4.4906 <.0001 
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Standardized Results for Covariances Among Exogenous 
Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f4 f8 CF4F8 0.27316 0.10181 2.6831 0.0073 
f4 F10 CF4F10 -0.03447 0.08442 -0.4083 0.6831 
f4 F11 CF4F11 0.36768 0.08934 4.1157 <.0001 
f6 f7 CF6F7 0.70594 0.09175 7.6941 <.0001 
f6 f8 CF6F8 0.77483 0.09517 8.1412 <.0001 
f6 F10 CF6F10 0.38707 0.08551 4.5266 <.0001 
f6 F11 CF6F11 0.29319 0.09699 3.0229 0.0025 
f7 f8 CF7F8 0.44630 0.11012 4.0528 <.0001 
f7 F10 CF7F10 0.51252 0.09025 5.6788 <.0001 
f7 F11 CF7F11 0.51944 0.09535 5.4477 <.0001 
f8 F10 CF8C10 0.32336 0.09413 3.4351 0.0006 
f8 F11 CF8F11 0.20030 0.10643 1.8821 0.0598 
F10 F11 CF10F11 0.42748 0.08375 5.1041 <.0001 
 
Stepwise Multivariate Wald Test 
Parm 
Cumulative Statistics Univariate Increment 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
CF4F10 0.16670 1 0.6831 0.16670 0.6831 
CF2F10 1.04784 2 0.5922 0.88114 0.3479 
CF3F10 4.13244 3 0.2475 3.08460 0.0790 
vare29 6.89798 4 0.1414 2.76554 0.0963 
CF8F11 10.28161 5 0.0676 3.38363 0.0658 
CF1F11 13.92421 6 0.0305 3.64260 0.0563 
CF2F11 17.23277 7 0.0160 3.30856 0.0689 
CF3F11 18.72786 8 0.0164 1.49509 0.2214 
CF6F11 19.78433 9 0.0193 1.05648 0.3040 
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RUN 4 - CFA - MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 9/21/17 
LSU DATA 
Run 4 CFA - FULL MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 9/21/17 
*********************** 
 
The CONTENTS Procedure 
 
Data Set Name WORK.TEST_1 Observations 306 
Member Type DATA Variables 39 
Engine V9 Indexes 0 
Created 09/22/2017 12:43:15 Observation Length 368 
Last Modified 09/22/2017 12:43:15 Deleted Observations 0 
Protection  Compressed NO 
Data Set Type  Sorted NO 
Label    
Data Representation WINDOWS_64   
Encoding wlatin1  Western (Windows)   
 
 
Engine/Host Dependent Information 
Data Set Page Size 65536 
Number of Data Set 
Pages 
2 
First Data Page 1 
Max Obs per Page 177 
Obs in First Data 
Page 
164 




Filename C:\Users\Machine\AppData\Local\Temp\SAS Temporary Files\_TD3024_LAPTOP-
OV06L7T4_\test_1.sas7bdat 
Release Created 9.0401M2 
Host Created X64_8HOME 
 
 
Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes 
# Variable Type Len Format Informat Label 
28 B1A Num 8   OPEN 
29 B1B Num 8   PICKUP 
30 B1C Num 8   LEAVE 
    
233 
 
Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes 
# Variable Type Len Format Informat Label 
31 B1D Num 8   REPORT 
32 B2A Num 8   EHS 
33 B2B Num 8   SOP 
34 B2C Num 8   RUN 
35 B2D Num 8   REVIEW 
36 B3A Num 8   QUENCH 
37 B3B Num 8   FINISH 
38 B3C Num 8   CONTACT 
39 B3D Num 8   OBSERVE 
2 F2 Num 8   EMPLOYEE 
3 Q1 Char 16 $16. $16. Q1 
4 Q2 Char 6 $6. $6. Q2 
5 Q3 Char 19 $19. $19. Q3 
6 Q4 Char 35 $35. $35. Q4 
7 Q5 Char 19 $19. $19. Q5 
8 Q8 Num 8   RESPONSE 
9 Q9 Num 8   AWARNESS 
10 Q10 Num 8   REPORTING 
11 Q11 Num 8   TRAINING 
12 Q12 Num 8   INVOLVEMENT 
13 Q13 Num 8   PROMOTION 
14 Q14 Num 8   SYSTEM 
15 Q15 Num 8   UTILIZE 
16 Q16 Num 8   RECONIZE 
17 Q17 Num 8   LEADERSHIP 
18 Q18 Num 8   CONCERN_1 
19 Q19 Num 8   ACCEDENTS_2 
20 Q20 Num 8   MEASURES 
21 Q21 Num 8   PPE 
22 Q22 Num 8   CONCERN_2 
23 Q23 Num 8   NEEDS 
24 Q24 Num 8   HESITANT 
25 Q25 Num 8   REPORTING 
26 Q26 Num 8   LITERATURE 
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Alphabetic List of Variables and Attributes 
# Variable Type Len Format Informat Label 
27 Q27 Num 8   DISCARD 




Run 4 CFA - FULL MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 9/21/17 
*********************** 
The CALIS Procedure 
 
 






Data Set WORK.TEST_1 
N Records Read 306 
N Records Used 290 
N Obs 290 
Model Type LINEQS 
Analysis Covariances 
 
Variables in the Model 
Endogenous Manifest B1D  B2A  B2B  B3B  B3C  Q10  Q11  Q12  Q13  Q14  Q15  Q16  Q17  Q18  Q19  Q20  
Q23  Q24  Q26  Q27  Q8  Q9 
 Latent f12  f13  f5  f9 
Exogenous Manifest  
 Latent F1  F10  F11  f2  f3  f4  F6  f7  f8 
 Error E21  E22  E25  E28  E29  e10  e11  e12  e13  e14  e15  e16  e17  e18  e19  e20  
e23  e24  e26  e27  e8  e9  D12  d13  D5  D9 
Number of Endogenous Variables = 26 
Number of Exogenous Variables  = 35 
 
 
Initial Estimates for Linear Equations 
Q8 =  LQ8f1 (.) F1 +  1 e8             
Q9 =  LQ9F1 (.) F1 +  1 e9             
Q10 =  lq10f1 (.) F1 +  1 e10             
Q11 =  LQ11F2 (.) f2 +  1 e11             
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Initial Estimates for Linear Equations 
Q12 =  lq12f2 (.) f2 +  1 e12             
Q13 =  LQ13F2 (.) f2 +  1 e13             
Q14 =  LQ14F3 (.) f3 +  1 e14             
Q15 =  LQ15F3 (.) f3 +  1 e15             
Q16 =  LQ16F4 (.) f4 +  1 e16             
Q17 =  lq17f4 (.) f4 +  1 e17             
f5 =  PF5F1 (.) F1 + PF5F2 (.) f2 + PF5F3 (.) f3 + PF5F4 (.) f4 +  1 D5 
Q19 =  LQ19F8 (.) f8 +  1 e19             
Q27 =  lq27f8 (.) f8 +  1 e27             
Q18 =  LQ18F7 (.) f7 +  1 e18             
Q20 =  LQ20F7 (.) f7 +  1 e20             
Q26 =  lq26f7 (.) f7 +  1 e26             
Q23 =  lq23f6 (.) F6 +  1 e23             
Q24 =  lq24F6 (.) F6 +  1 e24             
f9 =  PF9F6 (.) F6 + PF9F7 (.) f7 + PF9F8 (.) f8 +  1 D9     
B3B =  LB3BF10 (.) F10 +  1 E28             
B3C =  LB3CF10 (.) F10 +  1 E29             
B1D =  LB1DF11 (.) F11 +  1 E21             
B2A =  LB2AF11 (.) F11 +  1 E22             
B2B =  LB2BF11 (.) F11 +  1 E25             
f12 =  PF12F10 (.) F10 + PF12F7 (.) F11 +  1 D12         





The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Optimization 
 
Initial Estimation Methods 
1 Instrumental Variables Method 
2 McDonald Method 




N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
1 LQ8f1 0.65563 0.02129 
2 LQ9F1 0.73164 0.02346 
3 lq10f1 0.73693 0.02395 
4 LQ11F2 0.73545 0.02315 
5 lq12f2 0.90082 0.02810 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
6 LQ13F2 0.94712 0.02953 
7 LQ14F3 0.61165 0.01903 
8 LQ15F3 0.84563 0.02606 
9 LQ16F4 1.13398 0.03520 
10 lq17f4 0.96898 0.03067 
11 PF5F1 0.50000 0 
12 PF5F2 0.50000 0 
13 PF5F3 0.50000 0 
14 PF5F4 0.50000 0 
15 LQ19F8 0.99078 0.03283 
16 lq27f8 0.55476 0.01863 
17 LQ18F7 0.45756 0.01474 
18 LQ20F7 0.36509 0.01162 
19 lq26f7 0.54188 0.01672 
20 lq23f6 0.80161 0.02401 
21 lq24F6 0.90408 0.02561 
22 PF9F6 0.50000 0 
23 PF9F7 0.50000 0 
24 PF9F8 0.50000 0 
25 LB3BF10 1.66707 0.05772 
26 LB3CF10 0.59379 0.01874 
27 LB1DF11 0.68952 0.02289 
28 LB2AF11 1.23082 0.03956 
29 LB2BF11 0.91568 0.03022 
30 PF12F10 0.50000 0 
31 PF12F7 0.50000 0 
32 pf13f5 0.50000 0 
33 p13f9 0.50000 0 
34 p13f12 0.50000 0 
35 vare8 50.00000 0.01938 
36 vare9 50.00000 0.01923 
37 vare10 50.00000 0.01943 
38 vare11 50.00000 0.01938 
39 vare12 50.00000 0.01916 
40 vare13 50.00000 0.01906 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
41 vare14 50.00000 0.01956 
42 vare15 50.00000 0.01930 
43 vare16 50.00000 0.01842 
44 vare17 50.00000 0.01902 
45 vare18 50.00000 0.01969 
46 vare19 50.00000 0.01852 
47 vare20 50.00000 0.01971 
48 vare21 50.00000 0.01905 
49 vare22 50.00000 0.01779 
50 vare23 50.00000 0.01920 
51 vare24 50.00000 0.01872 
52 vare25 50.00000 0.01860 
53 vare26 50.00000 0.01933 
54 vare27 50.00000 0.01928 
55 vare28 50.00000 0.01807 
56 vare29 50.00000 0.01842 
57 VARD5 50.00000 0 
58 vard9 50.00000 0 
59 vard12 50.00000 0 
60 vard13 50.00000 0 
61 cF1F2 0.68600 -0.00294 
62 CF1F3 0.65438 -0.00132 
63 CF1F4 0.54210 -0.00220 
64 CF1F6 0.75569 -0.00505 
65 CF1F7 0.58266 -0.0006808 
66 CF1F9 0.53045 -0.00129 
67 CF1F10 0.30755 -0.00185 
68 CF1F11 0.19206 -0.0008020 
69 CF2F3 0.78465 -0.00242 
70 CF2F4 0.75541 -0.00476 
71 CF2F7 0.69472 -0.00126 
72 CF2F8 0.34263 -0.00112 
73 CF2F10 0.02967 0.0000286 
74 CF2F11 0.30067 -0.00214 
75 CF3F4 0.73920 -0.00224 





N Parameter Estimate Gradient 
76 CF3F6 1.00545 -0.00207 
77 CF3F7 0.77438 -0.0006877 
78 CF3F8 0.50160 -0.0008569 
79 CF3F10 0.12793 -0.0004391 
80 CF3F11 0.31033 -0.00106 
81 CF4F6 0.66397 -0.00260 
82 CF4F7 0.46404 -0.0007529 
83 CF4F8 0.24923 -0.0007444 
84 CF4F10 -0.03554 0.0006318 
85 CF4F11 0.44592 -0.00343 
86 CF6F7 0.71315 -0.0007994 
87 CF6F8 0.89011 -0.00221 
88 CF6F10 0.34038 -0.00193 
89 CF6F11 0.39126 -0.00187 
90 CF7F8 0.51408 -0.0005216 
91 CF7F10 0.52797 -0.00140 
92 CF7F11 0.56566 -0.00129 
93 CF8C10 0.33524 -0.00172 
94 CF8F11 0.10014 -0.0002815 
95 CF10F11 0.19632 -0.00212 









Scaling Update of More (1978) 
 
Parameter Estimates 95 
Functions (Observations) 253 
 
Optimization Start 
Active Constraints 0 Objective Function 59.27659925 
Max Abs Gradient Element 0.0577172152 Radius 1 
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1 * 0 4 0  54.22004 5.0566 0.0264 3.616 1.174 
2 * 0 6 0  53.98474 0.2353 0.0253 0.0616 0.946 
3 * 0 8 0  53.52990 0.4548 0.0258 0.0280 1.003 
4 * 0 10 0  52.59293 0.9370 0.0271 0.0138 1.033 
5 * 0 12 0  49.89646 2.6965 0.0714 0.00435 0.988 
6 * 0 15 0  49.06286 0.8336 0.0325 0.0367 0.888 
7 * 0 17 0  47.66711 1.3958 0.0416 0.0135 0.980 
8 * 0 19 0  44.68473 2.9824 0.0727 0.00665 1.057 
9 * 0 21 0  36.16932 8.5154 0.6359 0.00283 1.476 
10 * 0 24 0  34.09822 2.0711 0.6777 0.0289 1.108 
11 * 0 26 0  29.24823 4.8500 0.8906 0.0127 1.287 
12 * 0 28 0  14.05489 15.1933 0.6237 0.00331 2.164 
13 * 0 31 0  8.75222 5.3027 0.4305 0.0554 1.536 
14 * 0 33 0  2.95590 5.7963 1.9442 0.00332 1.699 
15 * 0 36 0  2.07527 0.8806 1.4734 0.0451 0.692 
16 * 0 38 0  1.56900 0.5063 0.2860 0.0189 0.726 
17 * 0 40 0  1.43221 0.1368 0.2850 0.00411 0.920 
18 * 0 42 0  1.39015 0.0421 0.4214 0.00061 0.740 
19 * 0 45 0  1.37839 0.0118 0.1295 0.00243 0.737 
20 * 0 47 0  1.37355 0.00484 0.1646 0.00361 0.723 
21 * 0 49 0  1.36911 0.00444 0.0792 0.00394 0.949 
22 * 0 51 0  1.36588 0.00323 0.1648 0.00276 0.408 
23 * 0 53 0  1.36119 0.00469 0.1206 0.00558 0.157 
24 * 0 55 0  1.31196 0.0492 0.0280 0.00068 1.027 
25 * 0 57 0  1.31025 0.00170 0.1295 0.00003 0.823 
26 * 0 60 0  1.30948 0.000773 0.0135 0.00027 0.911 
27 * 0 62 0  1.30916 0.000322 0.0421 0.00018 0.925 
28 * 0 65 0  1.30868 0.000474 0.0275 0.00031 1.047 
29 * 0 67 0  1.30860 0.000087 0.1088 0.00024 0.0813 
30 * 0 69 0  1.30467 0.00393 0.0445 0.00119 1.033 
31 * 0 72 0  1.30055 0.00411 0.0651 0.00450 1.261 
32 * 0 74 0  1.28809 0.0125 0.1479 0.00454 1.055 
33 * 0 77 0  1.22458 0.0635 0.0873 0.0728 1.361 
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34 * 0 79 0  1.14276 0.0818 0.0832 0.0474 1.117 
35 * 0 81 0  1.08950 0.0533 0.0560 444E-16 1.120 
36 * 0 83 0  1.08597 0.00353 0.00909 444E-16 1.092 
37 * 0 85 0  1.08472 0.00124 0.0206 444E-16 1.213 
38 * 0 87 0  1.08422 0.000504 0.00336 444E-16 1.265 
39 * 0 89 0  1.08402 0.000194 0.00706 444E-16 1.318 
40 * 0 91 0  1.08395 0.000074 0.00152 444E-16 1.347 
41 * 0 93 0  1.08392 0.000028 0.00242 444E-16 1.376 
42 * 0 95 0  1.08391 0.000011 0.000636 444E-16 1.398 
43 * 0 97 0  1.08391 4.109E-6 0.000849 444E-16 1.421 
44 * 0 99 0  1.08390 1.61E-6 0.000256 444E-16 1.440 
45 * 0 101 0  1.08390 6.41E-7 0.000328 444E-16 1.460 
46 * 0 103 0  1.08390 2.589E-7 0.000113 444E-16 1.477 
47 * 0 105 0  1.08390 1.059E-7 0.000143 444E-16 1.494 
48 * 0 107 0  1.08390 4.377E-8 0.000051 444E-16 1.509 
49 * 0 109 0  1.08390 1.825E-8 0.000062 444E-16 1.522 
50 * 0 111 0  1.08390 7.657E-9 0.000023 444E-16 1.534 
 
Optimization Results 
Iterations 50 Function Calls 114 
Jacobian Calls 52 Active Constraints 0 
Objective Function 1.0839033943 Max Abs Gradient Element 0.000022627 
Lambda 4.440892E-14 Actual Over Pred Change 1.5342219143 
Radius 954329.85402   
 
Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
The CALIS Procedure 
Covariance Structure Analysis: Maximum Likelihood Estimation  
 




Modeling Info Number of Observations 290 
 Number of Variables 22 
 Number of Moments 253 
 Number of Parameters 95 
 Number of Active Constraints 0 
 Baseline Model Function Value 5.9168 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square 1709.9539 
 Baseline Model Chi-Square DF 231 
 Pr > Baseline Model Chi-Square <.0001 
Absolute Index Fit Function 1.0839 
 Chi-Square 313.2481 
 Chi-Square DF 158 
 Pr > Chi-Square <.0001 
 Z-Test of Wilson & Hilferty 6.8704 
 Hoelter Critical N 174 
 Root Mean Square Residual (RMR) 0.1095 
 Standardized RMR (SRMR) 0.0523 
 Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) 0.9090 
Parsimony Index Adjusted GFI (AGFI) 0.8543 
 Parsimonious GFI 0.6218 
 RMSEA Estimate 0.0583 
 RMSEA Lower 90% Confidence Limit 0.0488 
 RMSEA Upper 90% Confidence Limit 0.0677 
 Probability of Close Fit 0.0741 
 ECVI Estimate 1.7982 
 ECVI Lower 90% Confidence Limit 1.6338 
 ECVI Upper 90% Confidence Limit 1.9920 
 Akaike Information Criterion 503.2481 
 Bozdogan CAIC 946.8868 
 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 851.8868 
 McDonald Centrality 0.7652 
Incremental Index Bentler Comparative Fit Index 0.8950 
 Bentler-Bonett NFI 0.8168 
 Bentler-Bonett Non-normed Index 0.8465 
 Bollen Normed Index Rho1 0.7322 




 Bollen Non-normed Index Delta2 0.9000 
 James et al. Parsimonious NFI 0.5587 
 
Standardized Results for Linear Equations 
Q8 =  -0.5437 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e8             
Q9 =  -0.6446 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e9             
Q10 =  -0.7156 (**) F1 + 1.0000  e10             
Q11 =  -0.6437 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e11             
Q12 =  -0.7301 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e12             
Q13 =  -0.7155 (**) f2 + 1.0000  e13             
Q14 =  -0.6645 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e14             
Q15 =  -0.7415 (**) f3 + 1.0000  e15             
Q16 =  -0.6465 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e16             
Q17 =  -0.7139 (**) f4 + 1.0000  e17             
f5 =  0.0686 (**) F1 + 0.0686 (**) f2 + 0.0686 (**) f3 + 0.0686 (**) f4 + 1.0000  D5 
Q19 =  -0.6122 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e19             
Q27 =  -0.4104 (**) f8 + 1.0000  e27             
Q18 =  -0.6018 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e18             
Q20 =  -0.4530 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e20             
Q26 =  -0.4532 (**) f7 + 1.0000  e26             
Q23 =  -0.5403 (**) F6 + 1.0000  e23             
Q24 =  -0.6343 (**) F6 + 1.0000  e24             
f9 =  0.0696 (**) F6 + 0.0695 (**) f7 + 0.0695 (**) f8 + 1.0000  D9     
B3B =  -0.8296 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E28             
B3C =  -0.4604 (**) F10 + 1.0000  E29             
B1D =  -0.5635 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E21             
B2A =  -0.5283 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E22             
B2B =  -0.5684 (**) F11 + 1.0000  E25             
f12 =  0.0703 (**) F10 + 0.0703 (**) F11 + 1.0000  D12         
f13 =  0.3834 (**) f5 + 0.3788 (**) f9 + 0.3743 (**) f12 + 1.0000  d13     
 
Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q8 F1 LQ8f1 -0.54368 0.05200 -10.4546 <.0001 
Q9 F1 LQ9F1 -0.64464 0.04684 -13.7625 <.0001 
Q10 F1 lq10f1 -0.71564 0.04387 -16.3123 <.0001 
Q11 f2 LQ11F2 -0.64371 0.04196 -15.3393 <.0001 
Q12 f2 lq12f2 -0.73014 0.03645 -20.0307 <.0001 
Q13 f2 LQ13F2 -0.71551 0.03734 -19.1619 <.0001 
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Standardized Effects in Linear Equations 
Variable Predictor Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Q14 f3 LQ14F3 -0.66449 0.04122 -16.1200 <.0001 
Q15 f3 LQ15F3 -0.74146 0.03839 -19.3115 <.0001 
Q16 f4 LQ16F4 -0.64649 0.04819 -13.4162 <.0001 
Q17 f4 lq17f4 -0.71394 0.04727 -15.1045 <.0001 
f5 F1 PF5F1 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
f5 f2 PF5F2 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
f5 f3 PF5F3 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
f5 f4 PF5F4 0.06863 0.0000756 907.6 <.0001 
Q19 f8 LQ19F8 -0.61216 0.08417 -7.2732 <.0001 
Q27 f8 lq27f8 -0.41041 0.07049 -5.8225 <.0001 
Q18 f7 LQ18F7 -0.60184 0.05415 -11.1152 <.0001 
Q20 f7 LQ20F7 -0.45302 0.05776 -7.8438 <.0001 
Q26 f7 lq26f7 -0.45322 0.05775 -7.8481 <.0001 
Q23 F6 lq23f6 -0.54034 0.05281 -10.2319 <.0001 
Q24 F6 lq24F6 -0.63429 0.05185 -12.2327 <.0001 
f9 F6 PF9F6 0.06959 0.0000826 842.4 <.0001 
f9 f7 PF9F7 0.06951 0.0000825 842.4 <.0001 
f9 f8 PF9F8 0.06954 0.0000825 842.4 <.0001 
B3B F10 LB3BF10 -0.82962 0.08676 -9.5624 <.0001 
B3C F10 LB3CF10 -0.46038 0.06605 -6.9703 <.0001 
B1D F11 LB1DF11 -0.56354 0.06717 -8.3897 <.0001 
B2A F11 LB2AF11 -0.52830 0.06704 -7.8802 <.0001 
B2B F11 LB2BF11 -0.56844 0.06721 -8.4575 <.0001 
f12 F10 PF12F10 0.07033 0.0000319 2203.5 <.0001 
f12 F11 PF12F7 0.07025 0.0000319 2203.5 <.0001 
f13 f5 pf13f5 0.38335 0.0003918 978.4 <.0001 
f13 f9 p13f9 0.37881 0.0003621 1046.2 <.0001 
f13 f12 p13f12 0.37433 0.0003073 1218.3 <.0001 
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Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Error e8 vare8 0.70441 0.05655 12.4570 <.0001 
 e9 vare9 0.58444 0.06039 9.6777 <.0001 
 e10 vare10 0.48786 0.06279 7.7694 <.0001 
 e11 vare11 0.58564 0.05403 10.8399 <.0001 
 e12 vare12 0.46689 0.05323 8.7713 <.0001 
 e13 vare13 0.48804 0.05343 9.1334 <.0001 
 e14 vare14 0.55846 0.05478 10.1942 <.0001 
 e15 vare15 0.45024 0.05694 7.9077 <.0001 
 e16 vare16 0.58205 0.06231 9.3418 <.0001 
 e17 vare17 0.49029 0.06749 7.2646 <.0001 
 e18 vare18 0.63779 0.06517 9.7861 <.0001 
 e19 vare19 0.62526 0.10305 6.0678 <.0001 
 e20 vare20 0.79477 0.05233 15.1881 <.0001 
 E21 vare21 0.68243 0.07571 9.0142 <.0001 
 E22 vare22 0.72090 0.07084 10.1769 <.0001 
 e23 vare23 0.70804 0.05707 12.4066 <.0001 
 e24 vare24 0.59768 0.06578 9.0862 <.0001 
 E25 vare25 0.67687 0.07641 8.8583 <.0001 
 e26 vare26 0.79459 0.05235 15.1799 <.0001 
 e27 vare27 0.83157 0.05786 14.3731 <.0001 
 E28 vare28 0.31174 0.14395 2.1656 0.0303 
 E29 vare29 0.78805 0.06081 12.9583 <.0001 
Latent F1  1.00000    
 f2  1.00000    
 f3  1.00000    
 f4  1.00000    
 F6  1.00000    
 f7  1.00000    
 f8  1.00000    
 F10  1.00000    
 F11  1.00000    
Disturbance D5 VARD5 0.94205 0.00208 453.8 <.0001 
 D9 vard9 0.96629 0.00229 421.2 <.0001 
 D12 vard12 0.98838 0.0008971 1101.8 <.0001 
 d13 vard13 0.55404 0.0009166 604.4 <.0001 
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Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Standardized Results for Covariances Among Exogenous 
Variables 
Var1 Var2 Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
F1 f2 cF1F2 0.66473 0.05985 11.1070 <.0001 
F1 f3 CF1F3 0.62848 0.06544 9.6044 <.0001 
F1 f4 CF1F4 0.54449 0.07459 7.2997 <.0001 
F1 F6 CF1F6 0.72910 0.06514 11.1930 <.0001 
F1 f7 CF1F7 0.56667 0.08480 6.6826 <.0001 
F1 f8 CF1F9 0.50706 0.10261 4.9419 <.0001 
F1 F10 CF1F10 0.35491 0.08246 4.3038 <.0001 
F1 F11 CF1F11 0.20127 0.09184 2.1915 0.0284 
f2 f3 CF2F3 0.81340 0.05177 15.7110 <.0001 
f2 f4 CF2F4 0.75767 0.05922 12.7932 <.0001 
f2 F6 CF1F6 0.72910 0.06514 11.1930 <.0001 
f2 f7 CF2F7 0.68801 0.07518 9.1515 <.0001 
f2 f8 CF2F8 0.36125 0.09952 3.6298 0.0003 
f2 F10 CF2F10 0.05213 0.08054 0.6472 0.5175 
f2 F11 CF2F11 0.31548 0.08529 3.6988 0.0002 
f3 f4 CF3F4 0.74238 0.06711 11.0623 <.0001 
f3 F6 CF3F6 0.98706 0.07500 13.1614 <.0001 
f3 f7 CF3F7 0.79445 0.07751 10.2498 <.0001 
f3 f8 CF3F8 0.47440 0.10564 4.4906 <.0001 
f3 F10 CF3F10 0.13640 0.08495 1.6056 0.1084 
f3 F11 CF3F11 0.28746 0.09145 3.1433 0.0017 
f4 F6 CF4F6 0.67676 0.08663 7.8122 <.0001 
f4 f7 CF4F7 0.41975 0.09518 4.4101 <.0001 
f4 f8 CF4F8 0.28702 0.10943 2.6229 0.0087 
f4 F10 CF4F10 -0.03330 0.08728 -0.3815 0.7029 
f4 F11 CF4F11 0.37556 0.09130 4.1132 <.0001 
F6 f7 CF6F7 0.68257 0.09956 6.8557 <.0001 
F6 f8 CF6F8 0.80825 0.12237 6.6048 <.0001 
F6 F10 CF6F10 0.37008 0.09461 3.9115 <.0001 
F6 F11 CF6F11 0.37084 0.10278 3.6082 0.0003 
f7 f8 CF7F8 0.49404 0.12023 4.1090 <.0001 
f7 F10 CF7F10 0.53905 0.09500 5.6740 <.0001 
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Standardized Results for Variances of Exogenous Variables 
Variable 
Type Variable Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error t Value Pr > |t| 
f7 F11 CF7F11 0.46289 0.09966 4.6448 <.0001 
f8 F10 CF8C10 0.35786 0.10671 3.3536 0.0008 
f8 F11 CF8F11 0.08583 0.11660 0.7361 0.4617 
F10 F11 CF10F11 0.17560 0.09185 1.9119 0.0559 
 
Stepwise Multivariate Wald Test 
Parm 
Cumulative Statistics Univariate Increment 
Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
CF4F10 0.14552 1 0.7029 0.14552 0.7029 
CF8F11 0.72351 2 0.6965 0.57799 0.4471 
CF2F10 1.66552 3 0.6446 0.94201 0.3318 
CF3F10 4.78969 4 0.3096 3.12416 0.0771 
CF10F11 7.88837 5 0.1625 3.09868 0.0784 
vare28 10.44715 6 0.1070 2.55878 0.1097 
CF1F11 13.80716 7 0.0547 3.36001 0.0668 
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APPENDIX C.  SAS PROC CALLIS MODELING RUN EXAMPLE LOG 
 
NOTE: Copyright (c) 2002-2012 by SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA. 
NOTE: SAS (r) Proprietary Software 9.4 (TS1M2) 
      Licensed to LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY-SFA-T&R, Site 70080688. 




NOTE: Updated analytical products: 
 
      SAS/STAT 13.2 
      SAS/ETS 13.2 
      SAS/OR 13.2 
      SAS/IML 13.2 
      SAS/QC 13.2 
 
NOTE: Additional host information: 
 
 X64_8HOME WIN 6.2.9200  Workstation 
 
NOTE: SAS initialization used: 
      real time           1.42 seconds 
      cpu time            1.34 seconds 
 
1     'log;clear;output;clear'; 
      ------------------------ 
      180 
 
ERROR 180-322: Statement is not valid or it is used out of proper order. 
 
2    ods html close; ods html; 
NOTE: Writing HTML Body file: sashtml.htm 
3    ods graphics on; 
4    options nodate nocenter pageno=1 ls=90 ps=56; 
5    ODS listing; 
6 
7    ODS HTML style=minimal body='Climate.html'; 
NOTE: Writing HTML Body file: Climate.html 
8    ODS RTF style=minimal body='climate.rtf'; 
NOTE: Writing RTF Body file: climate.rtf 
9    *ODS PDF style=minimal body='prec.PDF'; 
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14   title1 'LSU DATA'; 
15   title2 'CFA - FULL MEASUREMENT MODEL CULTURE 8/1/17'; 
16   Title3 
17 
18 
19   ***********************; 
20   ***  Culture Analysis  ***; 
21   *** Jerry E. Steward***; 
22   ***********************; 
23 
24   PROC IMPORT OUT= Test_1 
25               DATAFILE= 
"C:\users\machine\documents\SAS_2017\Coded_Dated_7_5_17_F.xlsx" 
26               DBMS=EXCEL REPLACE; 
27        RANGE="DATA$"; 
28        GETNAMES=YES; 
29        MIXED=YES; 
30        SCANTEXT=YES; 
31        USEDATE=YES; 
32        SCANTIME=YES; 
33        LABEL 
34           Q8  = 'RESPONSE' 
35       Q9  = 'AWARNESS' 
36       Q10 = 'REPORTING' 
37       Q11 = 'TRAINING' 
38       Q12 = 'INVOLVEMENT' 
39       Q13 = 'PROMOTION' 
40       Q14 = 'SYSTEM' 
41       Q15 = 'UTILIZE' 
42       Q16 = 'RECONIZE' 
43       Q17 = 'LEADERSHIP' 
44       Q18 = 'CONCERN_1' 
45       Q19 = 'ACCEDENTS_2' 
46       Q20 = 'MEASURES' 
47       Q21 = 'PPE' 
48       Q22 = 'CONCERN_2' 
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49       Q23 = 'NEEDS' 
50       Q24 = 'HESITANT' 
51       Q25 = 'REPORTING' 
52       Q26 = 'LITERATURE' 
53       Q27 = 'DISCARD' 
54       B1A = 'OPEN' 
55       B1B = 'PICKUP' 
56       B1C = 'LEAVE' 
57       B1D = 'REPORT' 
58       B2A = 'EHS' 
59       B2B = 'SOP' 
60       B2C = 'RUN' 
61       B2D = 'REVIEW' 
62       B3A = 'QUENCH' 
63       B3B = 'FINISH' 
64       B3C = 'CONTACT' 
65       B3D = 'OBSERVE' 
66       F1  = 'PRECEPTION' 
67       F2  = 'EMPLOYEE' 
68       F3  = 'DEPARTMENT' 
69       F4  = 'MANAGEMENT' 
70       F5  = 'CLIMATE' 
71       F6  = 'TEAM' 
72       F7  = 'PERSON' 
73       F8  = 'INSTITUTION' 
74       F9  = 'ATTITUDES' 
75       F10 = 'UNSAFE' 
76       F11 = 'SAFE' 
77       F12 = 'BEHAVIOR' 
78       F13 = 'Culture'; 
79   RUN; 
 
NOTE: Data source is connected in READ ONLY mode. 
NOTE: WORK.TEST_1 data set was successfully created. 
NOTE: The data set WORK.TEST_1 has 306 observations and 39 variables. 
NOTE: PROCEDURE IMPORT used (Total process time): 
      real time           0.28 seconds 











85   proc contents data=test_1; run; 
 
NOTE: PROCEDURE CONTENTS used (Total process time): 
      real time           0.26 seconds 
      cpu time            0.17 seconds 
 
 
86   *proc sort data=test_1; *run; 
87   *proc print data=test_1; *run; 
88   proc means data=test_1; *run; 
89 
90   *PROC CORR NOMISS noprob; 
91   *var Q8 Q9 Q10 q11 q12 q13 q14 q15 q16 q17; 
92   *run; 
93 
94   *PROC CORR ALPHA NOMISS; 
95   *var Q8 Q9 Q10 q11 q12 q13 q14 q15 q16 q17 Q18 Q19  Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 
Q25 Q26 Q27 
96   B1a B1b B1d B2a B2b B2c B3a B3b B3c B3d; 
97   *run; 
98 
99   *PROC FACTOR  METHOD=prin 
100  SIMPLE 
101  SCREE 
102  PRIORS=SMC 
103  ROTATE=varimax 
104  round 
105  flag=.4 
106  S C; 
107  *var Q8 Q9 Q10 q11 q12 q13 q14 q15 q16 q17 Q18 Q19  Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 
Q25 Q26 Q27 
108  B1a B1b B1c B1d B2a B2b B2c B2d B3a B3b B3c B3d; 
109  *run; 
110 
 
NOTE: There were 306 observations read from the data set WORK.TEST_1. 
NOTE: PROCEDURE MEANS used (Total process time): 
      real time           0.17 seconds 
      cpu time            0.14 seconds 
 
 
111  PROC CALIS 
112  COV MAXIT=1000 RESIDUAL modification; 
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113  lineqs 
114    q8  = LQ8f1 F1 + e8, 
115    q9  = LQ9F1 f1 + e9, 
116   q10 = lq10f1 f1 + e10, 
117   q11 = LQ11F2 f2 + e11, 
118   q12 = lq12f2 f2 + e12, 
119   q13 = LQ13F2 f2 + e13, 
120   q14 = LQ14F3 f3 + e14, 
121   q15 = LQ15F3 f3 + e15, 
122   q16 = LQ16F4 f4 + e16, 
123   q17 = lq17f4 f4 + e17, 
124   f5 =  PF5F1 F1 + PF5F2 F2 + PF5F3 F3 + PF5F4 F4 +D5, 
125 
126   q19  = LQ19F8 f8 + e19, 
127   q27  = lq27f8 f8 + e27, 
128   q21  = lq21f8 f8 + e21, 
129   q18  = LQ18F7 f7 + e18, 
130   q20  = LQ20F7 f7 + e20, 
131   q26  = lq26f7 F7 + e26, 
132   q22  = lq22f6 f6 + e22, 
133   q23  = lq23f6 F6 + e23, 
134   q24  = lq24F6 f6 + e24, 
135   q25  = lq25F6 F6 + e25, 
136   f9 =  PF9F6 F6 + PF9F7 F7 + PF9F8 F8 + D9, 
137 
138 
139   B1A = LB1AF10 F10 + E28, 
140   B3B = LB3BF10 F10 + E29, 
141   B3C = LB3CF10 F10 + E30, 
142   B2C = LB2CF10 F10 + E31, 
143   B1D = LB1DF11 F11 + E32, 
144   B2A = LB2AF11 F11 + E33, 
145   B2B = LB2BF11 F11 + E34, 
146   B3A = LB3AF11 F11 + E35, 
147   B3D = LB3DF11 F11 + E36, 
148   f12 =  PF12F10 F10 + PF12F7 F11 + D12, 
149   f13 = pf13f5 f5 + p13f9 f9 + p13f12 f12 +d13; 
150 
151 
152  std 
153  e8-e36 = vare8-vare36, 
154  f1 = 1, 
155  F2 = 1, 
156  F3 = 1, 
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157  F4 = 1, 
158  F6 = 1, 
159  F7 = 1, 
160  F8 = 1, 
161  F10 = 1, 
162  F11 = 1, 
163   D5 = VARD5, 
164   d9 = vard9, 
165   d12 = vard12, 
166   d13 = vard13; 
167 
168   Cov 
169 
170  F1 F2 = cF1F2, 
171  F1 F3 = CF1F3, 
172  F1 F4 = CF1F4, 
173  F1 F6 = CF1F6, 
174  F1 F7 = CF1F7, 
175  F1 F8 = CF1F9, 
176  F1 F10 = CF1F10, 
177  F1 F11 = CF1F11, 
178  F2 F3 = CF2F3, 
179  F2 F4 = CF2F4, 
180  F2 F6 = CF1F6, 
181  F2 F7 = CF2F7, 
182  F2 F8 = CF2F8, 
183  F2 F10 = CF2F10, 
184  F2 F11 = CF2F11, 
185  F3 F4 = CF3F4, 
186  F3 F6 = CF3F6, 
187  F3 F7 = CF3F7, 
188  F3 F8 = CF3F8, 
189  F3 F10 = CF3F10, 
190  F3 F11 = CF3F11, 
191  F4 F6 = CF4F6, 
192  F4 F7 = CF4F7, 
193  F4 F8 = CF4F8, 
194  F4 F10 = CF4F10, 
195  F4 F11 = CF4F11, 
196  F6 F7 = CF6F7, 
197  F6 F8 = CF6F8, 
198  F6 F10 = CF6F10, 
199  F6 F11 = CF6F11, 
200  F7 F8 = CF7F8, 
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201  F7 F10 = CF7F10, 
202  F7 F11 = CF7F11, 
203  F8 F10 = CF8C10, 
204  F8 F11 = CF8F11, 
205  F10 F11 = CF10F11; 
206 
207 
208  var Q8 Q9 Q10 q11 q12 q13 q14 q15 q16 q17 Q18 Q19   Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 
Q25 Q26 Q27 
208! B1A B1d B2a B2b B2c B3a B3b B3c B3d; 
209  run; 
 
WARNING: 16 of 306 observations in data set WORK.TEST_1 omitted due to missing 
values. 
NOTE: Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
WARNING: Although all predicted variances for the latent variables are positive, the 
         corresponding predicted covariance matrix is not positive definite. It has one 
         negative eigenvalue. 
NOTE: PROCEDURE CALIS used (Total process time): 
      real time           29.53 seconds 






213  ods html close; 
214  ods rtf close; 
215  ods pdf close; 
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Mr. Steward is currently the Chemical Safety Manager at the Baton Rouge Campus of Louisiana 
State University in the Office of Environmental Health and Safety (EHS).  The Chemical Safety 
Manager is responsible for the administration of the University’s EHS programs in laboratories 
across campus.   A primary responsibility is ensuring compliance with the regulatory 
requirements. Another responsibility is educating students and faculty in the methodologies for 
maintaining a safe work environment in the laboratory. He currently resides in Baton Rouge and 
has over thirty years of experience as a safety and environmental professional in industry, 
consulting, and defense. 
 
